




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THE  
HISTORY  
*John* OF THE *Campbell*  
PROGRESS AND TERMINATION  
OF THE  
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

BY  
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CAN SOCIETY OF ANTIQUARIES AT CORTONA,  
AND OF THE ARCADIA AT ROME.

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THE  
HISTORY  
OF THE  
PROGRESS AND TERMINATION  
OF THE  
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

*John Campbell*

CHAP. XX.

*Cæsar takes possession of his Province.—Migration of the Helvetii.—Their Defeat.—War with Ariovistus.—Return of Cæsar for the Winter into Italy.—Great Concourse of Citizens to his Quarters.—Motion to recal Cicero.—Disorders that followed upon it.—Consultations of Pompey and Cæsar.—Augmentation of the Army in Gaul.—Second Campaign of Cæsar.—Operations on the Aisne.—On the Meuse and the Sambre.—Battle with the Nervii.—Successful Attempt for the Restoration of Cicero.—Controversy relating to his House.—Repeated Riots of Clodius.—Trial of Milo.*

**W**HILST the transaction which termina- CHAP.  
XX.  
ted in the exile of Cicero was still in its  
course, Cæsar, although, by assuming the milita-  
ry character, he had disqualified himself to take  
any part in civil affairs, had actually left the city  
and embodied his legions, yet he still remained  
in the suburbs of Rome to observe the issue of that  
VOL. III. A business,

CHAP. business, and to direct the conduct of his party.  
 XX. He thought himself too much interested in the event to leave it entirely under the direction of Pompey, with whom his own connection was recent or precarious, and might be of short duration. He was inclined to ruin, if he could not gain, a person who, by his talents and character, was of so much consequence to the parties who contended for power in the State. Having failed in the attempt which he made to gain him as a dependant on himself, or to carry him as a part of his own retinue into Gaul, he secretly promoted the designs of Clodius against him, and employed his own retainers and friends to co-operate with this furious Tribune, until he saw the purpose accomplished.

The provinces of which Cæsar had obtained the command, comprehended, as has been observed, under the denomination of the two Gauls, considerable territories on both sides of the Alps. The Cisalpine Gaul, which was joined to Italy, extended to Lucca, not far from Pisa on one side of the Apennines, and to the Rubicon, not far from Ariminum on the other. Beyond the Alps, the whole territory from the Mediterranean to the Rhine and the Meuse, was known by the name of Gaul. A part of this tract, which was bounded by the Rhône, the mountains of Auvergne, the Garonne, and the Pyrenees, was already a Roman province, including, together with Languedoc and Dauphiné, what, from its early subjection to the Romans, took the name, which it still retains, of Provence.

The remainder of the country was divided into

three



three principal parts, occupied by the Aquitani, CHAP.  
XX.  
the Celtes, and the Belgæ, nations differing in language, establishments, and customs. The first division extended from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; the second from the Garonne to the Seine; and the third from thence to the Meuse and the Scheld.

In each of these tracts there was a multiplicity of separate cantons or independent communities, of which Cæsar had occasion to enumerate no less than four hundred. Even the smallest of these communities, by his account, was broken into parties and factions, who had their respective objects, and were engaged in opposition and frequent contests. The People, in general, were held in a state of dependance by two separate orders of men, whose condition and character may account for the manifold divisions and animosities that took place in their country. One order was ecclesiastical, composed of the Druids, who, by their profession, had the keeping of such mysteries, and the performance of such rites, as were then in use; and, having over their fellow-citizens the claim to a hierarchy, had, among themselves, in the various pretensions to preferment and rank in their own order, continual subjects of competition, jealousy, and quarrels.

The other division was entirely military, formed under leaders whose principal distinction arose from the number of their armed adherents; and who, therefore, vied among themselves in the multitude of their retainers, or in the force of their parties<sup>1</sup>.

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The

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. vi. c. 10,—20.

CHAP.  
XX

The country, we learn, in general, was interspersed with what are called towns, and what were, in reality, safe retreats, or places of strength. It abounded in corn and cattle, the resources of a numerous people; armies were collected, and political assemblies were statedly, or occasionally, called: but how the people were accommodated, or in what degree they were supplied with the ordinary productions of mechanic or commercial arts, is no where described.

In these particulars, however, as they were probably less skilful than the Italians, so they surpassed the Germans, to whom they yielded in the reputation of valour; and they were now in reality on the eve of becoming a prey to the rapacity and ferocity of the one, or to the ambition, refined policy, and superior arts of the other.

Among parties, who were already so numerous, and likely to be divided indefinitely by family or personal jealousies, Cæsar was about to find the occasion which he undoubtedly sought for, of raising his reputation in war, of enriching himself and his dependants, and of forming an army inured to service, and attached to himself. While he was yet in Italy, he had intimation of a wonderful project formed by the Helvetii, natives of the tract which extends from the Jura to the Alps, and of the vallies which divide those mountains, to quit their own country in order to exchange it for a better settlement, in a less inclement region, on the lower and more fertile plains of Gaul.

They

## OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

They had taken, for this purpose, in every canton, an exact account of their own numbers, and mustered no less than three hundred and fifty-eight thousand souls, of whom ninety-two thousand were warriors, or men fit to bear arms. To put this multitude in motion, a great apparatus of provisions, of horses, and of carriages was necessary; and they allotted no less than two years for the preparations necessary to this undertaking. This time was now elapsed, and the swarm began to dislodge on the twenty-fifth of March of the year in which Cæsar was to take possession of his province. On receiving the alarm, he set out from Italy, and with hasty journies arrived at Geneva, where, to prevent surprise, he broke down the bridge of the Rhône, and took other measures to preclude the access of strangers to his province.

In the mean time the Helvetians sent a pacific message, desiring, that they might be allowed to pass the Rhône, and giving assurances that they would abstain from every sort of hostility on their march through the Roman province. Cæsar, in order to gain time, affected to take their request into consideration, promised to give them an answer by the middle of April; and in this manner amused them, while he assembled the legion, that was dispersed in different parts of the province, and ordered new levies to be made with the greatest dispatch. At the same time, he fortified the banks of the river, from the Lake of Geneva, to the narrow pass<sup>1</sup> at which the Rhône enters be-

<sup>1</sup> Fort l'Ecluse.



CHAP.  
XX.

tween the Jura and the Vuache, and from thence running under cliffs and steep mountains, renders the access from Helvetia to Gaul either impracticable or easily obstructed<sup>1</sup>.

Being thus prepared for his defence, he, on the return of the Helvetian deputies, gave them for answer,

<sup>1</sup> The track of Cæsar's lines at Geneva, like that of Hannibal's passage of the Alps, has occasioned some controversy among antiquaries. His own words in the Commentaries are,—“ A lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Juram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, millia passuum decem novem, marum, in altitudinem pedum sexdecem, fossamque perducit.” This line has been fancied by some, and even represented in maps and plans, as having one end on the lake, at or near Nyon; the other at the foot of Mount Jura, near the Dole. But in assuming this track, we must suppose Cæsar to have committed a great blunder in breaking down the bridge of Geneva in his own rear, by which he was to have communication with the province he was to defend, and from which he was to draw his supplies. We must also overlook every circumstance of the attack afterwards made upon this line, when the Helvetians, being refused a passage, came to force it, by fording the Rhône, or passing in boats and rafts, and trying to scale the banks where least inaccessible:—“ Helvetii, ea spe dejecti, navibus junctis, ratibusque compluribus factis; alii, vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, nonnunquam interdum, sæpius noctu, si perumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum concursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu desisterunt.” These circumstances necessarily place the line to be attacked on the very banks of the Rhône, opposite to where the Helvetians approached it; and as it was certainly unworthy of Cæsar to be fencing impassable rocks and precipices, the amount of his line was probably no more than some breast-works, cast up at places where the banks of the river, generally steep, were most accessible. And his words apply to this track no less than to any other: it actually measures from the point at which the Rhône issues from the lake of Geneva to the Jura, near L'Ecluse, about nineteen miles.

As Cæsar never lost sight of his interest in the city, nor ceased to consider how he was talked of there, it is probable that his Commentaries contain the very accounts that were sent to be propagated at Rome; and the better for his purpose, that they left every one to conceive this nineteen mile fence of sixteen feet high, as continued without interruption from end to end. But the present compiler trusts he will be approved in stating the fact, as it results from circumstances without ambiguity or the chance of mistake. Vid. Cæs. de Bell. Gall. lib. i. c. 8.



answer, That the Romans never allowed strangers to pass through their country; and that if any attempt were made on his province, he should repel it by force. Upon receiving this answer, the Helvetians, though too late, endeavoured to effect the passage of the Rhône, and made repeated attacks, either where the river was fordable, or where it admitted the use of rafts or of boats, but were repulsed in every attempt, and were at last obliged to turn to the right, where, by the consent of the Sequani, their neighbours in that part of the country, they passed over the Jura into Gaul.

Cæsar, probably not more alarmed for the safety of his province, than desirous to render it a scene of action, determined to observe the migrations of this enemy, and to seize the occasion they furnished him of forming his troops to service. For this purpose he himself, in person, repassed the Alps, and without any regard to the limitations of his commission, which restricted his military establishment to three legions, ordered additional levies, and with the forces he had assembled near Aquileia, returned to his northern province. In this march he met with opposition from the inhabitants of the mountains, who endeavoured to obstruct his way: but he had traversed the country of the Allobroges, and passed the Rhône above its confluence with the Soane<sup>1</sup>, when he had intelligence that the Helvetii, having cleared the passes of Jura, and marched through the country of the Sequani, were arrived on the Soane; and

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although

<sup>1</sup> Then the Arar.

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XX.

although they had hitherto, agreeably to their stipulations with the natives, abstained from hostilities, that they threatened the nations inhabiting beyond this river with fire and sword.

Upon application made to him for protection from the natives inhabiting between the Soane and the Loire, this willing auxiliary continued his march; and being informed, that of the Helvetii, who had moved in four divisions (this being the number of their cantons), the three first had already passed the Soane; and that the fourth division being to follow, yet remained on the nearer bank of the river, he marched in the night with three legions, surprised this rear division; and, having put many of them to the sword, forced the remainder to take refuge in the neighbouring woods.

As soon as the main body of Cæsar's army arrived on the Soane, he constructed a bridge, and passed that river in his way to the enemy. The Helvetians, sensible of their loss in the late action, and alarmed at the rapidity of his motions, he having executed in one day the passage of a river which had detained them above twenty days, sent a deputation to treat with the Roman Proconsul, and to obtain, if possible, his permission to execute their project of a new settlement on amicable terms. They offered, in case they were allowed to sit down in quiet, to leave the choice of the place to himself; bidding him remember, at the same time, that "the arms of the Helvetii had, "on former occasions, been felt by the Romans: "that the recent fate of a single canton taken by  
"surprise

“ surprise ought not to flatter him too much : that  
 “ the Helvetians had learned from their fathers to  
 “ rely more on valour than on negotiation or arti-  
 “ fice ; but that they did not wish to have their pre-  
 “ sent migration signalized with any massacres, nor  
 “ their new settlement stained with Roman blood.”

To this message, Cæsar replied, “ That he could  
 “ recollect to have heard of insults which had been  
 “ offered to the Romans by their nation, and to  
 “ which they now probably alluded : that he like-  
 “ wise had more recent provocations which he  
 “ knew how to resent : nevertheless, if they meant  
 “ to comply with his demand, to repair the inju-  
 “ ries they had done to the Allobroges<sup>1</sup> and to the  
 “ Edui<sup>2</sup>, and to give hostages for their future beha-  
 “ viour, that he was willing to grant them peace.”

Upon this reply the Helvetian deputies with-  
 drew, saying, That it was the practice of their  
 countrymen to receive, not to give hostages ; and  
 both armies moved on the following day : the Hel-  
 vetians, in search of some quarter where they  
 might settle without interruption ; and Cæsar, to  
 observe their motions, and to restrain them from  
 plundering the country of his allies. Both con-  
 tinued on the same route during fifteen days, with  
 no more than an interval of five or six miles between  
 the front of the one army and the rear of the other.

On this march Cæsar's cavalry, having rashly en-  
 gaged themselves on unfavourable ground, receiv-  
 ed a check ; and he himself, being obliged to fol-  
 low

<sup>1</sup> Inhabitants of what is now the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy

<sup>2</sup> Occupying the country between the Soane and the Loire.



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XX.

low the course of the Soane, by which he received his provisions, was likely to lose sight of the enemy, when he had intelligence, that they had taken post at the foot of a hill, about eight miles in his front, and seemed to have formed a resolution to receive him, in that position, if he should choose to attack them. Having examined the ground on which they were posted, and observing, that the height in their rear was not by nature inaccessible, nor sufficiently secured against him, he dispatched Labienus in the night at the head of two legions, with orders to possess himself of the eminence, and to fall down from thence on the enemy's rear whenever he saw them attacked by himself in front. Labienus accordingly got possession of the hill, while Cæsar continued his march on the plain, to occupy the attention of the enemy, and to attack them in front. But the purpose of this disposition was frustrated by the misinformation of an officer of horse, who, being advanced before the army, reported, that the enemy still appeared on the height, and that Labienus probably had failed in his attempt to seize it. Cæsar, disconcerted by this information, made a halt, in which he lost so much time as to give the enemy an opportunity to decamp, and to retire in safety. He nevertheless continued his pursuit for one day longer, and at night encamped about three miles in their rear. But being obliged, on the following day, to alter his route in order to receive a supply of provisions, the enemy believed that he was retreating, and began to pursue in their turn. He halted on a rising

rising ground to receive them, placed the new levies with his baggage on the heights, and the choice of his army on the declivity towards the plain. Here the enemy advancing to attack him, after an obstinate engagement which lasted from one in the afternoon till night, were defeated with the slaughter of about two hundred thousand of their people; and the remainder, amounting to no more than one hundred and thirty thousand souls, reduced to despair by the sense of their losses, and the want of subsistence, surrendered at discretion. Cæsar ordered them back into their own country, charging the Allobroges to find them subsistence, until they should be able to provide for themselves. The Boii however, a part of this unfortunate migration, were received by the Edui, who, to gain this accession of people, allotted part of their own lands to accommodate these strangers<sup>1</sup>.

At the end of this first operation of Cæsar, while great part of the summer yet remained, another service on which to employ his army soon presented itself. The nations who inhabited the banks of the Soane and the Loire, being sensible of the deliverance they had received from a storm, which, by the uncertainty of its direction, alarmed every quarter of Gaul, sent deputies to congratulate the Roman general on his late victory, and to propose that they might hold, under his protection, a general convention of all their states. The object of their meeting, as it soon after appeared, was to obtain some relief from the common oppression they

<sup>1</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Gall. lib. i. c. 28, 29.

CHAP. they underwent from the tyranny of Ariovistus,  
 XX. a German Chief, who, when the Gauls were at war among themselves, had been invited as an auxiliary to one of the parties, and had obtained the victory for his allies; but took for the reward of his services possession of one-third of their territory, which he bestowed on his own people, and assumed for himself the sovereignty of the whole. His force was daily augmented by the continual arrival of more emigrants from Germany; so that, from fifteen thousand men, with whom this Chief had at first arrived from Gaul, his followers had multiplied to an hundred and twenty thousand. To accommodate this numerous people, he had recently made a demand of another third of the territory of the Sequani, and was extending his possessions from the neighbourhood of the Rhine to the Soane. Most of the nations on this tract had been obliged to submit to exactions made by these strangers, and to give hostages for the regular payment of their contributions.

The unfortunate nations, who, by trusting to the protection of a barbarous prince, had exposed themselves to this calamity, now applied for relief to another power, whose pretensions in the end were likely to be equally dangerous to their freedom. Sensible of the hazard to which they exposed their hostages by entering into any open concert against the Germans, they made their application to Cæsar in secret, and found him sufficiently willing to embrace every opportunity of rendering his province a theatre of action to his army,



army, and of renown to himself. He sent without delay a message to Ariovistus, desiring to have a conference with him on affairs that concerned the general interests of Gaul. This haughty chieftain replied with disdain, "That if the Roman general meant to have an interview with him, his place of residence was known; that he neither could trust himself in the quarters of Cæsar, without a proper escort, nor would he subject himself to the expence of assembling an army, merely for the satisfaction of a conference with him."

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Cæsar renewed the message with an express requisition that the hostages of the Edui should be restored; that Ariovistus should abstain from hostilities against this People, or against any other ally of the Romans; and that he should not suffer any more of his countrymen to pass the Rhine.

To this message Ariovistus replied, That he had conquered the possessions which he held in Gaul, and that he knew of no power who had a right to direct him in the use of his conquests; that whoever attacked him should do so at his peril; and that Cæsar, if he thought proper, might try the spirit of his people; they were ready to receive him, and had not for fourteen years slept under any roof.

Cæsar, not to seem backward in accepting this challenge, and in compliance with a maxim which he often observed with success, *That his blows should anticipate his threats, and outrun the expectations of his enemy*, advanced upon the Germans before they could think him in condition to act against them.

For

CHAP.  
XX.

For this purpose, without communicating his design to any person of his own army, he repassed the Soane, and ascended by the course of the Douze to Vefontio, now Befançon, a place of strength, which he understood Ariovistus meant to seize, and employ as the principal resort of his forces.

Here, for the first time, his intention of making war on the Germans began to be suspected in his own army; and the legions, taking their account of the strength and ferocity of that enemy from the report of the Gaulish auxiliaries, were greatly alarmed. Many citizens of distinction who had crowded to the standard of Cæsar, as to a place of victory and honour, now, under various pretences, applied for leave to retire. Their example spread a kind of panic in the army, and both officers and men muttered their resolution not to obey, if they should be ordered upon what they were pleased to consider as a service so unreasonable and wild.

Cæsar, being thus called upon to exert that undaunted courage and masterly eloquence by which he was distinguished on many occasions, assembled all the officers of his army, and reprimanded them for attempting to penetrate the designs of their general, or for pretending to question the propriety of his motions. The matter in dispute with Ariovistus, he said, might be terminated in an amicable manner. This chieftain had very lately made advances of friendship to the Romans, had been favourably received, and there was no reason to believe that he would now wantonly provoke their resentment.



resentment. “ But if he should, of whom are you  
“ afraid? Of a wretched remnant of the Cimbri  
“ or Teutones, already vanquished by Marius?  
“ Of a people confessedly inferior to the Helve-  
“ tians, whom you have subdued? But some of  
“ you, I am told, in order to disguise your own  
“ fears under the affectation of wisdom, talk of  
“ difficulties in the ways by which you are to  
“ pass, and of the want of provisions which you  
“ are likely to suffer. I am not now to learn from  
“ such persons what I owe to my trust, nor to  
“ be told that an army must be supplied with  
“ provisions. But our allies are ready to supply  
“ us in greater quantities than we can consume,  
“ and the very country we are to pass is covered  
“ with ripe corn. As for the roads, you shall  
“ speedily see and judge of them. I am little af-  
“ fected with what I hear of a design to abandon  
“ me in case I persist in this expedition. Such in-  
“ sults, I know, have been offered to commanders,  
“ who, by their avarice or by their miscarriages,  
“ had forfeited the regard or the confidence of their  
“ troops; what will happen to me a little time  
“ will discover. I meant to have made a longer  
“ halt at this place, but shall not defer giving you  
“ an opportunity to show, whether regard to your  
“ duty, or the fear of a supposed enemy, is to have  
“ the greatest effect on your minds. I mean to-  
“ morrow, at two in the morning, to decamp, and  
“ shall proceed, if no other part of the army should  
“ follow me, with the tenth legion alone.”

This speech had a very sudden effect. The  
tenth legion, having been formerly distinguished  
by

CHAP. by their general, felt this expression of confidence  
XX.

as an additional motive to deserve it, and sent a deputation of their officers to return their thanks. The whole army soon vied in excuses for their late misbehaviour, and in assurances of their resolution to support their general in any service on which he might be pleased to employ them. He accordingly decamped at the hour appointed; and making a circuit of forty miles, to avoid some difficulties which lay on the direct road, after a continual march of seven days, in which he was conducted by Divitiacus, a native of Gaul, he arrived within twenty-four miles of the German quarters.

Upon this unexpected arrival, Ariovistus, in his turn, thought proper to desire a conference with Cæsar. He proposed that they should meet on horseback, and be attended only by cavalry. In this part of his army, which was composed chiefly of Gaulish horse, Cæsar was weak. But, not to decline the proposal that was made to him, he mounted his supposed favourite legion on the horses of the Gauls, and with this escort came to the place appointed for the conference.

It was an eminence in the midst of a spacious plain, about half-way between the two armies. The leaders, each attended by ten of his officers, met at the top of the hill. Their escorts drew up on each side at the distance of two hundred yards. Cæsar began the conference, by reminding Ariovistus of the honours recently bestowed upon him by the Roman Senate, who ordered him the usual presents, and gave him the title of King. "The

"Edui,"

“Edui,” he said, “were the allies of Rome; CHAP.  
 “they had formed this connection in the height XX.  
 “of their prosperity, and when they were sup-  
 “posed to be at the head of the Gaulish nations;  
 “that it was not the custom of Romans to let  
 “nations suffer by their alliance, but to render  
 “it in every instance, to the party who embraced  
 “it, a source of prosperity and honour. He there-  
 “fore renewed his former requisition, that Ario-  
 “vistus should not make war on the Edui, or on  
 “any nation in alliance with the Roman People;  
 “that he should remit the tribute he had imposed  
 “upon them, and release their hostages; and, if  
 “he could not send back into their own country  
 “such of the Germans as were already on this side  
 “of the Rhine, that he should at least prevent the  
 “arrival of any more from that quarter.”

In answer to these propositions, Ariovistus re-  
 plied, That he had been invited into Gaul by the  
 natives of this country; that he had done them  
 services, and had exacted no more than a just re-  
 tribution; that, in the late quarrel betwixt them  
 and himself, the Gauls had been the aggressors, and  
 had suffered no more than the usual effects of de-  
 feat; that, to indemnify him for his losses, they  
 had subjected themselves to a tax, and had given  
 hostages for the regular payment of it. “Am not I  
 “too,” he said, “by your own account, in alliance  
 “with the Romans? Why should that alliance,  
 “which is a safeguard and an honour to every one  
 “else, be a loss and a misfortune to me? Must I



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“alone, to preserve this alliance, resign the advantage of treaties, and remit the payments that are due to me? No; let me rather be considered as an enemy than as an ally upon these conditions. My countrymen have passed the Rhine, not to oppress the Gauls, but to defend their own leader. If strangers are to be admitted here the Germans, as the first occupiers, have a right prior to that of the Romans. But we have each of us our province. What do the armies of Rome on my territory? I disturb no possession of yours. Must I account to you likewise for the use which I make of my own?”

To this pointed reply Ariovistus subjoined a reflection, which showed that he was not unacquainted with the state of parties at Rome. “I know,” he said, “that the Romans are not interested in this quarrel, and that, by cutting you off, I should perform an acceptable service to many of your countrymen. But I shall take no part in your internal divisions. Leave me; make war where you please; I shall not interpose in any matter which does not concern myself.”

Cæsar continued to plead the engagements which the Romans had contracted with many of the nations who now claimed their protection. “If conquest could give any right to possession,” he said, “we are the first conquerors. We have long since subdued the Arverni; but it is not our practice to enslave every nation we vanquish, much less to forsake those we have once patronized.”

“ized.” While he yet spoke the German horse had advanced, and even began to throw darts, which made it expedient for Cæsar to break up the conference. He accordingly withdrew, giving strict orders to his people not to return the insults of the enemy.

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In a few days after this conference, the German chief proposed another personal interview, or, if that were declined, desired that some person of confidence should be sent with whom he might treat. Being gratified in the second part of this alternative, but intending no more by the request than a mere feint to lull his antagonist into some degree of security, he pretended to take offence at the quality of the persons who were sent to him, ordered them into custody, and on the same day put his army in motion upon a real design, which showed that, barbarian as he was, he understood the plan, as well as the execution, of military operations. Observing the quarter from which the Romans derived their subsistence, he made a movement, by which he passed their camp, took a strong post about eleven miles in their rear, and by this means intercepted their ordinary supply of provisions.

Cæsar for many days successively endeavoured, by forming on the plain between the two armies, to provoke the enemy to a battle; but having failed in this purpose, was obliged to divide his army, and to place it in separate posts, which he fortified, in order to recover a communication with

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the country behind him. It was reported, that the Germans, although they had borne with great impatience the defiance which Cæsar had given, were restrained from fighting by the predictions of their women, who foretold that their own people would be defeated, if they should hazard a general action before the change of the moon; but while they waited for this period, their warriors, notwithstanding the awe in which they stood of predictions, endeavoured to dislodge one of the divisions of Cæsar's army, and, having failed in that attempt, were afterwards attacked by the Romans in their camp, and defeated with great slaughter. Ariovistus himself, with the remains of his followers, fled to the Rhine, about fifty miles from the field of battle, passed that river in a small boat; while numbers of his people perished in attempting to follow him, and the greater part of those who remained were overtaken, and put to the sword by the cavalry, which pressed in their rear.

In this manner Cæsar concluded his first campaign in Gaul. And laid the foundation of farther progress in that country, by stating himself as the protector of its native inhabitants against the Helvetii and the Germans, two powerful invaders who were likely to subdue them. He placed his army for the winter among the nations whom he had thus taken under his protection, and set out for Italy, under pretence of attending to the affairs of his province on that side of the Alps; but more probably to be near the city, where he had many political interests at stake, friends to support, and enemies



enemies to oppose, in their canvas for the offices of State. His head quarters were fixed at Lucca, the nearest part of his province to Rome; and that place began to be frequented by numbers who were already of his party, or who desired to be admitted into it, and with whom he had previously made his own terms in stipulating the returns they were to make for the several preferments in which he undertook to assist them.

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At the election of Consuls for this year, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was joined with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, of whom the latter had, in the capacity of Tribune, distinguished himself as an instrument of the most dangerous factions. Lentulus had lately attached himself entirely to Pompey, and, by the influence of this patron, probably now prevailed in his election. He had been Edile in the Consulate of Cicero, and had taken a vigorous part in those very measures for which Cicero was now suffering in exile<sup>1</sup>. He was likely to favour the restoration of that injured citizen, and upon this account was now the more acceptable to Pompey, who, having an open rupture with Clodius, was disposed to mortify him by espousing the cause of his enemy.

Clodius, soon after his late victory over Cicero, greatly rose in his presumption, and, forgetting that he had prevailed more by the connivance of Pompey and Cæsar, and by the support of their friends, than by any influence of his own, ventu-

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red

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 22.

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red to set Pompey himself at defiance, to question the validity of his acts in the late settlement of Asia, to set the younger Tigranes, still the prisoner of Pompey, at liberty, and proposed to restore him again to his kingdom. During the debates which arose on these measures in the assembly of the People, Pompey had the mortification to find that the sarcasms of Clodius were received by the audience in general with applause, as well as by the partizans of the Senate, in particular, with marks of great satisfaction. Chiefly governed by vanity and impatient of obloquy, he absented himself from the assemblies in which he received these insults, so long as Clodius remained in office, and was ready to embrace every measure by which he might be revenged of that factious Tribune, or regain his own credit with the more respectable class of the citizens<sup>1</sup>.

The majority of the Senate, who justly considered as their own the cause of a magistrature, under whose auspices they themselves had acted, now encouraged by this division among their enemies, had ventured on the twenty-ninth of October, while Clodius was yet in office, to move for the recal of Cicero. Eight of the Tribunes concurred in urging this measure, and it was rejected only in consequence of the negative of Ælius Ligur, one of the college whom Clodius had prepared to act this part, and whom he was ready to support with a party

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Afcon. Padian. in Orat. pro Milone.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Cicer. p. 475. & 476.



party in arms, if the opponents should persist in their motion <sup>1</sup>.

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Upon the election of the new Consuls and Tribunes for the following year, better hopes of success were entertained by the friends of the exile. Lentulus declared that the restoration of Cicero should be the first object of his administration; and that he should not fail to move it on the day that he entered on office. Metellus too, the brother-in-law of Clodius, though always inclined to favour the popular faction, could not in this matter set himself in opposition to Pompey, whom he had hitherto followed in all his designs; and declared his intention to concur with the Consul <sup>2</sup>.

At the same time, Milo, Sextius, and six more of the Tribunes, with all the Prætors except Appius Claudius, the brother of Publius, declared their intention to take an active part in forwarding this measure.

Encouraged by these appearances, Cicero left his retreat at Theſſalonica, and arrived at Dirrachium, before the twenty-fifth of November, to be at hand to consult with his friends on the steps that were to be previously taken. Meanwhile the Consuls-elect had their provinces assigned. Lentulus was destined to command in Cilicia and Cyprus; and Metellus in the farther province of Spain. Both were amply gratified in every article of their appointments, in order to confirm them in the interest of the Senate: but Cicero expressed great anxiety.

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<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. ep. 24.

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U. C. 696.  
P. Corn.  
Lentulus  
Spinther, Q.  
Cæcil. Me-  
tell. Nepos.

anxiety lest these concessions should be found premature ; and, being made before the new Tribunes entered on office, or could have their voice in these destinations, was afraid lest it might alienate their affections from his party, and render them less zealous to move for his recall. The Consul Lentulus, notwithstanding, kept his word ; and, on the first of January, the day of his entering on office, moved the Senate to resolve that Cicero should be immediately recalled from banishment ; that all persons opposing his return should be declared enemies to their country ; and that if the People should be disturbed by violence in passing this decree, it should, nevertheless, be lawful for the exile to avail himself of it.

This motion was received in the Senate with general applause. Eight of the Tribunes were zealous in support of it. On the contrary, two members of the college, Numerius and Serranus, were gained by Clodius to oppose it. Serranus, at the first meeting of the Senate on this business, could venture no farther than to plead for a delay. He was prevailed upon, however, during the intervening night, to interpose his negative in form, and the motion accordingly, could proceed no farther in the Senate.

It was resolved, notwithstanding, to propose a law to the People for Cicero's restoration ; and a day was fixed for this purpose. Early in the morning of that day, Fabricius, one of the Tribunes in  
the

the interest of the exile, endeavoured to occupy CHAP.  
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the place of assembly with an armed force, but found that Clodius, with a numerous troop of gladiators, was there before him. A conflict ensued, in which Fabricius, together with Cispus, another of the Tribunes who came to his assistance, with all the party of the Senate, were driven from the Forum.

Clodius, at the head of his gladiators, with swords already stained in blood, pursued his victory through the streets. The temple of the Nymphs, in which were kept some public records which he wished to destroy, was set on fire<sup>1</sup>; the houses of Milo and Cæcilius the Prætor were attacked. “The streets, the common sewers, the “river,” says Cicero, “were filled with dead “bodies, and all the pavements were stained with “blood.” No such scene had been acted since the times of Octavius and Cinna, when armies fought in the city for the dominion of Rome<sup>2</sup>.

Quintus Cicero escaped by hiding himself under the dead bodies of his own servants, who were slain in defending his house. The Tribune Publius Sextius actually fell into the hands of his enemies, received many wounds, and was left for dead among the slain. This circumstance, however, alarmed the party of Clodius not less than it alarmed his opponents. The odium of having murdered, or even violated the person of a Tribune,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero pro Milone, 27 Parad. 4 d. Haruspicum Responso 27.

<sup>2</sup> Orat. pro Sext. c. 35, 36. 38.



CHAP. bunc, was likely to ruin their interest with the  
 XX. People; and they proposed, to balance this outrage by putting to death Numerius, another Tribune, who, being of their own side, should appear to be killed by the opposite party; but the intended victim of this ridiculous and sanguinary artifice, receiving information of their design, avoided being made the tool of a faction at the expence of his life, and made his escape<sup>1</sup>.

After so strange a disorder, parties for some months, mutually afraid of each other, abstained from violence. The Tribune Milo commenced a prosecution against Clodius for his crimes; but it was for some time eluded by the authority of Appius Claudius<sup>2</sup>, brother of the accused, who was now in the office of Prætor; and the forms of trial, when actually begun, were repeatedly interrupted by the armed party of gladiators, with which Publius Clodius himself infested every place of public resort. It was vain to oppose him without being prepared to employ a similar force, and Milo accordingly had recourse to this method. He purchased a troop of gladiators, and of Bestiarii, or persons trained to the baiting of wild beasts, the remainder of a band which had been employed for public entertainment by the Ediles Pomponius and Cosconius, and which was now in the market for sale. He ordered the bargain to be secretly struck, concealing the name of the buyer, lest the opposite party,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero pro Sextio.

<sup>2</sup> The family name of these brothers is differently spelt by Cicero and others, probably from the affectation of Publius to refine on the orthography of his name.

party, suspecting the design, should interpose to prevent him. CHAP.  
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So provided, Milo ventured to encounter with Clodius. Their parties frequently engaged in the streets, and the populace, fond of such shews, enjoyed the spectacle which was thus freely presented to them in every corner of the city.

While the disorders which arose from the disputes relating to Cicero's restoration were daily augmenting, he himself fell from the height of his hopes to his former pitch of dejection and sorrow. The attempt which had been made in his favour might have succeeded, if Pompey had been fully prepared to concur in it. But all the measures of the Triumvirate being concerted at the quarters of Cæsar, Pompey was obliged, after declaring his own inclinations on the subject, to consult his associate, and found him by no means inclined to restore a citizen who was likely to be of so much consequence, and who was to owe the favour of his restoration to any other than himself. The Tribune Sextius, before the late violent convulsions, had made a journey into Gaul, to solicit the assent of Cæsar to this measure, but could not prevail; and it is probable that this artful politician was unwilling to restore an exile who was likely to ascribe the principal merit of that service to Pompey, and who, by his own inclinations in favour of the Senate, was to become an accession to a party which Cæsar wished to degrade and to weaken by every

1 Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 2.



CHAP. every means in his power. It was to strengthen  
 XX. himself against the Senate that Cæsar made his  
 coalition with Pompey and Crassus; and from animosity to this body, he wished to crush every person of consequence to their party, and to favour the pretensions of any turbulent citizen who ventured to act in open defiance of their government.

Pompey, in the mean time, though committing himself as a tool into the hands of Cæsar, was flattered with the appearance of sovereignty which he enjoyed in the city, and willingly supported his rival in every measure that seemed to fix his attention abroad, blindly consented to the repeated augmentations of the army in Gaul, and approved of every enterprize in which their leader was pleased to employ them.

In this year, which was the second of Cæsar's command, two more additional legions were by his orders levied in Italy; and, under pretence of an approaching war with the Belgæ, a nation consisting of many cantons in the northern extremities of Gaul, this reinforcement was made to pass the Alps to the northward in the spring. As soon as the forage was up, Cæsar himself followed in person took the field, and, in the usual spirit of his conduct, endeavoured, by the rapidity of his motions to frustrate or to prevent the designs of his enemies.

The army of Gaul now consisted of eight Roman legions, besides numerous bodies of horse and foot  
 from

from different parts of the provinces, archers from CHAP. XX. Crete and Numidia, and slingers from the Balearian islands; so that it is likely the whole may have amounted to about sixty thousand men. The greater part of this army had wintered on the Soane<sup>1</sup> and the Doufe<sup>2</sup>, as protectors, not as masters, of the country, being received only in the character of allies.

Cæsar being attended by many of the natives, as auxiliaries or as hostages, and having spent twelve days in preparing for his march, took his route to the northward, under pretence of carrying the war into the enemy's country, or of preventing them from gaining, in accession to their supposed confederacy against the Romans, any of the nations in the southern parts of Gaul. His passage lay through the high, though level, countries, now termed Burgundy and Champagne, in which the Soane, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Seine, with so many other considerable rivers, that run in different directions, have their source. After a march of fifteen days, he arrived in the Canton of the Remi<sup>3</sup>, where he found a people, though of the Belgic extraction, disposed to receive him as a friend, and to place themselves under his protection.

From this people he had a confirmation of his former intelligence relating to the designs of the Belgic nations, and an account of the forces which they

<sup>1</sup> Anciently named the Arar.

<sup>2</sup> The Dubis.

<sup>3</sup> Now the district of Rheims.

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they had already assembled. From the tract of country that is watered by the rivers, which are now called the Oyse, the Scheld and the Meuse, he understood that no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men could be mustered, and were actually assembled, or preparing to assemble, against him. To prevent the junction of this formidable power, or to distract part of its force, he detached his Gaulish auxiliaries to make a diversion on the Oyse, while he himself advanced to the Aisne, passed this river, and fortified a station on its northern bank. Having a bridge in his rear, he left six cohorts properly intrenched in its neighbourhood, to secure his communication with the country behind him.

While he remained in this position, the Belgæ advanced with a great army, attacked Bibrax, a place of strength about eight miles in his front; and having spent many hours in endeavouring to reduce it, were about to renew their assault on the following day; when Cæsar having in the night thrown into the garrison a considerable reinforcement of archers and slingers, the appearance of this additional strength on the battlements, induced the enemy to refrain their attack.

They nevertheless continued to advance, laid waste the country, and came within two miles of the Roman camp. They had a front, as appeared from their fires, extending about eight miles.

Cæsar, considering the numbers and reputation of this enemy, thought proper to proceed with caution. He observed them for some days from his



his intrenchments, and made several trials of their skill in partial encounters, before he ventured to offer them battle. But being encouraged by the event of these trials, he chose a piece of sloping ground, which extending in front before his camp, was fit to receive his army. As the enemies line was likely far to exceed him in length, he threw up intrenchments on the right and left to cover his flanks; and with this precaution, to prevent his being furrounded, drew forth his army to battle. The Belgæ too were formed on their part; but the ground between the two armies being marshy, neither thought proper to pass that impediment in presence of the other; and after a few skirmishes of the horse and irregular troops, the Romans re-entered their camp. The enemy, upon this event, disappointed in their expectations of a battle, took their way to the fords of the Aisne<sup>1</sup>, in order to pass the river, and get possession of the bridge in the rear of the Romans. Cæsar had intelligence of this movement from the officer who was stationed to guard that post; and marching instantly with all the cavalry, archers, and slingers of his camp, arrived in time to overtake them, while yet entangled in the fords, and obliged them to retire.

The Belgæ, having made these successive attempts with more impetuosity than foresight or conduct, soon appeared to be ill qualified to maintain a permanent war with such an enemy.

They

<sup>1</sup> Axona.

CHAP. They were disheartened by their disappointments,  
 XX. and alarmed by the rumour of a diversion which

Cæsar had caused to be made in a part of their own country. They had exhausted their provisions, and found themselves under a necessity to break up their camp. It was therefore resolved in their general council, that their forces, for the present, should separate; and that if any of their cantons should be afterwards attacked by Cæsar, the whole should assemble again for their common defence.

With this resolution they decamped in the night, but with so much noise and tumult, that Cæsar suspected a feint, or an intention to draw him into a snare. He therefore remained in his lines till the morning, when it appeared that they were actually gone, and were seen at a distance on the plain moving without any regard to order, and as in a total rout, striving who should soonest get beyond the reach of their enemies. He pursued them with his cavalry so long as it was day, and, though with great bravery resisted in his attacks on their rear, made considerable havock. At the approach of night he discontinued the pursuit, and withdrew again to the camp he left in the morning. On the following day he moved with his whole army, and, that the enemy might not have time to re-assemble their forces, determined to penetrate into the heart of their country. In the beginning of his march he followed the course of the Aisne, and in his way reduced the Sueffones and



and Bellovaci, two cantons which lay on the right and the left, near the confluence of this river with the Oyse. From thence, being himself to march to the northward, to visit the banks of the Sambre and the Meuse, he detached the young Crassus, with a considerable force, towards the sea-coasts, to occupy those cantons which now form the provinces of Normandy and Brittany.

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Part of the country through which the Meuse and the Sambre passed, now forming the dutchy of Hainault, was then occupied by the Nervii, one of the fiercest of the Belgic nations, who, having heard with indignation of the surrender of the Bellovaci and Sueffones, their neighbours, prepared for resistance, sent such of their people as, by their sex or age, were unfit to carry arms into a place of security, assembled all their warriors, and summoned their allies to a place of general resort. They took post on the Sambre, where the banks on both sides of the river being covered with wood, enabled them to conceal their numbers and their dispositions. They had intelligence that Cæsar, except in presence of an enemy, usually moved his legions with intervals between them, which were occupied by their baggage; and they made a disposition to surprise him on the march, and under this disadvantage. For this purpose they chose their ground on the Sambre, and agreed that the van of the Roman army should be suffered to pass unmolested, but that the appearance of the first column of baggage should be the signal

CHAP. for a general attack to be made at once from all  
 XX. the different stations in which their parties were posted.

Cæsar, in the mean time, about three days after he had marched from Samarobriva, now supposed to be Amiens, being apprised that he was come within ten miles of the river, on the banks of which the enemy was posted, altered the form of his march, placed six legions, clear of incumbrance, in the van of his army, next to these the whole of his baggage, and in the rear the two legions recently embodied in Italy. When he entered the open grounds on the Sambre, a few parties of horse appeared, but were soon driven into the woods by his cavalry. The legions that came first to their ground began, as usual, to intrench and received no disturbance till the column of baggage came in sight. At this signal multitudes of the enemy presented themselves on every side, drove in the cavalry that were posted to cover the working parties, and in many places were close in with the main body of the army before the infantry had time to uncover their shields, or to put on their helmets. The Roman soldier, nevertheless, ran to his colours, and, without waiting for the orders of his general, from whose abilities, on this occasion, he could derive no advantage, endeavoured to join his companions in the order to which they were accustomed.

The first events of this tumultuary action were various in different places. The Nervii, in one part

part of the field, forced the imperfect works of the Roman camp ; but in another part of it were themselves forced from their ground, and driven in great numbers into the river. Some of the Roman legions were broken, lost the greater part of their officers, and when Cæsar arrived to rally them, were huddled together in confusion. He himself was reduced to act the part of a legionary foldier, with a shield which he took from one of his men, he joined in the battle, and in this manner, by his presence or by his example, kept the enemy at bay, until he was relieved by the arrival of two legions of the rear-guard, and of two others, that were sent by Labienus to support him.

This seasonable relief, where the Romans were most distressed, changed the fortune of the day ; and the confusion, which in the beginning of the action had by the Nervii been turned to so good account against their enemy, now became fatal to themselves. The greater part of them fell in heaps on the ground where they first began the attack. The few who attempted to fly were met at every opening of the woods by parties of the Romans, by whom they were forced into the thickets, or put to the sword ; and as they fell in the end with little resistance, many became a prey even to the followers of the legions, who put themselves in arms, and bore a part in the massacre. Of four hundred chiefs only three escaped ; and of an army of sixty thousand men, no more than five hundred left the field of battle. The pitcous remains

CHAP. of this nation, consisting of superannuated men, of  
 XX. women, and of children, sent, from the marshes in which they had been concealed, a message to implore the victor's mercy; and he, with a mildness, uncommon in this or any ancient war, took them under his protection, and restored them to their usual place of abode: Laying at the same time an injunction on their neighbours not to molest them. In this, he studied the reputation of clemency to the vanquished, as in battle he maintained the superiority of force and valour.

- Another enemy yet remained in the field. The Attuatici, descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the late terrors of Gaul, of Spain, and of Italy, being settled below the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, had been on their march to join the Nervii, when they heard of this unfortunate action; and then withdrew to their own country. Being pursued by Cæsar, they shut themselves up in their principal fortress. Here they made a voluntary submission; and being commanded to lay down their arms, threw such a quantity of weapons from the battlements, as almost filled up the ditch to the height of the ramparts. But Cæsar, having delayed taking possession of the place till the following day, the besieged, whether they only meant to deceive him, or repented of their surrender,

1 Ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordiâ videretur. De Bell. Gall. lib. ii. c. 28. The world was yet to learn how odious, and in the end, how calamitous for both, it is for one nation to become subject to another; and Cæsar, intent to preserve as well as effect his conquests, took measures of mildness and clemency for the one, as he did those of prowess and valour for the other.



render, took arms again in the night, and in a CHAP.  
XX. fallily endeavoured to surprize the Roman army. In this desperate attempt, four thousand of them being killed, and the remainder being forced back into the town, were, in consequence of their former breach of faith, to the amount of fifty thousand persons, sold for slaves.

Thus Cæsar having, in the second year of his command, penetrated to the Meuse and the Scheld, being master of the eastern frontier of Gaul as far as the Rhine, and having even from beyond that river received some offers of submission; being master too of several Cantons in Normandy and Bretanny, which had submitted to the young Crassus, quartered his army for the winter in the midst of these conquests; and himself, as at the end of the former campaign, set out for Italy and the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here the principal point which he left in contest between the parties, relating to the restoration of Cicero, had been for some time determined. Clodius had found a proper antagonist in Milo, and, as often as he himself, or any of his party, appeared in the assemblies of the People, or in the streets, was every where attacked with weapons similar to his own, and in the view of these disorders. It was agreed among the citizens in general, that if the laws could not give protection to those who were most willing to be governed by them, they should not by their formalities screen the disorderly and profligate in the practice of every species of crime.



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Clodius had now for some months lain under an impeachment from Milo, and had declared himself candidate for the office of *Ædile*, endeavouring by violence, and by the artifices of his brother, to put off the trial till after the elections, when, if he should be vested with any public character, he might find a refuge under the privilege of his office. His own influence, however, and the fear which citizens entertained of his armed banditti, who were now in a great measure restrained by Milo, had abated so much, that the party of the Senate determined to make another vigorous effort for the recal of a member, whom the violence of this profligate had forced into exile.

This business was accordingly again brought forward; and about the beginning of June a decree was obtained in the fullest terms for the restoration of Cicero. The Consul was charged with the farther conduct of this measure, as of the utmost consequence to the public. This officer accordingly issued a proclamation, in terms employed only on the greatest occasions, requiring all who had the safety of the republic at heart to support him in the execution of this decree. There was, in consequence of this proclamation, a great concourse of orderly citizens from all parts of Italy. The enemies of the measure shrunk and withdrew their opposition. The act passed in the assembly of the People on the fourth of August. Cicero had been so confident of this event, that he on the same day sailed from Dyrrachium, and on the following arrived

rived at Brundisium. On the eighth day, being still at this place, he had notice of the act being passed, set out for Rome, continued his journey through multitudes of people, who were assembled on the roads to testify their joy upon his return, and entered the city on the fourth of September. CHAP.  
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Next day he addressed the Senate in a harangue, which is still extant, composed of lavish panegyric or vehement invective, corresponding to the demerit or merit of parties in his late disgrace and restoration. The multitudes that were assembled on this occasion, their impatience to see him, their acclamations and wonderful unanimity in his favour, raised him once more to his former pitch of glory, and appeared to repay all the services he had rendered to the public, and to compensate all the sorrows of his late disgrace. The whole matter may have been, to persons of reflection, an evidence of that weakness with which this ingenious man suffered himself to be affected by popular opinion, and of the levity with which multitudes, in the changes of fortune, run into opposite extremes.

During these transactions Cæsar was at a great distance, on the northern extremities of Gaul, engaged with fierce and numerous enemies, involved in difficulties, concerning which there were various reports, and of which the issue, with respect to himself and his army, was supposed to be doubtful. In these circumstances, however willing Pompey may have been to persevere in the

CHAP. measures concerted with Cæsar, it is probable that  
 XX. he found himself unable to resist the force of the Senate, which was now exerted to obtain the restoration of a person who had taken so distinguished a part in their measures.

It is possible likewise, that in these circumstances Pompey may have taken upon him to act independently of his associates; though he afterwards, in trying to gain Cicero to the party of the triumvirate, affected to give Cæsar equal merit with himself in procuring his recall; and he appealed to Quintus, the brother of Marcus Cicero, for the truth of this assertion. Cicero himself, however, was not disposed to give Cæsar any credit upon this account; and, though both Cæsar and Crassus, after the matter was decided, affected to concur in the measure, yet he does not seem to have believed them sincere. He imputes to Cæsar an active part in the injury he had received, but none in the reparation that was done to him.

Pompey, not the less jealous of Cæsar for their pretended union, and sensible of the advantage his rival had gained in having a military command of so long a duration at the gates of Rome, now wished to propose for himself some appointment of equal importance. The moment of cordiality in the Senate on their recovering a favourite member, and the first emotions of gratitude in the breast of Cicero himself, whom he had recently obliged,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiari lib. 2. ep. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Orat. in Senat. post Reditum, c. 15.



obliged, seemed to form a conjuncture favourable for such a proposition; and he laid, with his usual address and appearance of unconcern, the plan of a motion to be made for his purpose. CHAP.  
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The importation of corn into Italy had been lately interrupted, and a great scarcity and dearth had ensued. The populace being riotous upon this complaint, had in the theatre attacked with menaces and violence numbers of the wealthy citizens who were present, and even insulted the Senate itself in the Capitol. A report, industriously raised by the enemies of Cicero, was propagated, to make it be believed that the distress arose from his engrossing for so long a time the attention of government; and, in opposition to this surmise on the one hand, it was alleged on the other, that the late corn act of Clodius, and the misconduct of one of his relations, intrusted by him with the care of the public granaries, was the cause of all this distress. But whatever may have been the cause, it was insinuated by the adherents of Pompey, that no man was fit to relieve the People besides himself; that the business should be committed to him alone; and Cicero, in entering the Senate, was called upon by the multitude, as he passed, to make a motion to this purpose, as bound to procure some relief to the People, in return to their late cordiality in his cause.

Cicero had in reality owed his recal to the declarations of Pompey in his favour; and, however little reason he had on the whole to rely on his friendship,

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friendship, it was convenient for the present to appear on good terms with a person of so much influence. He suffered himself, therefore, to be carried by the stream that seemed to run in favour of this fashionable leader. As if the necessity of the case had suggested the measure, he moved the Senate that a commission, with proconsular power over all the provinces, should be granted to Pompey, to superintend the supplies of corn for the city. The Senate, either of themselves disposed to grant this request, or won by the eloquence of their newly recovered member, instructed the Consuls to frame a resolution to this purpose, and carry it to the assembly of the People for their assent.

Here C. Messius, one of the Tribunes, proposed to enlarge the trust, and to comprehend the superintendency of the revenue, with an allotment of fleets and armies suited to the extent of this unprecedented commission. Pompey, however, observing that this additional clause was ill received, denied his having any share in proposing it, and affected to prefer the appointment intended for him in terms of the act which had been proposed to be drawn up by the Consuls. His partizans, in the mean time, still pleaded, though in vain, for the extension of the commission as proposed by Messius. The extravagance of the proposal gave a general alarm to the Senate, and still more to the party of Cæsar, who were willing to employ Pompey as an agent in the city ;  
but



but not to arm him with a military force, or to give him in reality that sovereignty in the empire of which, by his residence in the Capital, he so much affected the appearance. CHAP.  
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The extraordinary commission, now actually granted to Pompey, although it was exorbitant in respect to the influence it gave him over all the producers, venders, buyers, and consumers of corn throughout the whole empire; yet, as it did not bestow the command of an army, fell short of the consequence which Cæsar principally dreaded in his rival; and though probably the cause of some jealousy betwixt them, did not produce any immediate breach.

Pompey, being entitled by this commission to appoint fifteen lieutenants, put Cicero at the head of the list; and this place was accepted of by him, on the express condition, that it should not prevent his standing for the office of Censor, in case an election took place on the following year<sup>1</sup>. He was now in the way of recovering his consideration and his dignity, but was likely to meet with more difficulty in respect to his property, which Clodius had taken care to have forfeited, having even demolished his house, and consecrated the ground on which it stood to pious uses. This last circumstance had placed a bar in his way, which could not be removed without a formal decree of the Pontiffs.

The college met on the last of September to hear parties in this cause. A violent invective  
having

<sup>1</sup> Cicero Orat. in Senat. post Redit. c. 13. ad Att.

CHAP. XX. having been pronounced by Clodius against his antagonist, Cicero replied in that oration, which is still extant among his works on the subject of his house. The question was, Whether the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, being formally consecrated, could be again restored to a profane or common use? The Pontiffs appear to have been unwilling to give any explicit decision. They gave a conditional judgment, declaring, that the consecration of Cicero's ground was void; unless it should be found that this act had been properly authorised by the People. Both parties interpreted this judgment in their own favour; and the Senate was to determine, whether, in the act of consecration, the consent of the People had or had not been properly obtained.

The Senate being met on the first of October, and all the parties who were members of it being present, Lucullus, in the name of the Pontiffs, his colleagues, reported, That they had been unanimous in their judgment to revoke the act of consecration, unless it should be found, that the magistrate, who had performed that ceremony, had been properly authorised by the People; but that this was a question of law now before the Senate. A debate ensued, in which Lentulus Marcellinus, Consul-elect for the following year, gave his opinion against the legality of the consecration: he was followed by numbers, and the judgment of the Senate was likely to be on that side. When Clodius,

dius, to put off the question, spoke for three hours, and would have prevented the Senate's coming to any resolution, if the members, becoming impatient, had not silenced him at last by their interruptions and clamours. A resolution being moved for in the terms that had been proposed by Marcellinus: the Tribune Serranus, who had formerly suspended the decree for the recal of Cicero, now again interposed with his negative. The Senate, nevertheless, proceeded to engross the decree, in which it was resolved, that the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, should be again restored to the owner in property; that no magistrate should presume to contest the authority of the Senate in this matter; and that if any interruption were given in the execution of this decree, the Tribune, who now interposed with his negative, should be accountable for the consequences. Serranus was alarmed. His relation, Cornicinus, to give him the appearance of greater importance, and an opportunity to recede with dignity, laid himself on the ground at his feet, and besought him, by his intreaties, to say, that he would not insist for the present on the negative he had given; but he begged the delay of a night to consider of the matter. The Senate, recollecting the use which he had formerly made of such a delay on the first of January, was disposed to refuse it, when, upon the interposition of Cicero himself, it was granted; and this Tribune having thought proper to withdraw his negative, the act accordingly



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ly passed on the second of October. Cicero was allowed two millions Roman money<sup>1</sup> to rebuild his house in town; five hundred thousand <sup>2</sup> to rebuild his villa at Tusculum, and two hundred and fifty thousand <sup>3</sup> to rebuild that at Formiæ. The first sum he seems to have considered as adequate to his loss, but complains of the other two <sup>4</sup>. He proceeded, without delay, to take possession of his ground, and to employ workmen in rebuilding his house. He had made some progress, when Clodius, on the third of November, came with an armed force, dispersed the workmen, and attacked the house of Quintus Cicero, the brother, that was adjoining, set it on fire, and kept a guard of his retainers in the streets till it was burnt to the ground.

By this act of violence, Clodius had rendered his cause, in the criminal prosecution which still hung over him, in a great measure desperate. His safety required the actual destruction of his enemies, and he had no scruple to restrain him from the most violent extremes. He accordingly attacked Cicero as he passed in the streets on the eleventh of November, attended by a company of his friends, forced them into a walled court, where they found means, with some difficulty, to defend themselves. Clodius, in this attack, had frequently exposed his own person, and might have been killed;

<sup>1</sup> About 16,145 l. 16 s. 8 d.

<sup>2</sup> About 4,036 l. 9 s.

<sup>3</sup> About 2,018 l. 4 s. 6 d.

<sup>4</sup> Ad Atticum, lib. iv. epist. 2.



killed ; but Cicero was now become too cautious for so bold a measure. "I have put my affairs," he writes to Atticus, "under a gentle regimen ; and, "in all the cures I am to apply for the future, "have renounced the use of the surgeon's knife."

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Clodius, upon this occasion, being disappointed of his design upon Cicero's life, came into the streets on the following day, which was the twelfth of November, with a number of slaves provided with lighted torches, and escorted by a party armed in form with shields and swords. They made directly for a house belonging to Milo, with intention to set it on fire ; took possession of that of P. Sylla, in its neighbourhood, as a fortress or place of arms from which to resist all attempts to extinguish the flames, and till the house they were about to destroy should be burnt to the ground.

While they were proceeding to execute this design, a number of Milo's servants, led by one Flaccus, sallied forth against the incendiaries, killed several of the most forward, put the rest to flight, and would not have spared Clodius himself, if he had not withdrawn to the cover, which, in forming this project, he had prepared for his party.

On the following day, Sylla made his appearance in the Senate, in order to exculpate himself of the ill use which had been made of his house ; but Clodius did not venture abroad. It appears scarcely credible, that a state could subsist under such extreme disorders ; yet the author of them had been long under prosecution for crimes of the same

CHAP. same nature ; and it was still a question, whether  
XX. the charge against him should be heard, or whether he should not be allowed to take refuge in some one of the offices of State, to which he was sure of being named by the People, provided the elections were allowed to precede his trial.

Marcellinus, the intended Consul of next year, moved the Senate to hasten the trial, and to join the late disorders committed by the criminal to the former articles of the charge which lay against him. But Metellus Nepos, one of the present Consuls, and the relation of Clodius, having formerly found a pretence for delay, still struggled, if possible, to repel the attack. And for this purpose endeavoured to prevent any immediate determination of the Senate, by prolonging the debate. But the majority of the members were greatly exasperated, and obtained a resolution, that the trial of Clodius for these repeated acts of violence and outrage should precede the elections. His friend the Consul Metellus, nevertheless, that he might have the chance of a refuge from this prosecution in the public office of Edile, to which he aspired, would have brought on the elections on the nineteenth of November, if he had not been prevented by Milo, who, in the middle of the preceding night, had, with an armed force, occupied the place of assembly, and was prepared to observe the heavens, and to announce some of the celestial presages of unfavourable events, in case other methods to suspend the elections should not have prevailed.

Metellus,

Metellus, with the two brothers, Appius the Prætor, and Publius Clodius, being apprised of this intention, and of the power with which it was supported, did not make their appearance in the field, and Milo kept his station till noon, when he withdrew with the general applause of the Senate, and of the more orderly citizens.

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The meeting, or assembly of the People, being adjourned to next day, Metellus, in order to lull the vigilance of Milo, assured him, that there was no occasion to occupy posts in the dead of the night; that he meant to do nothing before it was day; that if any one wished to suspend the election, he should, in the morning, be found in the market-place, and there submit to the forms which any one was legally entitled to plead against his proceeding. Milo, accordingly, at break of day, repaired to the market-place, where he expected to be joined by the Consul; but soon afterwards was told, that Metellus had deceived him, was hastening to the field of Mars, where the elections were commonly held, and would instantly begin to call the votes, when it would be too late to interpose even under the pretence of religion. Upon this information, Milo immediately pursued and overtook his antagonists before the election began; and, by declaring his intention to observe the heavens, once more frustrated the designs of the faction.

On the twenty-first, the People could not assemble by reason of the public market; and their

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U. C. 697.  
Cn. Corn.  
Lentulus  
Marcellinus,  
L. Marc.  
Philippus.

meeting being called for the twenty-third, Milo again took possession of the field with an armed force; and Cicero, who concludes a letter to Atticus with describing this state of affairs, made no doubt of Milo's success<sup>1</sup>. What passed on this day is not particularly mentioned; but it is known, that Clodius at last prevailed; that, being elected *Ædile*, he was, by the privilege of his office, screened from the prosecution that was intended against him; and being himself safe, did not fail, upon the expiration of Milo's *Tribunate*, to retort the charge upon his prosecutor; and accordingly brought him to trial on the second of February, for acts of violence or breach of the peace.

Pompey, as well as Cicero, appeared in defence of Milo; and they succeeded in having him acquitted, while they incurred a torrent of reproach and invective on the part of the prosecutor. The market-place was crowded with the partizans and retainers of Clodius, who had instructed them in replies to his interrogations, to direct all their abuse on Pompey. "Who starves the People for want of corn?" he asked. They answered, Pompey. Who wants to be sent to Alexandria? Answer, Pompey." This farce greatly disturbed the concerted dignity of this politician. As his principal object was consideration, he could not endure contempt. He was on bad terms with the Senate; and they listened to the invective of his personal enemies with apparent satisfaction. He complained to Cicero, that the People were alienated from him;

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 3.



him ; that the Nobility were his enemies ; that the Senate was adverse, and the youth in general ill disposed to him<sup>r</sup>. He had indeed submitted to become the agent of a faction at Rome ; and, with the friends of the republic, incurred all the odium of what was done by their influence. Cæsar, in the mean while, was rising every day in military reputation, and had formed an army almost at the gates of Rome, with which he held every party in the republic in awe. Pompey, on this occasion, really did, or affected to believe, that a design was formed against his own life ; he assembled a numerous party of his retainers from the country, and absented himself, during some time, from the Senate and from the assemblies of the People.

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<sup>r</sup> Cicer. ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. epist. 3.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Return of Cato from Cyprus.—His Repulse at the Election of Prætors.—Arrival of Ptolemy Auletes at Rome.—Visit of Pompey and Crassus to Cæsar's Quarters at Lucca.—Renewal of their Association.—Military Operations in Cæsar's Province.—Violent Election of Crassus and Pompey.—Provinces.—Of Crassus in Syria.—Of Pompey in Spain for five Years.—Crassus departs for Syria.*

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THE particulars we have related in the last chapter have led us on to the middle of February, in the Consulate of Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus. The first was attached to the forms of the republic, and was a strenuous partizan of the Senate. His election was probably a sequel of the victory which this party had obtained in the restoration of Cicero. Philippus, the other Consul, was now nearly related to Cæsar, having married Atia his niece, the widow of Octavius; and possibly owed his preferment in part to this connection. He was, by his marriage with the mother, become the stepfather of young Octavius, now a boy of ten years of age, and entered as a part of his family. This parent, indeed, appears to have been a man of great moderation, no way qualified to be a party in the designs or usurpations of the family with which he was now connected, and which make so great a part in the sequel of this history.

Some

Some time before these Consuls entered on office, or in the end of the preceding year, Marcus Cato arrived from having executed his commission to Byzantium and Cyprus. The business upon which he had been sent to the first of these places, was to restore some exiles who had been driven from their country in the violence of faction. At the second he was to seize the treasure and the other effects of the king, and to reduce his kingdom to the form of a Roman province. This measure, by all accounts, was unjust, and the office highly disagreeable to Cato; but he was determined to perform it with the punctuality and respect due to an order of the State. While he himself went to Byzantium, he sent forward Canidius to Cyprus, to intimate the commands of the Roman People, and to exhort the king to submission. Upon his return to Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, he had intelligence, that this prince, unable to bear the ruin of his fortunes, had, in despair, killed himself. His treasure was seized, and his effects sold: the whole yielded to the treasury about seven thousand talents of silver. Upon the approach of Cato to Rome, the magistrates, the Senate, and multitudes of the People, went forth to receive him. The Senate thought proper in this manner to distinguish a friend, and to favour him with some marks of consideration, in order to balance, if possible, the public honours which were so frequently lavished on their enemies. For the same purpose likewise they resolved to insert the

CHAP. name of Cato among the Prætors of the present  
 XXI. year; but this honour he himself rejected as unprecedented and illegal. The year following, however, when he stood candidate for this office in the ordinary form, he was rejected; and Vatinius, the well-known tool of Cæsar, who had been commonly employed by him in things which were thought too mean for himself to appear in, was chosen<sup>1</sup>.

Cæsar, as has been observed on different occasions, had a serious antipathy to Cato, considering him as a determined and resolute opponent; he employed all his influence to exclude him from the offices of State, and probably had a particular pleasure in procuring him a repulse, by the preference of so mean an antagonist as Vatinius, who in this instance had the majority of votes against him. But, in mentioning this event, Valerius Maximus, with the sense which remained of it in subsequent ages, though with the quaintness of epigram, is pleased to reverse the form of expression, usual in speaking of disappointed candidates, saying, "That the list of Prætors for this year had not the honour of Cato's name<sup>2</sup>."

Cato, in the execution of his late commission, had taken exact inventories of all the effects sold at Cyprus; but his books being lost, or burnt in a vessel which took fire on the voyage, Clodius frequently threatened him with a prosecution to account for the sums he had received; and in  
 this

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, & Cicero in Vatinius.

<sup>2</sup> Val. Max. lib. vii. c. 5.



this was seriously instigated by Cæsar, who, from his winter quarters at Lucca, watched all the proceedings at Rome. CHAP.  
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From this station, the Proconsul of Gaul, although he could not attend in person, sent his agents to the city, took part in every transaction of moment that related to his adherents or to his enemies. It appeared to be his maxim, that no man should be his friend or his enemy without feeling the suitable effects. Memmius, who had been Prætor with Domitius Ahenobarbus, and who had joined his colleague in the prosecution that was commenced against Cæsar at the expiration of his Consulate, having since been Prætor of Bithynia, and accused of misconduct in his province, was attacked by him in a memorial which he drew up to be employed in support of the charge. Memmius, in defending himself, recriminated, sparing no kind of invective; and in the issue of this matter had the good fortune to escape from the resentment of his enemy.

The power of Cæsar, aided by his influence in so important a station, was daily increasing; and as he spared no pains to crush those whom he despaired of gaining, so he declined no artifice to gain every one else. All the spoils of his province were distributed in gratuities at Rome. He knew the state of every man's family, and where he could not reach the master, paid his court to the mistress, or to the favourite slave. While in his winter quarters at Lucca, so many Senators resorted

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from Rome to pay their court, that of these no less than two hundred were said to have been present at one time; and so many of them in public characters, that the Lictors, who, with the badges of office, paraded at the entrance of his quarters amounted to one hundred and twenty<sup>1</sup>.

During this winter, a question relating to the restoration of Ptolomy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, gave rise to warm debates in the Senate. This prince had been dethroned by his subjects; and, conceiving that he had sufficient credit with many persons at Rome, who had experienced his bounty, he repaired thither to solicit his own restoration. In his way he had an interview with Marcus Cato at Cyprus, and was advised by him to return to Egypt, and to accept of any terms from his own People, rather than to enter on such a scene of anxiety and mortification, as he should find every suitor for public favour engaged in at Rome. The giddiness of the multitude, the violence of the parties, of which one was sure to withstand what the other promoted, the avarice of those who might pretend to be his friends, and whose rapacity the treasures of his kingdom could not assuage, were sufficient to deter the king from proceeding on his voyage. But the importunity of his attendants, who wished to have him restored without any concession to his subjects, confirmed him in his former resolution. He accordingly proceeded to Rome; and, to the great encouragement

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Cæsar.

ment of his hopes, was favourably received by Pompey, who was then possessed of the reigning influence in the city, and who considered this occasion of restoring a king of Egypt to his throne, as a proper opportunity to have a military command for himself, joined to the civil commission of which he was already possessed. CHAP.  
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In the mean while the people of Alexandria, not knowing to what place their king had withdrawn, imagined that he was dead, and put his daughter Berenice in possession of the kingdom. Being afterwards informed, that he had gone to sea and steered for Italy, where he was likely to engage the Romans against them, they sent a deputation to counteract his solicitations in the Senate. But these deputies being intercepted, and murdered by order of the king, he proceeded, without opposition, in his application at Rome, and obtained a decree for his restoration to the crown. In this the opposite parties agreed, for some one leader in each aspired to be employed in resettling the kingdom of Egypt; but the unfortunate king soon found, that in this act, pronounced in his favour, he had yet made but a small progress in his suit. The whole difficulty arose in the choice of a person to carry the decree of the Senate into execution.

Soon after the general decree had passed, Lentulus Spinther, Consul of the present year, being destined, at the expiration of his magistracy in the city, to command in Cilicia and Cyprus, had inserted

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ferred the business of restoring the king of Egypt as a part of his own commission. But after Lentulus was gone for his province, this part of the commission, probably by the influence of Pompey, who had views on that expedition, as the object of a military command for himself, was recalled. A strong party of the Nobles, however, being jealous of the state which Pompey affected, and of his continual aim at extraordinary powers, conceived an expedient to disappoint him on this occasion, or to render the commission unworthy of his acceptance. In visiting the books of the Sybils, verses were said to be found, containing an injunction to the Romans, not indeed to withhold their friendship from a king of Egypt soliciting their protection, but "to beware how they attempted to restore him with a military force." The authenticity of this oracle was acknowledged, or declared by the Augurs; and the Tribune Caius Cato, who was averse to the cause of Ptolemy, availed himself of it, to suspend the effect of the resolution which had been already taken in favour of that prince. The Senate and People were divided in their opinions. One party urged, that Pompey should be appointed to restore the king of Egypt to his throne; others agreed, that he might be appointed, provided that he undertook the commission, as Proconsul, attended by two Lictors, and, in the terms of the oracle, without any military force<sup>1</sup>. Pompey himself affected to

think,

<sup>1</sup> Dio, l. b. xxxix. c. 12—16: Cicero ad Lentulum. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. vii.



think, that the business should have been left as it was in the department of Lentulus the Proconsul of Cicilia and Cyprus; but his retainers, so long as they had any hopes of rendering this a military commission; or of making it a pretence for placing their patron again at the head of an army, never ceased to urge that he should be employed in it.

Ptolomy himself likewise wished to have this business devolve upon Pompey, as the most likely person to have the force of the republic at his disposal, and to employ it effectually. But both despairing at last of success, Ptolomy retired to Ephesus; and fearing the resentments he had provoked in the contest with his own people, and in the late murder of their deputies, he took refuge in the temple of Diana; a retreat from which he was not conducted, till about two years afterwards, when Gabinius undertook to replace him on his throne<sup>1</sup>.

Pompey was disgusted with his disappointment in not being named to this service, and probably mortified more by the little respect that was paid to him by all parties, while he lay under the lash of continual invectives from his petulant opponents Clodius and Caius Cato. Having obtained, on the fifth of April, a grant of some money towards executing his office of general purveyor of corn for the People; and having heard his own and Cæsar's embezzlement of the public treasure, especially in the alienation of the revenues of Campania,

<sup>1</sup> Liv. Epitom. Decad. xi. lib. 5.

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pania, severely censured in the Senate<sup>1</sup>, he left Rome on pretence of applying, in Sardinia and Sicily, the sums with which he was now intrusted for the purchase of corn. In his way to this market he passed by Lucca, and, together with Crassus, augmented the number of attendants who paid their court at the quarters of Cæsar. At an interview of these three leaders, they renewed their former confederacy; and it being known, that Domitius Ahenobarbus was to stand for the next election of Consuls, Cæsar, considering how much a citizen so determined in opposition to himself, instigated by Marcus Cato, and supported by the party of the Senate, might attempt or execute against him in his absence, proposed, that the opposition to this candidate should not be committed to any person of inferior consideration in their party; but that Pompey and Crassus should themselves enter the lists, in order to exclude Domitius from the Consulate<sup>2</sup>.

It was agreed likewise, at this conference, that, upon the expiration of the term for which they were to hold the magistracy at Rome, Pompey should have the province of Spain, Crassus that of Syria, each with a great army: that Cæsar should be continued in his present command, and have such additions to the establishment of his province as might enable him to support an army of eight Roman legions, with the usual accompaniments

of

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 5 et 6.

<sup>2</sup> Suet. in Cæsare, c. 24.

of auxiliaries and irregular troops. Such was already in fact the state of his forces<sup>1</sup>, including a CHAP.  
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Soon after these matters were settled, Crassus being to remain in Italy, Pompey proceeded on his voyage to Sardinia, and Cæsar repaired to his army in Gaul, where the war in different places had been renewed in his absence. Among the dispositions he had made for the winter, the young Crassus was left to command on the coasts of the British Channel; and Galba, another of his lieutenants, was posted among the Alps, to protect the traders of Italy at a principal pass of these mountains. This officer had dislodged the natives from many of their strong-holds, from which they were accustomed to infest the highways, or to lay such as were passing under severe contributions; and he took hostages for their good behaviour for the future. He fixed his quarters, during the winter, at Octodurus, supposed to be the village of Martinach in the Vallais, situated at the foot of the mountains by which travellers now pass in the route of the greater abbey of St. Bernard. Here he remained for some time in quiet possession of his

<sup>1</sup> Suet. in Cæfare, c. 24.

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XXI. under his command had been greatly reduced by the services of the preceding campaign, and by the detachments which he had recently made from his quarters, formed a design to surprise and to cut him off. For this purpose, the inhabitants of the village in which he was quartered suddenly withdrew from him, and soon after appeared with multitudes of their countrymen on the neighbouring mountains. From thence they made a furious attack on the Roman intrenchment, continually sending fresh numbers to relieve those who became fatigued, or who had exhausted the store of their missile weapons.

The Romans, on the first prospect of this attack, had deliberated, whether they should not abandon their post ; but had resolved to maintain it, and were now become sensible that they must perish, if they could not, by some impetuous effort, disperse the enemy who were assembled in such numbers against them. For this purpose, they determined to break from their lines, and to mix with their assailants sword in hand ; a manner of fighting, in which, by the superiority of the Roman shield and sword, they always had a great advantage. They accordingly sallied from their intrenchment, and, after the slaughter of ten thousand of the enemy, about a third of the whole, put the remainder to flight. Galba, notwithstanding the respite he obtained by this victory, not thinking it prudent to remain in a situation in which he had been exposed



sed to so much danger, withdrew, for the remainder of the winter, to the neighbourhood of Geneva.

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The war had broke out at the same time in the quarters of Crassus, at the other extremity of the province. Some nations, who had made their submission, and given hostages at the end of the preceding campaign, repented of this step, and entered into a concert to recover their liberties. They began with seizing the Roman officers who had been stationed among them as commissaries to provide for the subsistence of the army, and they detained them as pledges for the recovery of those whom they themselves had given as hostages for their own peaceable behaviour.

The principal authors of this revolt were the inhabitants of what is now termed the coast of Brittany, between the rivers Vilaine and Blavet. They trusted to the strength of their situation on small islands, peninsulas, or head-lands, of which many were joined to the continent only by some narrow beach or isthmus, which the sea, at high-water, overflowed. They depended likewise on the strength of their shipping, in the use of which, by the practice of navigation on that stormy sea, and by their frequent voyages even to Britain, they were extremely expert. They were said to supply the want of canvas and hempen cordage with hides and thongs of leather, and the want of cables with iron chains, to which they fastened their anchors.

Caesar,

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Cæsar, having received intelligence of this revolt while he remained in his quarters at Lucca, sent orders to build as many ships as possible upon the Loire, and to assemble mariners from the neighbouring coasts. Apprehending, at the same time, a general defection of the province, and perhaps a descent from the Germans, that were ever ready to profit by the distress or divisions of their neighbours, he sent Labienus with a large body of horse to the Moselle, at once to awe the Belgic nations, and to observe the passage of the Rhine. He sent also Titurius Sabinus with a proper force into Normandy, where the natives were already in arms; and the young Crassus to the Garonne, to occupy the people of Gascony in their own country, and to prevent their junction with the principal authors of this rebellion.

He himself made haste to join the troops that were stationed in Brittany, and ordered Decimus Brutus to assemble his fleet, and to make sail without loss of time for the bay of Vannes. After his arrival on the coast, he met with all the difficulties which he had reason to expect from the nature of the country, and from the disposition and skill of its inhabitants. The enemy had retired from the continent to their strong-holds on the promontories or head-lands, in which they were periodically surrounded by the sea. Being attacked at one station, they withdrew in their boats to another; and by their situation seemed to be secure from any enemy, who was not in a condition

to

to assail them at once, both by sea and by land. CHAP.  
XXI.  
They could frustrate his operations on shore, by embarking on board of their vessels ; and his attack from the sea, by landing from their boats, which they drew up on the beach.

Cæsar, to decide the event of this singular contest, was obliged to wait the arrival of his shipping. As soon as it appeared, the natives, sensible that their fate depended on the event of a sea-fight, embarked the most expert of their warriors, got under sail with all their force, amounting to two hundred and twenty vessels, and steered directly for their enemy. While the fleets drew near to each other, the shores were crowded with spectators ; and the army, with Cæsar himself, came forth on the heights, from which they could behold the scene.

The Romans being inferior to their enemy in the management of sails, as well as in the strength of their vessels, endeavoured to supply their defect, as usual, by an effort of address or unexpected contrivance. They had provided themselves with scythes, fastened to shafts of a proper length, to cut the enemy's rigging, and by this means to let loose or discompose their sails ; and having thus, in the first encounter, disabled many of their ships, they afterwards grappled, and boarded them sword in hand.

The Gauls, seeing a great part of their fleet in this manner irrecoverably lost, would have escaped with the remainder ; but were suddenly becalmed, and

CHAP. being, from ten in the morning till night, exposed  
 XXI. to the continual attacks of their enemy, were all  
 either taken or destroyed; and the nation, thus bereft of its principal strength and the flower of its people, surrendered again at discretion.

Under pretence that the inhabitants of this district had violated the law of nations, in seizing the persons of officers who were stationed among them in a public character, their leaders were put to death, and their people sold for slaves. Those of the lower banks of the Seine, at the same time, having been defeated by Titurius, agreeably to what was said to be the character of Gaulish nations in general, returned to their former submission, with a levity equal to that with which they had joined the revolt.

The nations inhabiting the banks of the Garonne were still inclined to resist the approach of the Romans to their country. To the advantage of numbers, they joined a lively courage, of which these invaders had frequently felt the effects. Every chief was attended by a number of followers, whom he called his *Soldurii*, and who had devoted themselves to his service. While the chieftain lived, the *Soldurii* fared in every thing alike with himself; but if he perished by violence, they too must die, and there was no instance of their failing in this part of their engagement.

Craffus being arrived on the Garonne, and warned by the example of other Roman officers, who had fallen or miscarried in that country, deferred  
 passing



passing the river till he had augmented his force by the junction of some troops from Toulouse, and other parts of the Roman province. Being thus reinforced, he proceeded against the natives: These comprehended many little hordes, of which Cæsar has, on this occasion, enumerated twelve, but jealous of one another, and unwilling to join even in their common defence. They accordingly, notwithstanding their known valour, fell separately into the hands of the Romans, and in the end were all of them vanquished, or made their submission.

By these conquests, the former acquisitions of Cæsar on the Seine and the Marne, had a direct communication with the districts of Toulouse and Narbonne, or what had already been for a considerable period the Roman province of Gaul. And the conqueror, having re-established peace in those parts of the country, which are now termed Brittany and Normandy, closed the campaign with a march still farther to the northward, where he penetrated through marshes and woods into Brabant; but being stopped by heavy rains, and the approach of winter, he returned on his route, without making any settlement; and having put his army into winter quarters among the nations who had lately revolted, he himself set out as usual for Italy. There his presence was greatly wanted by Pompey and Crassus, who, on the approach of the elections, were likely to meet with unexpected difficulties in executing the plan which had been lately concerted betwixt them.

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At Rome, the spring, and part of the summer, had passed in disputes among those who were attached to the opposite parties. Clodius had attacked Cicero in his own person, in his effects, and in the persons of his friends. P. Sextius, who, in the character of Tribune, had been so active in the recall of this injured exile, and who had exposed his own life in the riots to which that measure gave rise, was now accused, and brought to trial for supposed acts of violence committed by him in the course of those contests. He was defended with great zeal by Hortensius, and with a proper gratitude by Cicero; and by their joint endeavours was, on the twelfth of March, acquitted by the unanimous verdict of his judges<sup>1</sup>.

After this trial was over, a point of superstition, curious as it serves to mark of the age, gave occasion to a fresh dispute between Cicero and his enemy Clodius. Upon a report, that horrid noises and clashing of arms had been heard under ground in one of the suburbs, the Senate thought proper to take the subject under consideration, and they referred it for interpretation to the college of Augurs. This body delivered in judgment, that the gods were offended, among other things, by the neglect and profanation of holy rites, and by the prostitution of sacred places to profane uses. This response Clodius endeavoured to apply to the case of Cicero's house, once consecrated and set apart for religion, and now again profaned by  
being

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. epist. 4. Orat. pro Sext.

being restored to its former owner. Cicero endeavoured to remove the charge of profanation from himself to Clodius, by reviving the memory of his famous adventure in Cæsar's house. "If I quote any more recent act of impiety," says he, "this citizen will recal me to the former instance, in which he intended no more than adultery." He proceeded, however, to apply the response of the Augurs to a more late adventure of Clodius in alarming the theatre at the head of an armed rabble, while the games were celebrating in honour of the great Goddesses.

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The Senate for two days together listened to the mutual invective of these parties, and were entertained with their endeavours to surpass each other in declarations of zeal for the sacred rites which had been profaned. Cicero, however, by the goodness of his cause, the force of his admirable talents, and perhaps still more by the aid of the Triumvirate, who were at this time at variance with Clodius, prevailed in the contest.

This martyr in the cause of the Senate, ever since his return from banishment, had courted the formidable parties, whose power, at least to hurt, he had experienced. He committed, or affected to commit himself entirely into the hands of Pompey; and, with a declaration of much attachment also to the party, composed a flattering panegyric, on Cæsar which this leader received with great pleasure, probably more on account of the breach it was

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likely

2 Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. epist. 5.

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likely to make among his opponents in the Senate, than on account of any satisfaction he otherwise received from it, or of any real accession of strength it gave him in the pursuit of his designs. By this conduct, indeed, Cicero disgusted his former friends, and felt his situation in the city so painful, that he absented himself, during great part of the summer; a circumstance which interrupted the course, or changed the subject of those letters to which we are indebted for the best record or account of the times.

We have great reason to regret any interruption of materials from which the history of a Consulate so interesting as the present could be collected. The republic seems in part to have recovered its dignity by the able and resolute conduct of Marcellinus, and by the tacit concurrence of his colleague Phillippus, who, though connected with Cæsar, did not co-operate in the projects of his party<sup>1</sup>. By the influence of these Consuls the applications made to the Senate by Gabinius, now commanding in Syria, for certain customary honours were rejected<sup>2</sup>. This refusal was intended to mortify Pompey, who protected Gabinius, and who himself was commonly treated by Marcellinus with great freedom and severity. Those who opposed the Triumvirs recovered their courage, and Domitius Ahenobarbus, by their influence, was in a fair way to succeed in his election for Consul of the following year. While the Tribunes, conducted chiefly by

<sup>1</sup> Cic. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. ep. 7.



a Cato, one of their number, distinguished from his more respectable namesake by the appellation of Caius, indirectly supported their cause, by proposing many regulations in behalf of what was called the Popular Interest. The Consul Marcellinus endeavoured to mar or interrupt their proceedings by the appointment of fasts and holidays, in which it was not lawful to transact affairs in the assembly of the People. The Tribunes, in their turn, suspended the election of Consuls, and in this were encouraged by Pompey and Crassus, who feared the effect of a choice to be made under the direction of Marcellinus, and had not yet ventured to declare their own intentions to offer themselves. But their late interview with Cæsar, and the part they had taken in consequence, had created suspicion of their views. Marcellinus put the question to Pompey in the Senate, Whether he desired the Consulate for himself? And this politician, long unaccustomed to make plain declarations, answered indirectly, That if there were no ill-disposed citizens in the commonwealth, he should have no such desire. Crassus, to the same question, made a like evasive reply, That he should be governed by what he judged best for the State. Both appear to have perceived that they were to rely for success chiefly on popular tumults; and as these would come to be employed with great disadvantage against such an able and resolute magistrate as Marcellinus, they took measures to defer the elections until the term of the present Consuls in office should elapse<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 37.

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XXI

They found the Tribune Caius Cato a proper instrument for their purpose, secured his negative, and employed it repeatedly to suspend the elections. The republic, upon the approach of the new year, being to lose its former magistrates, without any succession of new ones, was likely to fall into a state of great confusion. The Senate went into mourning, and discharged every member from assisting at any of the public entertainments or shews. In this state of suspense and alarm, Publius Clodius, who had for sometime been at variance with Pompey, as if gained by the concurrence of measures on this occasion, was reconciled to him, and attacked Marcellinus with continual invectives.

While the year was suffered to pass without any election of Consuls; the fasces dropped from the hands of Marcellinus and Phillippus, and an interregnum ensued. Pompey and Crassus then openly appeared as candidates for the vacant offices of State. Young Crassus coming from the army in Gaul, attended by a numerous body of citizens then serving under Cæsar, brought a considerable accession of votes to the party of their general, and were themselves not likely to be outtripped by their opponents in acts of sedition or violence. Domitius Ahenobarbus alone, supported by the councils of Marcus Cato, who was his kinsman, had the courage to persist in a contest with these powerful and dangerous antagonists. The time of election being fixed, this candidate went before break of day to occupy his place in the field of Mars,

Mars, but found his way already obstructed by a disorderly populace, and even by men in arms. CHAP. XXI.  
 The slave who carried a light before him was killed. Some of his friends, particularly Marcus Cato, was wounded <sup>1</sup>; and his adherents, not being in condition to dispute the ground with such a force as was assembled against them, retired to their own houses, leaving Pompey and Crassus to be named without opposition.

In the same manner the faction of the Triumvirate over-ruled every other election, procured the preference, which has already been mentioned, of Vatinius to Marcus Cato, and filled every office with their own creatures. They prevailed in the appointment of *Ædiles* by actual force, and at the expence of the lives of some of those who opposed them. Pompey himself having been entangled in one of these tumults, retired to change his clothes, which were stained with blood. They were overpowered in the nomination only of two of the *Tribunes*, Publius Aquilius Gallus and Attius Capito, in whose election the aristocratical party prevailed.

These events however were, by the contest which arose on every question, deferred for all the months of winter and spring. The offices of *Prætor* were not filled up by the middle of May <sup>2</sup>. The elections had begun for this purpose some time before; but it being observed that Marcus Cato had the first

U. C. 693.  
 Cn. Pompeius Magnus, 2do;  
 M. Licinius Crassus.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Crass. Pompeio, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Cicer. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 9.

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first Centuries, Pompey, under a pretence, allowed by the Roman superstition, that he was to observe the heavens, interposed to suspend the ballot. The faction employed the time which they obtained by this delay in procuring votes, and were so unguarded in giving money, that they laid themselves open to a criminal prosecution, and had reason to apprehend that whatever election they made would be disputed before the tribunals of justice. To prevent this consequence, Afranius, a person entirely under the direction of Pompey, moved in the assembly of the People for a dispensation from the statute of bribery in the case of elections then depending for the office of Prætor; and having obtained this extraordinary indulgence, secured to the party the fruits of their influence and of their money<sup>1</sup>.

Among the acts of Pompey and Crassus, in their second Consulate, are mentioned some regulations respecting the courts of justice, by which the juries, though taken in equal numbers from the Senate, the Equestrian order, and the mass of the People, were nevertheless limited to persons of considerable property. There are likewise mentioned some resolutions then passed to enforce the laws against murder, and to amend those against bribery by additional penalties, together with a sumptuary law to check the extravagance and prodigality of the age. "So willing were these magistrates," said Hortensius, "to compensate by the laws they enacted

" for

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Quint. Frat.



“for the defects of their own practice, that they  
 “made laws even to limit the expence of the  
 “table.” Such professions to reform the age  
 were probably intended to retrieve the character  
 which the popular leaders had lost by the violence  
 and barefaced corruption of their recent canvasses,  
 and to mark their administration with some mea-  
 sures that might seem to disprove the imputations  
 of libertinism commonly laid to their charge.

Pompey, at the same time, had an opportunity  
 to signalize his Consulship, by opening, during the  
 present year, the magnificent theatre which he  
 himself, or his freedman Demetrius, had erected  
 for the accommodation of the People at the pu-  
 blic shows. At this solemnity were brought on  
 the stage many dramatic performances, and other  
 exhibitions of a different sort. Among these, in the  
 course of five days, no less than five hundred lions  
 were let loose and killed by African huntsmen; and  
 the whole concluded with the baiting of eighteen  
 elephants, animals that seemed to have sagacity  
 enough to be conscious of the indignity and the  
 wrong which they suffered. By their piteous cries  
 they moved compassion in the breasts even of that  
 barbarous rabble, for whose entertainment they were  
 slain<sup>1</sup>.

The allotment of provinces, which was the  
 principal object of this Consulship, was for some  
 time kept from the view of the People. Pompey  
 continued to profess that he did not intend to ac-  
 cept of any province whatever. But the public  
 did

<sup>1</sup> Dio. lib. xxxix. Cicero ad Familiar. lib. vii. Plin. lib. viii. c. 7.

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did not give credit to such declarations on his part ; and his own partizans were as usual prepared to press upon him what they knew he wished, but affected to decline <sup>1</sup>. Every one, therefore, in all conversations, endeavoured to accommodate him in a province, some with Syria, others with Spain and Africa ; to all which suggestions, or officious projects, he affected indifference, or even aversion. Trebonius, meanwhile Tribune of the People, made a motion, which was soon understood to be the real mind of his authors, and the actual result of their counsels : that the province of Syria should be assigned to Crassus ; that of Spain, together with Africa, to Pompey ; and not to fall short of Cæsar's appointment in Gaul, each of them to continue for five years, with such establishments of men and of money as the necessity of the service during that period might require. This motion was made in execution of the original plan concerted with Cæsar, and it served to bring into light the object of their late consultation at Lucca, which had so much alarmed the friends of the republic.

On the day that this arrangement was proposed in the assembly, Marcus Cato, by means of the Tribunes Attius Capito and Aquilius Gallus, obtained leave to address the People. He endeavoured to disappoint the faction by occupying so much of their time as to prevent their coming to any decision. Being commanded silence, and still persisting to speak, he was ordered by  
Trebonius

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 9.

Trebonius into custody. In this manner, however, CHAP.  
XXI.  
the time of the first meeting was spent, and the assembly adjourned to the following day.

The Tribunes Atteius and Gallus, suspecting that means might be used to exclude them from the assembly which was then to be held, took measures to secure their admission. For this purpose Gallus remained all night in the Senate house, which fronted the Comitium or place of popular assembly. But this device was turned against himself; the opposite party having placed a guard to confine him where he was. His colleague Atteius, with Marcus Cato, Favonius, and some others, eluded the parties that were placed to intercept them, and found their way to the place of assembly. When the question was put, Cato, being lifted up into view by those of his friends who were near him, gave an alarm that it thundered; an intimation ever held by the superstition of the Romans to be ominous, and sufficient to suspend their procedure in any business of State. He was, however, on this occasion forced from the Comitium with the slaughter of some of his friends, who resisted the force that was employed against them. About the same time the Tribune Acquilus was wounded in attempting to force his way from the Senate-house, and a great concourse of people was forming around him as he stood bleeding in the streets. Violence to the person of a Tribune was still considered with religious horror, and the Consuls, in whose behalf this tumult had been raised, fearing the consequence of suffering such a spectacle to remain

CHAP. main in the view of the People, ordered the mul-  
 XXI. titude to withdraw, and affecting concern for the  
 accident, removed the Tribune still bleeding of his  
 wounds

In the sequel of these operations, Pompey and Crassus having obtained the provinces allotted to themselves, and in the terms proposed; proceeded to fulfil their part of the late engagement to Cæsar, by moving that his command should be continued during an additional term of five years more. "Now, indeed," said Cato, (addressing himself to Pompey,) "the burden is preparing for your own shoulders. It will one day fall on the republic, but not till after it has crushed you to the ground."

These arrangements being made, the Consuls in the prospect of vacating their office of magistracy in the city, proceeded to anticipate the charge of their respective trusts. Pompey, the newly named Proconsul of Spain, under pretence of a war subsisting with the Vacceii, raised the establishment of his province to four legions, two of which, the subject of much animadversion hereafter, Cæsar, under pretence of more urgent service in Gaul, had the address to borrow from him.

Pompey either had not yet begun to perceive what Cato suggested, That the greatest difficulty he had to apprehend, in preserving the eminence to which he aspired, was the competition of Cæsar; and that the sword must determine the contest between them; or he flattered himself that, like the person who stays at the helm, he was to command



command the vessel; and that by remaining at the seat of government, while his associates and rivals accepted of appointments at a distance, he continued to preside as sovereign, or supreme head of the republic. Under the influence of these conceptions, although his proper station was Spain, he either procured, or at least availed himself of, a motion that was made by some of the Tribunes to detain him in Italy; and fancied, that while he sent his own lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius, as private agents for himself into that province, even Cæsar and Crassus, though in the command of formidable armies, were to act in a subordinate station to himself, who should appear, by residing at Rome, to have the supreme direction of their operations as well as other affairs of state.

Crassus ever considered riches as the chief constituents of power, and he expected, with the spoils of Asia, to equal the military or political advantages that were likely to be acquired by his rivals in Europe. From the levies and other preparations which he made for his province, it soon appeared that he intended a war with the Parthians, the only antagonists which the Romans had left to dispute their progress even to India itself. Observing that he was likely to meet with an opposition to this design from the Senate, and from the Tribunes, who exerted their powers to interrupt his preparations, or took measures to detain him at home, he became the more impatient to set out for his province, and left Rome even before the full expiration of the year for which he was elected

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ted into the office of Consul. The Tribune Attius endeavoured to stop him, first by his tribunitian negative, next by actual force, and last of all by solemn imprecations, devoting the leader himself, and all who should follow him on that service, to destruction.

While the Consul passed through the gates of Rome, on his intended departure for Asia, this Tribune, with a lighted fire, the usual form of devoting a victim to the infernal gods, denounced a curse, which greatly alarmed many of those who were destined with Crassus on this expedition. This piece of superstition he might, in his own mind, have justly contemned: but it was imprudent to slight the effects of it on the minds of the People, and on the minds of his own army. In the apprehension of both he was by this form in a manner doomed to destruction, and proceeded in the war at the head of troops ill prepared to ward off calamities, which they were thus made to believe hung over them, in consequence of imprecations of which they were not disposed to doubt the effect.

CHAP.

## C H A P. XXII.

*State of the Commonwealth.—Administration of the Provinces.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul, Germany, and Britain.—State of Pompey at Rome.—Progress of Crassus into Syria.—Kingdom of Parthia.—Invasion of Crassus beyond the Euphrates.—Second Invasion of Cæsar in Britain.*

THE provincial appointments of Pompey and Crassus, with that which was at the same time prolonged to Cæsar, seemed to dismember the empire, if not to expose the republic itself to imminent danger. CHAP.  
XXII.

Of these three adventurers, Pompey and Cæsar, apart from the evil particularly apprehended in any of the measures they pursued, were in themselves subjects of a very dangerous character: neither possessed that dignity of mind which disdains every advantage beyond that of equal justice; neither could acquiesce in the same measures of consideration or power which other Senators had enjoyed before him; neither could be at ease where he did not command as master, or appear at least as the principal personage in every scene in which he was employed.

This paltry ambition, some ages before, might have been held in contempt by the meanest of the People, or must have shrunk before that noble elevation of mind by which the statesman conceived no eminence besides that of high personal quali-

CHAP.  
XXII.

ties employed in public services, or before that austere virtue which confined the public esteem to acts of public utility, supported by unblemished reputation in private life. But in the present age, there was a fashion which set such antiquated notions at defiance, controuled the authority of the State itself, and bestowed on private adventurers the attachment which belonged to the commonwealth, and the deference which was due only to the laws of their country.

In the progress of this republic the character of parties has already repeatedly changed, and the danger to be apprehended from them accordingly varied.

In the first periods of its history, citizens were divided on the supposed distinctions of birth; and, in the quality of Patrician or Plebeian, strove for prerogative or privilege with much emulation, as separate orders of men in the commonwealth, but with little jealousy of personal interests.

In a subsequent period, when the invidious part of the former distinction was removed, citizens having no longer the same subject of animosity, as being born to different pretensions, they entered more fully on the competition of individuals, and the formation of separate factions. They strove for the ascendant of aristocratical or democratical government, according to the interest they had formed to themselves in the prevalence of either. They were ready to sacrifice the peace and honour of the Public to their own passions, and entered

into



into disputes accordingly, which were in the highest degree dangerous to the commonwealth. They CHAP.  
XXII thought personal provocations were sufficient to justify public disorders; or, actuated by vehement animosities, they signalized their victories with the blood of their antagonists. But, though sanguinary and cruel in their immediate executions, they formed no deliberate plans of usurpation to enslave their country, nor formed a system of evils to continue beyond the outrage into which they themselves were led by their supposed personal wrongs or factious resentments.

We are now again once more to change the scene, and to have under our consideration the conduct of men who were in reality as indifferent to any interest of party as they were to that of the republic, or to any object of State; who had no resentments to gratify; or who easily sacrificed those which they felt to the purposes of a cool and deliberate design on the sovereignty of their country. Though rivals, they could occasionally enter into combinations for mutual support, frequently changed their partizans, and had no permanent quarrel but with those who uniformly wished to preserve the republic. They were surrounded by persons who admired the advantages of wealth or of power which might be obtained at the expence of their country, and who indeed were ready to extol the virtues of any adventurer who could lead a numerous list of retainers to

CHAP. share with himself in the spoils of the common-  
 XXII. wealth.

Peace had now, for some years, except in that part where Cæsar commanded, been established throughout the empire. Instead of military operations, the State was occupied in directing the farms of the revenue, in hearing complaints of oppression from the provinces, and in appointing the succession of military governors. Besides the disputes which have been mentioned relating to the provincial appointments of Crassus and Cæsar, there arose a question on the subject of provinces to be assigned to their immediate predecessors in the Consulship, Marcellinus and Philippus. It was strongly urged that Piso, Gabinius, and even Cæsar himself, should be recalled to make way for officers who were intitled to similar command in their turns. This measure was supported in part by Cicero, who vehemently contended, that Piso and Gabinius should be superseded; but urged the continuance of Cæsar in his station, a circumstance for which this able adventurer had taken sufficient precaution not to leave it in hazard from the issue of this debate.

Piso, the near relation of Cæsar, in the event of these deliberations, was actually recalled, and, upon his return to the city, complained to the Senate, in terms of great asperity, of the injury done to his character. Cicero had ever treated Piso and Gabinius, though in reality but the instruments of Pompey and Cæsar, as the principal authors of his  
 own

own calamities ; and, upon the present occasion, had pronounced against Piso that violent invective which still remains among his works, and which the subsequent conduct of the person against whom it was directed in a great measure disproved. CHAP.  
XXII.

Gabinus had for some years enjoyed the government of Syria, and during this time had ventured to employ the force of his province in a manner which, together with some other offences, drew upon him, at his return to Rome, the animadversion of the Senate.

It has been mentioned, that Ptolomy Auletes, king of Egypt, in exile from his kingdom, had applied to the Romans for aid in recovering his crown ; that his suit had been granted, but rendered ineffectual by the regard which was paid to a supposed oracle, which forbade his being reinstated with a military force ; that he had withdrawn to Ephesus, and taken sanctuary in the celebrated temple of that place, where he waited for some change of fortune in his favour. Lentulus, the governor of Cilicia, to whom the business of restoring him, though without military force, had been committed by the Senate, deliberated whether he should not venture to disregard the restriction imposed upon him ; march with an army to restore the king of Egypt ; possess himself of the wealth which was to be found in effecting such a revolution ; and trust to the influence of his friends at Rome in procuring his pardon from the Senate, and

CHAP. even their approbation of what he should have  
XXII done.

Upon this question Cicero advised Lentulus, if he had a force sufficient to undertake the enterprise, not to lose an opportunity of performing a service which, though not authorised, could be afterwards vindicated. But the business still remained in suspense, when Gabinius arrived in Syria, and probably, by an advice from Pompey to the same purpose with that of Cicero to Lentulus, undertook, in opposition to a decree of the Senate and of the Augurs, the restoration of this exile to his throne. Having received or bargained for a great sum of money in return for this service, he advanced with a fleet and an army towards Egypt, passed through Palastine, and on his way raised a contribution in that country.

Berenicé, the daughter of Ptolomy, now in possession of the crown, had married Archelaus; and, in order to strengthen her hands against her father, had assumed her husband as a partner in the throne. But the forces of these associated sovereigns were defeated by Gabinius, and Ptolomy was restored to his kingdom. Gabinius, with the treasure amassed on this occasion, hoped to be secure against the attacks which, at his return to Rome, were likely to be made upon him, for his contempt of the Senate, and of the oracle, and for the extortion of which he was accused at the same time in Palestine, a part of his own province.



In this busy time of Cæsar's faction at Rome, he himself, upon the alarm of an invasion from Germany, had been called to defend the northern extremity of Gaul. Two separate hordes, the *Tencheri* and *Usupetes*, pretending to be driven by superior force from the usual tract of their own migrations, had united together, and presented themselves on the banks of the Rhine. The natives on the right bank of that river instantly abandoned their habitations, and collecting all the boats that could be found to the opposite side, made a disposition to stop the passage of these invaders.

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The Germans, observing the precautions which were taken to resist them, affected to lay aside the design of passing the Rhine; and, by changing their course, made a feint to divert the attention of their antagonists. In execution of this purpose, they continued for three days to retire from the river. At the end of this time, supposing that their opponents would be off their guard, or returned to their ordinary way of life, they suddenly changed their direction, and in one night re-passed the ground over which they had marched on the three preceding days, surprised a sufficient number of boats with which to accomplish their passage, dislodged the natives of the country on the left of the river before them, and from thence continued their migrations betwixt the Rhine and the Meuse, over what is now called the dutchies of Juliers, of Limburg and Luxemburgh.

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These invaders amounted, by Cæsar's account, to upwards of four hundred thousand souls<sup>1</sup>; a number which exceeds that of the inhabitants of any city in Europe, besides London and Paris, and which may perhaps raise some suspicion of error in copying the text, or of exaggeration in the commentary, which was itself intended to raise the character of Cæsar at Rome. But on the question relating to the probability of so great a number, it may be observed, that those migrating nations, certainly unacquainted with many of the arts which are practised to supply and to accommodate populous cities, were likewise exempt from the want of such supplies, and acquiesced in what was necessary to mere subsistence. Such nations have less skill and industry than the manufacturer and the trader in a settled and well regulated city; but they have less waste and less misapplication of labour to superfluous and unprofitable purposes than take place in times of luxury or refined accommodation.

The German nations of this age, although they had opportunities to observe among their neighbours the advantages of land-property, and of agriculture supported by skill and industry, yet frequently preferred the state of migration, and from policy declined making any permanent settlement, lest the care of property, and the studies of ease and convenience, should corrupt or enervate their people. Their favourite occupation was hunting,

which

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. c. 15.

which they considered as a preparation for war. CHAP;  
XXII.  
They traversed the woods and pasture lands, with numerous herds, and subsisted chiefly by milk, flesh, and game. They likewise knew the use of corn, of which they sometimes took a crop from favourable lands; but without remaining beyond the period of a single seed-time and harvest to cultivate any particular portion of ground.

They moved in great and numerous bodies, which must to a great extent have covered the face of the country over which they passed; but the multitude thus moving as one body, was distinguished into separate clans and fraternities, led by their headmen or chiefs, who kept order in their several divisions. They allowed private parties to make war beyond the limits of their own country, and to choose their leaders for this purpose. But in peace, the separate clans had no band of connection. If they had at any time a general government which comprehended the whole of their tribes, it was but a temporary expedient, to which they had recourse in military adventures, and on other pressing occasions.

Under such equality of conditions, every individual, who was of a proper age, was obliged to labour for himself, and to subsist by what he procured; and he employed his labour only in procuring what was necessary. In these circumstances, it was not likely that commodities should accumulate; but the numbers of the people, if we may rely on the testimony of Cæsar in this place, or on  
the

CHAP. the evidence of ancient history in general, was cer-  
 XXII. tainly great<sup>1</sup>.

The Suevi, before whom the present invaders of Gaul had retired, were said to consist of a hundred cantons, each furnishing annually a thousand men for war, and a like number for the care of their herds and domestic concerns. Such clouds gathering on the frontier of Cæsar's province, required his presence. He accordingly assembled his army, and advanced to observe them between the Rhine and the Meuse.

The Germans, in general, were accustomed to despise the Gauls, and the present invaders expected no formidable opposition on this side of the Rhine; they had ventured to divide their forces, had sent the great body of their horse upon an excursion beyond the Meuse to scour the lower parts of the country, and upon Cæsar's approach, they offered to treat of an alliance with him.

“ They neither sought (they said) nor would they  
 “ decline a war with the Romans. It was their  
 “ way to repel injuries with the sword, not to  
 “ elude them by negociation. But in the present  
 “ case, they should nevertheless condescend so far  
 “ as to assure the Roman general, that they had  
 “ passed the Rhine from necessity, and not with  
 “ any intention to invade his province. That if  
 “ he were pleased to receive them as friends, they  
 “ were in condition to merit this title, should be  
 “ content with the ground they had gained, or  
 “ accept

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. vi.



“ accept of any other which he might choose to  
“ assign them.” Cæsar replied, “ That while  
“ they remained in Gaul, he could not consider  
“ them as friends. That if they repassed the Rhine,  
“ he had allies in Germany, with whom he should  
“ endeavour to join them in a league of defence  
“ against any enemy, by whom they had been thus  
“ forced to relinquish their usual bounds.”

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Having received this answer, the German deputies, to make their report, and to receive the command of their nations, desired a cessation of arms for three days. But Cæsar, suspecting that they only meant to amuse him, and to gain time for the junction of all their forces, refused to comply with this request, and continued his march. Being arrived within twelve miles of their camp, he was again met by their deputies, with fresh intreaties that he would advance no farther, or at least, that he would give to the cavalry, who made the van-guard of his army, orders to abstain from hostilities for three days: that in this time, they might have an answer from the German nations mentioned in their last conference, and know whether such a league could be formed, as was then proposed, to give them some prospect of safety in returning to their usual haunts.

Cæsar, upon this occasion, seems to have granted a cessation of arms; though on account of what afterwards happened, he is willing to diminish the extent of his own engagement, and to impute the breach of faith which followed to his enemies.

He

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He agreed to advance no farther than four miles for the convenience of water, and sent an order to his van-guard to abstain from hostilities. This order, however, had no effect. His advanced guard consisting of five thousand horse, had an encounter with eight hundred of the enemy.

When this encounter happened, the Germans were not yet joined by the great body of their horse. They had earnestly sued for a cessation of hostilities ; it was not likely that they would have begun the attack. Yet Cæsar accused them of a design, with this small party, to surprise the whole of his cavalry.

On the day which followed this skirmish of the cavalry, or the parties advanced, the leaders and principal men of the Germans leaving their own camp, without officers, in perfect security, came in great numbers to that of Cæsar to exculpate themselves of what had passed on the preceding day, to convince him of their own pacific dispositions, and to deprecate the farther progress of his army. This he thought a favourable opportunity to cut off, by a complete surprise, this enemy entirely, and to finish the war. Having accordingly secured the persons of their leaders, who had thus unwarily put themselves in his hands, he advanced with his whole army directly to their camp, easily overcame the few that took arms to oppose him, and without distinction of sex or age, put the whole to the sword. The country, over all the ways by which they endeavoured to escape from the camp, at  
which

which the slaughter began, to the confluence of the Rhine or Wall, and the Meuse, was strewed with the slain<sup>1</sup>. CHAP.  
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The Roman people, though seldom sparing of the blood of their enemies, were shocked at the recital of this extraordinary massacre; and when Cæsar, on account of this victory, applied for a thanksgiving, and for the usual honorary decrees of the Senate, the whole of his conduct was questioned, he was charged with having wantonly invaded the nations of Gaul, and of having dishonoured, by a recent act of treachery, the arms of the Republic. It was proposed to deliver up his person to those injured nations, that he might expiate, by his own sufferings, so many acts of injustice and impiety, which the gods might otherwise avenge on his country.

That part of the German horse, which by their absence had escaped the calamity which befel their countrymen, appear soon after to have repassed the Rhine, and to have taken refuge with some of the hordes who lived near the sources of the Roer and the Lippe. Thither Cæsar, to spread the terror of his arms, soon afterwards pursued them; and passed the river, not in boats and by surprise, as the Germans were accustomed to do, but in a manner which he seems to have chosen, as better suited to the dignity of the Roman state; he projected a bridge, which was executed in ten days, with much ingenuity, and some ostentation of his power

<sup>1</sup> That branch of the Rhine which falls into the Meuse, changes its name for that of Wall,

CHAP. power and skill. This work being finished, he  
XIII. placed proper guards at both its extremities, and  
 advanced with the main body of his army into the  
 contiguous parts of Germany, where, on account  
 of the reception given in that quarter to the ca-  
 valry who had escaped the late massacre on the  
 Meuse, he laid the country under military exe-  
 cution.

Cæsar, from the place at which he had passed  
 the Rhine, appears to have gone up the eastern  
 side of the river, where he visited the Ubii, a na-  
 tion inhabiting over against what are now the cities  
 of Bonne and Cologne. Here he had intelligence,  
 that the Suevi, a nation consisting, as has been ob-  
 served, of a hundred cantons, and mustering two  
 hundred thousand warriors, who were divided into  
 two squadrons that took the field, and conducted  
 the domestic affairs of the nation by turns, were  
 preparing to oppose him; that they had actually  
 sent their wives, children, and superannuated men  
 into places of safety, and had draughted their  
 chosen warriors for action. These hordes having  
 an ascendant over all the cantons of Germany,  
 considered it as a proof of their valour, that no na-  
 tion could pretend to settle on the tract of their  
 migrations, or within reach of their excursions;  
 and that the country, to a great distance around  
 them, was accordingly waste. In their own move-  
 ments, they never halted above a year to raise a  
 single crop from fields, which, to keep up the mar-  
 tial spirit of their nation, and to preclude the de-

fire



fire of property, with the other passions that accompany settlement, they successively abandoned. CHAP.  
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Cæsar, not being prepared to enter on a war with such an enemy, and being sensible that a defeat might expose his army to ruin, while even a victory could not procure him any advantage proportioned to the risk, having remained eighteen days on that side of the Rhine, and employed no more than twenty-eight days in the whole service, chose, while he still had the reputation of victory unimpaired of his side, to repass that river, and to break down his bridge.

This singular man, whose abilities were equal to any task, and who had no occasion to court the public admiration by measures concerted on purpose to obtain it, was, nevertheless, not above ostentation, and gave way to it, not only where it might contribute to impose on an enemy, but even where it would do no more than gratify his own vanity, or increase the fame of his actions at Rome. To this motive we may venture to impute the design, which, at an advanced season of the year, and at the end of the same summer in which he had, between the Meuse and the Rhine, vanquished the numerous army of the Tenchteri and Usepates, in which he had passed the great barrier of Germany itself, and insulted its warlike inhabitants on their own territory, he now projected the invasion of Britain, though surrounded by the ocean, and untouched by the arms of any foreign invader. To carry this design into immediate execution, as

soon

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soon as he had repassed the Rhine, he continued his march through the low countries, and collected his forces in the neighbourhood of the Portus Itius and Gesoriacum<sup>1</sup>. While we perceive the features of vanity in the leader, we must admire the hardness and vigour of the troops who could accomplish these services.

The extent of this island, the numbers and character of its people, were then unknown on the continent. Cæsar having in vain endeavoured to procure information in these particulars, sent a galley with orders to explore the coast, and to observe the countenance of the natives. He ordered all his shipping, and even those vessels which he had employed the preceding year against the Veneti<sup>2</sup>, to sail round the Cape of Brittany into the British channel, and repair to the straits which separate this island from the continent.

On the report of these preparations, which evidently pointed at Britain, some of the natives, willing to avert by negotiation the storm which threatened them, sent to the Roman Proconsul a submissive message, and offered to come under his protection.

Cæsar, founding a claim to the possession of the island on these advances which were made to him, proceeded with more boldness to the execution of his enterprize. In order that the natives of the country he was leaving behind him might not create any trouble

<sup>1</sup> Calais and Boulogne.

<sup>2</sup> In the Bay of Biscay, about Vannes.

trouble in his absence, he obliged them to give hostages, and made a proper disposition of his army to keep them in awe. He had assembled at the most convenient haven on the Gaulish side, now supposed to be the Wissan, between Calais and Boulogne<sup>1</sup>, eighty transports or ships of burden, with a number of galleys to accommodate the officers of rank, and their equipage. The remainder of his shipping was yet detained, by contrary winds, in a creek at some distance, supposed to be Boulogne; thither he sent his cavalry, with orders to embark on board the ships where they lay. He himself went on board, with the infantry of two legions, at the former haven, and having found a favourable wind with moderate weather, weighed about ten at night, and reached the coast of Britain, on the following day, at ten in the morning. The cliffs, where he first approached the shore, were high and steep, and the hills were covered with numerous bodies of men, on foot, on horseback, and even in wheel carriages, a species of machine which the natives of this country were accustomed to make war. It being impossible to land under such difficulties, and in the face of this opposition, he bore away, as is probable, to the northward about eight miles, with a favourable wind, to some part of the flat shore<sup>2</sup> which is contiguous to the Downs; and here, in the manner of ancient debarkations, for which the shipping of

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those

<sup>1</sup> See Danville's Geography of ancient Gaul.

<sup>2</sup> Planum et apertum littus. See Cæsar's Commentaries.

CHAP. those times was built, ran his transports aground,  
XXII. and prepared to land.

In the mean time the Britons, who in their march on the hills had kept pace with the Roman galleys, came down to the strand, and advanced even some way into the water to oppose the descent. As the surf on that shore usually runs high, and the Romans, from where their vessels struck, had some way to wade in water too deep to allow them the free use of their arms, they durst not meet the enemy under such disadvantages, and remained on board. Cæsar seeing his men unusually backward, did not think proper in these circumstances to urge them farther; but ordered some of the lightest vessels, which were mounted with missile engines, or manned with archers and slingers, to row as near to the shore as they had water on the right and the left of the landing place, and from thence to gall the enemy. This disposition had the effect to clear the way for his men to descend from their ships, but they were still slow to avail themselves of the opportunity: until the bearer of a standard, plunging into the water, and calling aloud for those who were near, to follow if they meant save a Roman eagle from falling into the hands of the enemy, numbers at once from different ships, and without any order, obeyed this call, and the islanders, notwithstanding the advantage of the ground, and the superiority of their numbers, both on horseback and on foot, withdrew



withdrew from the landing place, and soon after disappeared. Seeing their enemy thus in possession of the land, they in a few days even offered to surrender, and were about to deliver their hostages, when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to resist. CHAP.  
XXII.

On the fourth day after the Roman infantry had landed, a second division of ships, with the cavalry, appeared in sight; but before they could reach the shore, were dispersed by a violent storm; part was driven back towards Gaul, part carried down the British channel, and cast in distress on the contiguous coast. Even the shipping, from which the legions had disembarked, lying aground in the surf, or at anchor in a high sea and spring-tide, circumstances with which the Italians were little acquainted, were set adrift, or filled with water, many of them beat to pieces or greatly shattered, and rendered unserviceable.

By these misfortunes, Cæsar, although he had made no provision to subsist for the winter in Britain, was in danger of being obliged to remain in the island for want of shipping. The natives retracted their late submission, began to drive away the cattle, and to lay waste the country within reach of his camp. They flattered themselves that he would be obliged to depart, or must perish for want of provisions; and that they would, by the example of so vain and calamitous an attempt, deter every enemy for the future from invading their country.

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## XIII.

Cæsar, in the mean time, while he employed all his workmen with the greatest diligence in repairing his ships, endeavoured to collect some provisions, and to form a magazine. The natives assembled in great bodies to intercept his foragers, and obliged him to cover every party employed on this service with the force of his army. The legions were at first greatly disconcerted by the unusual effect of the British chariots, and by the want of their own cavalry; but as they prevailed in every close fight, the Britons were driven to renew their former submission, and became bound to deliver double the number of hostages they had formerly stipulated. Victorious however as this mighty commander has recorded himself, not thinking it proper, with shattered vessels, at the mercy of autumnal winds and stormy seas, to await the performance of this article, he ordered the hostages to be sent after him into Gaul, reembarked with his army, and with the first favourable wind repassed to the continent. At his arrival, he found that the Gauls, upon the report of his late misfortunes, had revolted; that one of his transports, with three hundred men on board, having parted with the fleet, and landing at a separate place, were attacked; and that it was necessary to send the remains of his cavalry to their relief. The Morini, inhabiting what are now the districts of Calais and Dunkirk, with other nations of the low countries, had taken arms against the officers he had stationed in his absence to keep them in awe. The campaign therefore concluded with

with the operations, which were necessary to quell this revolt. Labienus subdued the Morini. CHAP.  
XXII. Quintus Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Cotta, having recovered possession of the interior country, fell back to the coast.

The Roman army was soon after put into winter quarters; and Cæsar, as if sensible that he had made his attempt on Britain with too small a force—and whatever representation he might give of particulars, had incurred the imputation of a miscarriage, gave orders to refit his fleet, and to add, during the winter, as many more ships as possible, built upon a construction more fit for the service to which they were destined, broader, and more capacious in the hull, for the reception of men and horses, and lower in the gunwale, for the convenience of landing. The timber was probably taken from the neighbouring forests; but the materials of his rigging, it is said, were brought from Spain. Having taken these measures to enable him at a more convenient season to renew his expedition into Britain, he set out as usual for Italy, and his winter station in the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here he found Pompey and Crassus employed, as has been already related, in accomplishing for themselves, and for him, the objects which they had severally in view. Crassus had fixed his thoughts on the treasures of the east, and projected the sale of kingdoms, of which he hoped to have the disposal in that part of the world. Pompey, still more especially was gratified in his wishes; being stationed to act for the party, with a degree of consideration

CHAP. and majesty, little short of monarchy, at Rome ;  
 XXII. while he obtained a separate military establishment, and the patronage of a mighty province for himself, abroad. In this new distribution, Cæsar appears to have been least considered: but he had already provided, what he knew in the end was to decide every controversy, a great army, inured to service, and in a station which gave an easy access to Italy, and the command of Rome. As if secure of their interests, therefore, they permitted the election of Consuls to proceed without disturbance; and suffered Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a professed partizan of the Senate, together with Appius Claudius, to be elected Consuls; Marcus, Cato, and Milo, to be placed in the list of Prætors; and several citizens, well affected to the Senate, to be admitted into the college of Tribunes.

U. C. 699.  
 L. Dom.  
 Ahenobar-  
 bus, App.  
 Claud. Pul-  
 cher.

The winter and spring, however, were inactive on the part of the aristocracy. Cato, probably did not see any public object in which to engage with advantage beyond the duties of his office, in which he endeavoured to restrain by his authority, and by his example, the extravagance and luxury of the age. The dangerous powers which had been recently granted to persons, from whose ambition the republic had so much to fear, no doubt greatly alarmed the Senate; but this body, though led by Domitius, one of the Consuls, by Cato and Milo, two of the Prætors, and supported by many of the Tribunes, either did not think themselves entitled to dispute the validity of those grants, nor to attempt the revocation of what had been so recently confirmed



confirmed by the people, or perhaps thought themselves happy in the supposed removal of so many factious adventurers from the scene of affairs at Rome.

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Even in this Pompey disappointed their hopes, though now master of Spain and part of Africa, with an adequate army, still under the pretence, as has been mentioned, of his commission to furnish the public granaries with corn, remained in Italy, and passed the greater part of his time among his country villas, executing the duties of general purveyor with the assistance of his lieutenants, and managing his intrigues in the city by means of his agents and friends. He was attended by numbers of every rank and condition, who resorted to him with the assiduity of courtiers, and with a fervility, which, seemed to place the sovereignty in his hands. He even maintained the appearance of a monarch in the state which he assumed, as well as in the influence he acquired. While he affected reserve and moderation, in order to appear worthy of his rank, his retainers ever treated him as a great prince, and with his connivance fomented disorders tending to shake the government of the Senate; in order that the republic might be forced to rely on him for support, while he himself affected to decline the burden.

In the management of these intrigues, and in the full hopes of their success, Pompey was now left seemingly at the helm of affairs by Crassus, as well as by Cæsar. The first, in his impatience to take possession of his government, had broken

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through all the impediments already mentioned that were placed to hinder his departure from Rome, made haste to Brundisium with his army, embarked, notwithstanding the unfavourableness of the season, and, with considerable loss, both of men and of shipping in a storm, made his passage into Macedonia. The prohibition of the Tribune still sounded in his ears. He dreaded a vote of the Senate or People to recal his commission. It appears, indeed, that soon after his departure, a motion had been actually made for this purpose; and that Cicero, though formerly on ill terms with Crassus, being taught by his late sufferings to court the favour of those who at least could hurt, if they could not protect him, appeared on this question in his favour, and claimed a share in the merit of obtaining the decision that was given to confirm the commission<sup>1</sup> under which he was already set out for the east.

But without attending to the issue of these deliberations at Rome, Crassus continued his march by Macedonia and the Hellespont into Asia. In passing through Galatia, finding Dejotarus, sovereign of that principality, then of an advanced age, occupied in a work that is becoming at every age, devising the plan of a new city, and making a settlement for increased population; he is said to have observed to this veteran, that it was somewhat too late, at his age, to be forming new projects of settlement; "nor are you very early," replied the other, "in your undertaking of a conquest in Parthia."

Crassus

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Famil. lib. v. ep. 9. ad Crassum.

Crassus was turned of sixty, and having ever considered riches as the surest means of arriving at eminence and power, now joined, to the rapacity of a youthful ambition, the avarice of age. Upon his arrival in Syria, he pillaged the temple of the Jews, and laid hold of treasure wherever else he could find it. He made a pretence of the military levies to be made in the provinces for extorting money; and afterwards, reserving the money for his own use, neglected the levies. He exacted from the different districts of his province, and from the neighbouring allies, large quotas of men and military stores, merely that they might buy exemptions with proportional sums of money<sup>1</sup>. In the same spirit of avarice and rapacity, he invaded the Parthians without any authority from the State, and even without the pretence of a quarrel.

The Parthians, like other dynasties which before or since have arisen in that part of the world, or in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates and the Tigris, were of Scythian extraction. On the decline of the Macedonian power, about two hundred years before the present date, a swarm from the north had migrated to the lower banks of the Tigris, over-ran the country round Ctesiphon, continued to harass the neighbourhood by their depredations; and, at last, being commanded by Arsaces, the founder of this new kingdom, took possession of an extensive country, and though under

CHAP.  
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<sup>1</sup> Plut. in Crasso, 11. Dio. Cass. lib. iv. c. 13.

CHAP. der a new name, in fact restored the monarchy of  
XXII. Persia<sup>1</sup>.

The Parthian, or new Persian monarchy, being yet in its vigour, was the most formidable power that now any where appeared within reach of the Roman arms. Its forces consisted almost entirely of horse. Part cased in heavy armour, and using the lance were intended for regular charges; part mounted in a lighter manner, for expedition or swiftness, and using the bow. While in the field they were attended by herds of spare horses, which they pastured, or had drove in the rear of their armies. With this supply, upon any occasional loss, they new-mounted their cavalry, or, having reliefs of fresh horses, performed amazing marches, and frequently presented themselves to their enemies, where it was not expected they could appear. They had different notions of victory and defeat from other nations; they always counted it a victory, when, by their own flights, they led an enemy into hasty and unguarded pursuits<sup>2</sup>, which enabled them to return with advantage from what appeared to be a rout or dispersion of their forces.

When Crassus advanced to the Euphrates, Orodes king of Parthia, then engaged in a war with Artabazus, on the side of Armenia, sent a deputation to expostulate with the Roman general on the cause of his hostile approach. Crassus made answer,

<sup>1</sup> Justin. lib. lxi. Dio. Cass. lib. xl, xli.

<sup>2</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 15.



swer, That he would give the reasons of his coming when he arrived at Seleucia. "Here," said one of the Parthian deputies (showing the palm of his hand) "hair will grow before you shall arrive at Seleucia." Crassus proceeded in his march, passed the Euphrates, and ravaged Mesopotamia without any resistance. Having continued his operations until the end of the season, he returned for the winter into Syria<sup>1</sup>. Upon his arrival in this province, he was joined by his son Publius, who had served some years under Cæsar in Gaul, and was now detached by him with a thousand horse, and many marks of honour, to act under his father in Syria.

This invasion of Mesopotamia, after the season was so far spent, served only to alarm and provoke the enemy, without procuring any advantage to the arms of the Romans; and hostilities were likely to proceed in the spring with great animosity, when Crassus was to prosecute the war which he had thus commenced on such dangerous ground.

Cæsar, in the mean time, found continual occupation for his troops in Gaul, or in the neighbourhood of that province. He himself, with his usual activity, having been in Italy in the beginning of winter, and having conferred with the persons with whom he intrusted the management of his affairs at Rome, proceeded to Illyricum, upon a report, that this part of his province was infested by the incursions of the Pyrustæ, a warlike tribe on the frontier.

<sup>1</sup> Dio. lib. xl. Plut. in Crasso.

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frontier. Upon his arrival, the invaders of his province withdrew, and were disowned by their own nation. The Pyrustæ denied, that they had ever given a commission to make war on the Roman province, became bound for the future to restrain the depredations of private adventurers, and gave hostages for the observance of this article.

Early in the spring, Cæsar returned from this expedition to the quarters of his army in the Low Countries, and found, that in consequence of the orders he had given at the end of the preceding campaign, no less than six hundred transport vessels, and twenty-eight galleys, were actually built in different harbours from Ostend to Boulogne, and in a few days might be ready for sea. He accordingly ordered them to be launched, and directed the whole to assemble at the same port from which he had sailed on the preceding year, in order to receive the army on their intended invasion of Britain. But, before his departure, being informed that certain nations on the Moselle were meditating a revolt, and were soliciting the Germans to come over the Rhine to their assistance, in order that he might not leave any enemy on foot in his rear, and that he might secure the peace of Gaul in his absence, he marched to the Moselle with four legions and eight hundred horse. Upon his arrival he had the good fortune to find the people divided between two leaders, who, being jealous of each other, made their submissions separately; and gave

the

the necessary hostages as a pledge for their future behaviour.

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With these securities, Cæsar returned to the coast, found all his armed galleys and five hundred and sixty of his transports actually assembled; the other forty transports had been put back by contrary winds, and were still retained in the port at which they had been built. The force intended for this expedition to Britain consisted of five legions, amounting possibly, or on the probable supposition that they were not complete, to about twenty thousand men<sup>1</sup>, together with a body of Gauls, including many of their chiefs, whom Cæsar chose to retain with his army, rather as hostages for the fidelity of their countrymen, than as auxiliaries in the war. The fleet consisted of five hundred and sixty transport vessels, twenty-eight armed gallies, with many tenders, and small craft provided by officers for their own accommodation, and for the reception of their equipages; making in all eight hundred sail.

The wind being northerly for five-and-twenty days<sup>2</sup> after the fleet was assembled, the troops still remained on shore. At the expiration of this time the wind changed, and the troops began to embark, but were suddenly interrupted by the desertion of a Gaulish chief, who, being averse to the service, thought this a favourable opportunity to disengage himself with his followers. Cæsar considered

<sup>1</sup> The legions, at the end of this campaign, were reduced to 3,500.

<sup>2</sup> See Cæsar's Commentaries.

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considered this desertion as a declaration of war, and being sensible of the danger he might incur in case of any disaster by having such enemies in his rear, suspended the embarkation, and sent a party of horse in pursuit of the fugitive, who, being overtaken, was killed in attempting to defend himself. His followers were brought back, and obliged with others of the country to join the forces that were destined for Britain.

On the return of the party employed in this service the embarkation proceeded, and being completed at sunset of the same day, the wind being still fair, the fleet weighed, and got into the Channel; but the wind, soon after having failed, or shifted more to the west, and the tide being set to the northward, they were carried a considerable way in that direction past the port for which they had steered. At day-break, they saw the land of Britain on their left, and seemed to leave some conspicuous part of the island, probably the South Foreland, astern: but with the turn of the tide, and the help of their oars, they arrived at noon at a convenient part of the coast not far distant from the landing-place of the former year, but less exposed to the sea. This place we may suppose to have been *Pigwell Bay*, beyond the mouth of the Stour, or the entry to Sandwich Haven<sup>1</sup>.

The

<sup>1</sup> Mr d'Anville, on a supposition that Cæsar must have passed into Britain by the shortest possible line, fixes upon Hith, about eight miles west of Dover, as the place of his landing in his first invasion of Britain; and, consequently, on some other contiguous part as the place of his landing in the second invasion: but this does not agree, either with the description of the



The Britons had assembled as formerly to oppose the descent of the Romans; but, on the appearance of so great a fleet, were intimidated, and again withdrew from the coast.

Cæsar, flattering himself that he had found a safer road for his ships than that at which he had stationed them in the preceding year, left his fleet at anchor, and guarded against any attempts of the natives by a body of ten cohorts and three hundred horse, who were properly intrenched on the shore. Being informed that the Britons had their forces assembled on a small river (probably the *Stour*), at the distance of ten or twelve miles from his landing-place, he put his army in motion in the night, and at break of day came up with them, dislodged them from their post, and obliged them to withdraw to a place of retreat in that neighbourhood, which, on occasion of their own wars, had been fortified in their manner with a mote, and ramparts of wood. To reduce them in this stronghold, he erected some works, and made regular approaches; but as he had not invested the place, the only effect of his attack was, to force the enemy to abandon their station, and to continue their retreat. He had taken his resolution to pursue them on the following day, and had begun his march in three divisions, when it

coast, being *planum et apertum littus*, or with the sequel of the story, which places some such river as the *Stour* to be passed in his march, about twelve miles from where he debarked. The coast at Hith, though not altogether inaccessible, is steep and hilly, and would have exposed Cæsar to difficulties in his first operations on shore, which he could not possibly have omitted to mention.

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it appeared, that the element which so greatly favours the defences of Britain, though not always sufficient to keep its enemies at a distance, yet is subject to accidents which render the attempt of invaders abortive, and their condition, even when on shore, sufficiently hazardous. To this purpose a messenger overtook Cæsar on his march with tidings, that all his ships, in a storm which arose in the preceding night, had been driven from their anchors, had run foul of one another, that many of them were stranded or wrecked, and all of them greatly damaged.

On this report Cæsar suspended his march, and, having fixed the main body of his army in a well-fortified camp; he himself with a proper escort, returned to the coast. At his arrival, he found that forty of his ships were irrecoverably lost; but that the remainder, though greatly damaged, might be refitted. For this purpose he gave orders in the army, that all who had been instructed in the trade of a carpenter, should repair to the sea-port to be employed in restoring the fleet; he called many workmen likewise from Gaul, and gave directions for building a number of new vessels on different parts of that coast; and to guard, for the future, against such accidents as had lately befallen his ships, he ordered that they should be drawn up on shore. In this work part of the army was incessantly employed for ten days, and without intermission even in the night. The fleet, at length,

being

being in this manner secured from the dangers of the sea, and covered by an intrenchment on the side of the land, he returned to his camp, and resumed the operations he had projected for his farther progress in the island.

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It appears that the natives of Britain, being divided into many small cantons or separate principalities, and, as usual in such cases, frequently at war among themselves, had been actually so engaged when Cæsar arrived; but, during the short respite which the disastrous state of his fleet had given them, they had agreed to suspend their own quarrels, and were assembled in greater numbers than formerly, under Cassivelaunus, a chieftain of Middlesex, or, as Cæsar describes him, a prince residing on the northern banks of the Thames, and about seventy or eighty miles from the sea.

This chieftain brought into the field a numerous army of infantry, of horsemen, and armed chariots. His knowledge of the woods enabled him to harass the Romans on their march, and, following the tracts that were clear of underwood, not only to gall them with missiles from the thickets, but to charge them likewise with his horsemen and chariots, even in places where the ground seemed least fitted to the movement of such bodies. Encouraged with his success in this species of warfare, he ventured to attack the Roman cavalry, which, being on a foraging party, was supported by an entire legion. But being defeated in this

CHAP. attempt, with great slaughter, he lost courage, or  
 XXII. was deserted by his followers, and never more attempted to face the victorious enemy.

Cæsar, finding this chieftain remit his ardour, advanced with a quicker pace. From his silence on the subject of any difficulty in passing the Medway, we must suppose him to have followed the vale of the Stour to Ashford, and from thence to have kept on the plains to Maidstone, near to which place the river Medway is every where naturally fordable ; and from the length of his march, being about eighty miles from the sea, when he came upon the banks of the Thames, we may suppose him to have arrived somewhere below where it winds nearly from south to north, between Kingstone and Brentford. There he observes, that the only ford in the river was fenced and guarded ; having a row of sharp stakes driven under water, and the opposite bank lined with a palisade, which was manned by a numerous body of the natives. He nevertheless proceeded to force his way, and by the impetuosity of his attack, drove the enemy from their post, and, without any loss, effected his passage, although his men were obliged to wade up to the chin.

Cassivelaunus had, for some time, made no attempt to resist the Roman army ; he had contented himself with observing their motions, and with endeavouring to strip the country before them of every particular by which they could profit on their



their march. Cæsar, on his part, advanced with the precautions necessary against such an enemy, and, as they had destroyed what could be of immediate use to his army, he destroyed what was left, in order to distress the natives, and force them to submission. In this state of the war, having leisure and opportunity to observe the condition of the country and the manners of the People, he gives the following account of both: "That on the coast there were colonies from the neighbouring continent, still distinguished by the names of the countries from whence they had come; that these colonies, being possessed of agriculture, and well stocked with cattle, were extremely populous; that they had money coined of iron or brass; the first of which metals, with great quantities of tin, were found in their own island; the other metal was imported from abroad; that the winter was milder here than in Gaul; that the woods of Britain furnished the same timber with those of Gaul, except the fir and the beech; and that the houses were built in the same manner in both countries." From this account of the coast he proceeds to observe, "That the inland parts were occupied by the original natives, who, with little corn, subsisted chiefly by milk and the other produce of their herds; that, by a particular superstition, although hares were numerous in the fields, and the country well stocked with geese, and other

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“ such fowls, the people were forbid to eat of these  
“ animals ; that they were curious in the ornaments  
“ of the person, affected to have bushy whiskers,  
“ and long hair ; that they stained or painted their  
“ bodies of a blue colour, and had peculiar  
“ clothes besides the skins of beasts ; that they associ-  
“ ated in small clubs or fraternities, of ten or a dozen  
“ men in number.” And with respect to these, add  
a circumstance, in which, if he were not deceived  
as is common enough to foreigners, by some appearances  
which were not sufficiently explained to him, he  
gives a striking example of the diversity which  
takes place among mankind in settling the canons  
of external actions. The brothers, the father, and  
the son, though separately married, and reputed  
parents of the children brought forth by their respec-  
tive wives, yet, without jealousy or imputation  
of evil, cohabited with those wives in common.<sup>1</sup>

Cæsar, being on the northern bank, or on the  
left of the Thames, made an alliance with the  
Trinobantes, supposed to have been inhabitants of  
Essex and Suffolk. The sovereign of this canton,  
having, in some quarrel with his own people, been  
expelled from his kingdom, had taken refuge with  
Cæsar in Gaul, and was now, by force of the Roman  
arms, restored to his kingdom. Five other  
principalities made their submission at the same  
time. Cassivelaunus retired to his principal fort

trell

<sup>1</sup> See Cæsar's Commentaries on his last expedition to Britain.

treſs, which, conſiſting of a palifade and a ditch ſituate in the leaſt acceſſible part of the woods, was by the natives, as Cæſar is pleaſed to expreſs himſelf, called a town, and was in reality, in caſe of alarm, a place of retreat for themſelves and their cattle. Upon the approach and attack of Cæſar Caſſivelaunus retired by an outlet on the oppoſite ſide of his ſtronghold, leaving ſome herds of cattle, and many of his men, to fall into the enemy's hand.

After this defeat, the Britiſh prince endeavoured, as a laſt reſource, to give Cæſar an alarm on his rear; and for this purpoſe ſent an order to the four princes of Kent, to aſſemble their people, endeavour to force the Roman ſtation, and deſtroy the ſhipping, where it lay on the coaſt. They accordingly attacked the intrenchment, but were repulſed; and Caſſivelaunus himſelf, reduced to deſpair by the defection of ſo many of his countrymen, and by his repeated defeats, determined to make his ſubmiſſion. Meanwhile the ſeaſon of the year being far advanced, and Cæſar, deſirous to retire with honour from a country in which he was not prepared to make any permanent ſettlement, accepted, on eaſy terms, the offer which was made to him.

A certain tribute was impoſed on the nations inhabiting the banks of the Thames, hoſtages taken for the payment of it, and the invaders, with a numerous aſſemblage of captives, then the only

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or principal spoils of this island, retired to their ships, which, not being sufficient to receive them at one embarkation, were obliged to return for a second; and in this way successively, without any material accident, transported the whole of the Roman army into Gaul.

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## C H A P. XXIII.

*Death of Julia the Daughter of Cæsar and the Wife of Pompey.—Trial of Gabinius.—Detection of an infamous Transaction of Memmius and Abenobarbus.—Revolt of the Low Countries.—Military Execution against the Inhabitants of the Country between the Rhine and the Meuse.—Operations of Crassus in Mesopotamia.—His Death.—Competition for the Consulate.—Death of Clodius.—Riot in the City.—Pompey sole Consul.—Trial of Milo.*

WHILE the Roman army was in Britain, there happened, by the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and the wife of Pompey, a great change in the condition of parties at Rome, this being a discontinuance of the relation which subsisted between those rivals in the State, and a separation of their political interests, to unite no more. The connection which then came to be dissolved, had been devised as a bond of confederacy between parties whose interfering objects of pursuit, always a subject of jealousy, must otherwise on many occasions have proceeded to a manifest breach. Neither the father-in-law, nor the son, indeed, was likely to sacrifice his ambition to mere affection, but each may have expected, that the other should be, in some degree, the dupe of his relation, or should abate a little of the jealousy to which he was, by his situation and his objects,

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so much inclined. This passion, however, we may believe, was far from having been extinguished in the mind of either. The choice which Pompey made of Spain for his province, with a military command for a term of five years, sufficiently bespoke his emulation of Cæsar, and even his apprehension of a struggle, in which the force of armies was to decide. Cæsar had the advantage of being nearer the Capital: but in a position to be awed by the forces of Pompey on his rear, and by the resources of a province better matured under the dominion of Rome.

Notwithstanding the effects of emulation imperfectly disguised, whilst the familiar relation of father-in-law and son subsisted between Cæsar and Pompey, and while Crassus continued to hold a species of balance in their councils, they seemed to acquiesce in a participation of popularity and of power. But the death of Julia, and that likewise of the child of which she had been delivered only a few days before her death, put an end, not only to any real cordiality in this connection, but even to any semblance of regard, and rendered them, from this time forward, more openly jealous of the advantages they severally gained, whether in respect to force in the provinces, or to state and consideration at Rome.

It is observed, that, from this date, Cæsar became more than formerly attentive to reports from the city, or watchful of his intelligence from  
thence ;

thence<sup>1</sup>; and that he endeavoured to gain every person who might be of consequence in deciding the contest which he perceived must arise. Among these he paid his court in particular to Cicero, who was otherwise likely, about this time, to devote himself entirely to Pompey, and whom he wished, at least, to keep in suspense between them: for this purpose, as appears from their correspondence, he applied, as usual, to his vanity, and, while he himself was piercing the woods of Britain in pursuit of Cassivelaunus and his painted followers<sup>2</sup>, affected to read and to admire verses composed and sent to him by Cicero, a person much more esteemed for his prose than his poetry.

The Roman army had been tempted into Britain by the hopes of finding mines of silver, but were disappointed; for, besides slaves, they did not find any booty in this island. Such probably likewise were the principal spoils of Gaul; yet we find their general, in consequence of his conquests in that country, enabled to expend great sums in supporting his influence at Rome. While Pompey procured his own appointment to the command of an army, in order to keep pace with Cæsar in the provinces, Cæsar, in his turn, projected public works at Rome, to vie with the magnificence of Pompey, and with that of other citizens, who engaged in such works as a part of their policy to gain the People. For this purpose Cæsar proposed to

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. et lib. iii. ep. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. ii. ep. ult. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.



CHAP. to build a Basilica<sup>1</sup>, and to enlarge the Forum, at  
 XXIII. an expence of six millions Roman money, or about  
 fifty thousand pounds; to rail in the field of Mars  
 with marble ballisters, and to surround the whole  
 with a colonade or portico extending a thousand  
 paces, or about an entire mile.

In these works Cæsar affected to consult or to employ Cicero in a manner which flattered his vanity, and renewed his hopes of being able to direct his councils also<sup>2</sup> in what related to matters of State.

In the mean time, parties in the city, though engaged on the side of different competitors for office at the approaching elections, were likewise intent on the cause of Gabinius, which involved, in some measure, the interest and credit of Pompey, by whom he was supported. This officer, while yet in his province, had been impeached for disobeying the orders of the Senate, and for contempt of religion in his expedition to Egypt. But having, by the joint influence of Pompey and of Cæsar, eluded this first attack, he set out for Rome in great confidence, and, on his journey, gave out, that he was to demand a triumph. But, upon his approach to the city, hearing in what manner the Senate and People were affected towards him, he thought proper to make his entry in the night; and being arrived, on the eighteenth of September, did not even venture to appear in the Senate for  
 ten

<sup>1</sup> What the Romans called a Basilica or palace, was a kind of exchange, containing porticoes for merchants, and other public accommodations.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.



ten days. No less than three prosecutions were preparing against him: for treason, for extortion in his province, and for other crimes. The first day on which he presented himself in the Senate, the Consuls, when he would have withdrawn, commanded him to stay. And, having called the farmers of the revenue from Syria, who attended with a complaint from the province, bid them state their charge.

An altercation ensued, in which Cicero, mindful of the injuries he had received from Gabinius, took a principal part against him, and pronounced an invective, which the other returned with the abusive appellation of *fugitive*, in allusion to his late exile<sup>1</sup>. Yet, soon after, when this criminal was brought to trial for extortion in his province, Cicero, as will be mentioned, undertook, at the solicitation of Pompey, to appear in his defence.

Before this trial for extortion took place, C. Memmius, one of the Tribunes, on the ninth of October, delivered to the People, with great force, a charge of treason against Gabinius<sup>2</sup>. The judgment of the Tribes being called for, and sentence of condemnation likely to pass, while the Lictors were preparing to seize their prisoner, his son, a young man, with much filial piety, a virtue highly esteemed by the Romans, threw himself at the feet of the Tribune, and, being rudely spurned on the

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. iii.

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the ground, happened to drop his ring, the badge of Roman nobility; the spectators were moved; Lelius Balbus, another of the Tribunes, interposed, and, with the general approbation of the People, commanded the process to stop <sup>1</sup>.

The other prosecutions nevertheless were continued against the offender. One before the Prætor Alfius, in which, though the majority of the judges voted to acquit, there were twenty-two, out of seventy, who voted guilty <sup>2</sup>. Another before Cato, on a charge of depredation in his province, to the amount of quater millies, four hundred millions Roman money, or about three millions sterling; in this last suit he was condemned, and forced into exile. At this trial, Pompey and Cæsar continued to employ their influence in his favour. And even Cicero, although he had hitherto treated Gabinius as the author of his own exile, being reconciled to Pompey and Cæsar, no longer continued at variance with a person, who had been no more than their tool or instrument in procuring his misfortunes, and condescended, on this occasion, though ineffectually, to plead his cause <sup>3</sup>.

After this bustle was over, the approaching elections gave rise to competitions and intrigues more connected with the state of the republic, and more an indication of the manners which then prevailed. The poorer citizens were come in a great measure

<sup>1</sup> Val. Max. lib. viii. c. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 63. Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 1. & 3.

ture to depend for their subsistence on the distributions of corn from the granaries, and on other gratuities, which were made or procured by those who courted popularity, or who aspired to the offices of State. Corruption became every day more flagrant or less disguised ; and the laws against bribery were losing their force for want of persons to prosecute a crime, of which so many either wished to reap the benefit, or which many were so strongly tempted to commit. To supply this defect, Cato moved in the Senate, That every one elected into office should be subjected to an inquest, even if no one should prosecute<sup>1</sup> ; and actually obtained an edict, requiring the ordinary judges, who were named for trials within the year, to take cognizance of the means by which candidates succeeded to office ; and to set those aside who were found to have incurred the penalties of corruption<sup>2</sup>. The Tribunes interposed their negative, or suspended the effect of this resolution, until an act of the People should be obtained to confirm it. The proposal gave great offence to the parties concerned ; and Cato, being attacked by the populace, narrowly escaped with his life. He afterwards, in a full assembly of the more respectable citizens, was favourably heard on this subject. But Terentius, one of the Tribunes, still persisting in his negative, this attempt to restrain the corrupt practices

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

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tices of those who canvassed for office, had no farther effect.

The candidates themselves, in the mean time, if each could have trusted the laws for restraining others, as well as himself, from the practice of giving money, or if any number of them could have relied upon an agreement to be entered into among themselves to refrain from it, would, it is probable, have been glad to be relieved from an abuse which rendered their pretensions so expensive and so precarious. Moved by these considerations, candidates for the office of the Tribune entered into an agreement not to bribe, and deposited each a sum of money<sup>1</sup> in the hands of Cato, to be forfeited by any person who should be found acting in contravention to their treaty<sup>2</sup>. One of them, however, was detected in giving money, and accordingly forfeited his pledge.

In the competition for the Consulate, corruption was carried to the greatest excess. An office was opened, at which the candidates dealt out money to the People, who came in the order of their Tribes to receive it<sup>3</sup>. A gratuity of ten millions of sesterces<sup>4</sup>, was offered to any person who should secure the vote of the first Century, or, as it was called, the *Prerogativa*. The demand for money to be employed in this species of traffic became so great, that by the first of July interest rose from  
four

<sup>1</sup> Quingena, 500,000 Roman money, about 4000 l.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 15. ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. c. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 17.

<sup>4</sup> About 80,000 l.



four to eight per cent. <sup>1</sup>. All the four candidates, CHAP. XXIII.  
 Memmius, M. Scaurus, Cn. Domitius, and M. Messala, mutually raised prosecutions for bribery against each other; and in the course of these transactions, it appeared that Caius Memmius, once a vehement partizan of the Senate against Cæsar, had made his peace with this enemy, and was now supported by his party at Rome.

Memmius, it may be remembered, having been Prætor at the expiration of Cæsar's Consulship, brought a charge of high misdemeanour in office against him. And Cæsar appeared for some time to resent this attack; but was in reality as little to be diverted from his purpose by resentment, as he was by affection, and knew how to choose his friends from among those who had the resolution to provoke, as well as from among those who inclined to serve him. Cæsar accordingly, in the present ardour of competition, found means to separate Memmius from the rest of his enemies, and by his means brought to light a scene of corruption, in which Memmius himself, with other professed supporters of the Senate, had been concerned, and which furnished the supposed popular party with a great triumph against these pretenders to purity of manners and disinterested virtue.

It appeared that, among other irregularities at Rome in the administration of government, even laws, and supposed acts of the Senate or People, could be forged or surreptitiously obtained. The present

<sup>1</sup> Ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. Idibus quintilibus scenus fuit besibus ex triente.

CHAP. present Consuls, Cn. Domitius, Ahenobarbus, and  
 XXIII. Ap. Claud. Pulcher, entered into a compact with two of those who were candidates to succeed them, Caius Memmius and C. Domitius Calvinus: the two first, to secure their own nomination to lucrative provinces at the expiration of their Consulship; the two others now standing for this office, to secure their elections. The parties agreed to forge an edict of the Senate and of the People, fixing the consular provinces. And a sum of money was deposited by the candidates in the hands of the Consuls, to be forfeited, if they did not support this forgery, with the evidence of three Augurs, who should vouch for the passing of the law in the assembly of the People, and two Senators of consular dignity, who should swear they were present when this allotment of provinces was confirmed by the Senate, although it was notorious that no meeting of the Senate had ever been held for this purpose.

Memmius being gained by what was called the popular party, was persuaded to sacrifice his own reputation, in order to ruin that of Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was held in esteem by the other. He laid this strange agreement, which had been drawn up in writing, together with the bonds which had been granted upon it, before the Senate. Appius Claudius braved the detection; but Ahenobarbus, professing himself to be of a party which contended for purity and reformation of manners, incurred much reproach and disgrace.

From

From this transaction it should appear, that not only the assemblies of the People, as we have said, were extremely irregular and tumultuary, and might be made up of such persons as were by any party purposely brought to the Comitium; but that even the meetings of the Senate might be packed; that their proceedings were carelessly recorded, and might be easily forged. The numbers required to form a Comitium or collective body of citizens, not being fixed by law, any convention of persons at which a Tribune presided, occupying the usual place of assembly, might take upon them the designation and powers of the Roman People; and as the fluctuating sovereignty of the State by this means passed from one party to another, its orders were often surreptitious and contradictory, and every act might be considered as the mandate of a party or faction in the field, not as the will of the community<sup>1</sup>. Great as these disorders were, there were at all times numerous parties who had an interest in the continuance of them; and the age, though suffering under the most grievous abuses, was still more averse to the necessary reformati-  
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The infamy of this recent transaction produced a delay of the elections, until the term of the present Consuls in office was expired. An interregnum accordingly ensued. The partizans of Pompey hinted the necessity of naming a Dictator. He himself affected great reserve, in expectation

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that

<sup>1</sup> Dion. Cassius, lib. xxxix. c. 65.

CHAP. that when the present troubles came to their height  
 XXIII. the powers necessary to suppress them would, by  
 general consent, be pressed into his hands.

In the mean time Cæsar, whose councils were wont to have so great a share in determining such events, was detained in the northern parts of Gaul, and was obliged, contrary to his usual practice, to pass the whole winter on this side of the Alps. On his return from Britain, finding that the harvest in Gaul had been scanty, he was tempted, in order to facilitate the subsistence of his army, to extend his quarters much farther than had been his ordinary practice. Labienus, with one division, was sent to the Moselle; Titurius Sabinus, with another, to the neighbourhood of the Meuse, near to what are now the districts of Liege and Maestricht. Quintus Cicero was posted on some of the branches of the Scheld or the Sambre, in the county of Hainault. And the whole army, by this disposition, extended from the Seine to the Meuse about Maestricht, and from the sea to the neighbourhood of Treves. The distance at which the posts were placed from each other being observed by the natives, who still bore with impatience the intrusion and usurpation of these strangers, tempted them to form a design against each of the quarters apart, and by cutting them off, to rid their country for ever of these imperious and insatiable guests who acted as lords or proprietors on every territory into which they were received, and branded every



act of resistance to their unjust usurpation with the name of defection and rebellion.

In execution of this design, Ambiorix, leader of the nations which were situated in the angle, above the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, and round the quarters of Sabinus, which are supposed to have been at a place which is now called Tongres, suddenly presented himself with a numerous body before the Roman station, and endeavoured to force the intrenchment; but being repulsed, had recourse to an artifice in which he succeeded. Affecting a great regard for the Romans, he desired that he might have an opportunity of communicating to their general a matter of the most serious concern. An officer being sent to him upon this request, he pretended to disclose, with the utmost regret, a secret design formed by the Gauls to cut off the Roman army; gave notice that a great body of Germans had already passed the Rhine to join in the execution of this purpose; that he himself had been very much averse to the project; but had been obliged to give way to the popular impetuosity of his countrymen, which he could not restrain; that all he could do was to warn the Romans of their danger, to the end that they might, in the most effectual manner, consult their own safety. If the commander at this place, while it was in his power, chose to gain the nearest station of his own people, it was possible to hinder his being molested on the march: but if he should hesitate for

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any time, or did not depart before the Germans arrived, it would no longer be in the power of any friend to avert the storm with which he was threatened.

This admonition, even from an enemy, after a long debate in the council of war, determined Sabinus to quit his present situation. He accordingly began a march of fifty miles towards the quarters of Quintus Cicero. And falling into a snare, which the treacherous chieftain had laid for him, perished, with an entire legion and five cohorts, of whom the greater part were put to the sword. Some got back to the station they had left, but finding no security in that place, killed themselves in despair. A very few escaped, by the woods, to Labienus on the Moselle.

The natives, thus encouraged by the success of their first operation, pushed on to the quarters of Quintus Cicero, armed and assembled the country as they passed, and arrived with such expedition, that they intercepted all the parties which were abroad in search of wood, provisions, or forage, and made so unexpected an attack on the Roman station, as left Cicero scarcely time sufficient to man his intrenchments. The Nervii making part of this insurrection, renewed the artifice which had been practised with so much success against Sabinus. But Cicero, though unacquainted with the manner in which the legion retiring from Tongres had been betrayed, determined to remain in his camp, and with the utmost dispatch to make Cæsar acquainted with his danger. For this purpose, while  
he

he strengthened his post with additional works, he published a reward to the first person who should succeed in carrying intelligence to the nearest quarter of the Roman army.

The enemy being about sixty thousand men, formed a circle, facing to the centre, quite round the Roman intrenchment; and, the more effectually to cut off all communication of supplies or intelligence from without, effected a line of circumvallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a breastwork eleven feet high, extending over a circumference of fifteen miles<sup>1</sup>. In this work, being unprovided with intrenching tools, they were obliged, as Cæsar reports, to cut the turf with their swords, and fetch earth in their cloaks. But having broke ground at once on every point of a circumference, which their number was sufficient to cover, the whole was accomplished in no more than three hours.

From this line, which they formed by the direction of some Italian deserters, they made regular approaches to the Roman intrenchment; and, having pushed their turrets quite up to the ditch, threw, by means of their slings, red hot bullets and burning darts into the thatch with which the winter huts of the camp were covered; set them on fire; and, in the midst of the confusion which arose from this circumstance, endeavoured to scale the palisade and the parapet.

While Cicero continued, with great ability and courage, to withstand these attacks, the persons

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who

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gallico, lib. v. c. 41.

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who endeavoured to carry the tidings of his situation to Cæsar, were repeatedly intercepted, and, to deter others from renewing the same attempt cruelly tortured. The intelligence, however, was at last carried to the head-quarters of the Roman army, by a native Gaul, who, availing himself of the dress, manners, and language of his country, passed unobserved through the lines of the enemy.

Cæsar, as usual, trusting more to dispatch and rapid execution than to the numbers of his men, left a legion at Samarobriva<sup>1</sup> to guard his stores, magazines, and baggage, and with two other legions, not exceeding seven thousand men, being all that, without hazarding an improper delay, he could assemble, hastened his march to the quarter from which this alarm was brought. He, at the same time, dispatched two messengers, one to Labienus, with orders, if possible, to put the troops under his command in motion towards the Meuse, and another to Quintus Cicero himself, with hopes or assurances of immediate relief. The first messenger found Labienus beset with a numerous army of Gauls, and therefore unable to move; the other, having come to the foot of Cicero's intrenchment, cast the billet which contained the intelligence, wound up on the shaft of a dart, against one of the towers, where it stuck, and hung for some days unobserved; but being found at last, it was carried to Cicero, and gave notice of Cæsar's approach. At the same time the fire and the smoke

<sup>1</sup> Amiens.



of his camp began to appear on the plain, and gave both parties equal intimation of his coming. CHAP.  
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The Gauls, without delay, got in motion with all their force, and having abandoned their lines of circumvallation, advanced to meet Cæsar. Cicero sent him intelligence of this movement of the enemy. And the armies arrived nearly at the same time on the opposite sides of a brook running in a hollow tract between steep banks, which neither party in the presence of the other could safely venture to pass.

Cæsar, supposing that the inferiority of his numbers might inspire the Gauls with contempt, endeavoured, by exceeding his usual caution, to feed their presumption. He affected to choose a ground that was fit to secure his camp; and contracting its limits, crowded both his legions within the dimensions which were usually occupied by one. In this posture he meant to await the effects of the enemy's temerity, or, if they declined passing the brook, he proposed to avail himself of the security they were likely to feel, and by surprise to attack them in their own camp.

The event justified Cæsar in his first expectation. The Gauls, trusting to the superiority of their numbers, thought they had nothing to dread but the escape of their enemy; and they accordingly began to scale the banks of the rivulet, in order to surround them. Upon their approach, instead of waiting to defend his camp, he poured forth his two legions at once from all its avenues, and, with the

CHAP. advantage of a surprise upon those who meant to  
 XXIII. assail him, and by the great superiority which the  
 Romans ever had, when mixed sword in hand with  
 an enemy, routed, dispersed, or forced to lay down  
 their arms, the greater part of this multitude which  
 had advanced to the ground with so much ferocity  
 and confidence.

By this victory Cæsar not only relieved Quintus  
 Cicero, whom he joined the same evening, but  
 likewise dispelled the cloud which hung over the  
 other separate quarters of his army, of which ma-  
 ny had been at the same time invested by the na-  
 tives. These insurrections, however, which kept  
 all the inhabitants of the low countries in mo-  
 tion, even in the most unfavourable season, gave  
 him the prospect of an early and a busy campaign,  
 and so much disconcerted the plan which he had  
 formed for the winter, that he was hindered, as  
 has been now mentioned, from making his usual  
 journey across the Alps.

During this necessary stay in Gaul, it does not  
 appear that the interests which Cæsar commonly  
 studied were suffering in any considerable degree  
 at Rome. The civil government in the city was  
 hastening fast to its ruin, and the longest sword  
 was soon likely to decide the sovereignty of the  
 empire. The office of Consul was unoccupied,  
 and continued to be so from the beginning of Ja-  
 nuary to the middle of July. In all this time  
 there was no administration of justice, nor any  
 exercise

exercise of magistracy, besides that of the Interrex, who, during the five days of his appointment, was supposed to have no other object besides the elections of Consuls. This object was vainly attempted by every successive Interrex. The popular tumults were fomented by the Tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey; and some prodigy, or unfortunate presage, was continually alleged, to prevent the elections. The Senate, striving to put an end to these disorders, even ventured to commit to prison Q. Pompeius Rufus, a Tribune, who seemed to be most active in disturbing the public peace. The occasion seemed ripe for the execution of a design, which was some time a hatching, to throw the whole powers of the State into the hands of Pompey; and accordingly another Tribune, Luceius Hirrus, known to be in the secret of all his intrigues, moved that he should be named Dictator<sup>1</sup>. He himself, as usual on such occasions, kept aloof from the assembly, and was ready, as the case might require, to avow or to disown the measures of his party.

This motion was strongly opposed by Cato, and appeared to be extremely disagreeable to all the principal members of the Senate<sup>2</sup>. Pompey therefore thought proper to disclaim the measure, denied his having encouraged the Tribune who made the motion, and even refused to accept of any such power,

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio. D. Con. Cicero epist. ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

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power, if it should be offered; adding, That he had been already called to the exercise of great powers earlier than he himself had expected; and that he had always resigned such powers earlier than had been expected by any one else<sup>1</sup>. In this was expressed the great object of Pompey's ambition; he preferred this point of estimation to the possession of power itself. The odium of the proposed measure fell upon Luceius Hirrus, the Tribune who moved it, and had nearly brought upon him a deposition or degradation from his office. Cato, willing to gain Pompey, or to confirm him in the virtue he assumed, pronounced an encomium on this act of moderation, recommended the republic to his care, and encouraged him in the resolution he had taken, to prefer the esteem of his fellow-citizens even to the power of disposing of their lives at his pleasure and fortunes. Pompey from thenceforward joined with the Senate in bringing on the elections; and accordingly, after seven months interval of confusion and anxiety, Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were chosen and entered on office in the month of July.

U. C. 700.  
Cn. Dom.  
Calvinus,  
M. Val.  
Messala,  
Cos.

While Pompey was endeavouring, by his intrigues in the city, to make a species of monarchy in his own person appear to be necessary, Cæsar was in fact providing himself with the only means which, in so distracted a state, can either acquire or preserve such a power. He was joining three additional legions to the establishment of his province;

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Vit. Pompeii.



vince; and, under pretence of his late losses on the Meuse, or of his fears of a general defection in Gaul, he had the address to bring into his own service a legion which had been recently formed in Italy under the commission of Pompey. This legion he now borrowed, and, as will appear in the sequel, either actually debauched, or rendered of doubtful fidelity, if ever it should be recalled and destined to act against himself.

While he took these measures for the augmentation of his forces, and before the end of winter, having intelligence that the Nervii, or the inhabitants of the county of Hainault, who had such a share in the attack of Cicero's station, were holding frequent consultations together, and were about to take arms, he determined to prevent them; and for this purpose, with four legions drawn from the nearest quarters, he marched into their country, and, without meeting with any opposition, destroyed their habitations, moved away their cattle, and made many prisoners. He continued these severities until the natives, reduced to great distress, implored his mercy, and gave hostages for their future submission.

Having, in the course of this winter, called the nations of Gaul to a general congress at an island in the Seine <sup>1</sup>, he began the operations of the following summer by punishing some of the cantons <sup>2</sup>, who had absented themselves from that assembly, and who, by this act of disrespect, had incurred his

<sup>1</sup> Now Paris.

<sup>2</sup> The Senones and Carnutes.

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his resentment, or given him suspicion of hostile intentions. The principal object of the campaign, however, was the punishment of Ambiorix and his countrymen, by whom, as has been related, Sabinus, with a legion and five cohorts, had been circumvented and cut off in the beginning of the preceding winter,

As the Romans scarcely appear to have conceived that any people had a right to withstand their invasions, and treated as rebellion every attempt a nation once vanquished made to recover its liberties, Cæsar states it as necessary for the credit of the Roman army, for the security of their quarters, and for preventing such acts of supposed perfidy in future, that the subjects of Ambiorix should suffer an exemplary punishment. To secure this effect, he projected two expeditions; one to the right and the other to the left of this enemy's country, with intention to preclude them from any retreat or assistance on either side. In execution of this design, he penetrated into the woods and marshes on the left of the Meuse, and obliged the inhabitants to come under engagements not to assist or harbour any enemy of his, if they should attempt to take refuge in that country.

From thence, still avoiding to give any alarm to the nation which was the principal object of these operations, and having formerly sent his baggage under an escort of two legions to the Moselle, he now followed in the same direction with the whole of his army; and finding that Labienus had, by a recent victory.

victory, vanquished all his enemies in that quarter, he continued his march to the Rhine, constructed a bridge on that river a little way higher up than the place at which he had formerly passed, and once more set foot upon German ground. CHAP.  
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The Suevi, and other great migrating nations of the continent, having recently moved to the eastward, leaving nothing behind them but deserts, on which no army could subsist, he contented himself with exacting hostages from the Ubii and other contiguous nations, to secure their neutrality, or rather to make sure of their concurrence in the execution of his sanguinary project. And with these pledges he repassed the Rhine, broke down part of his bridge, and left a guard of twelve cohorts properly intrenched to secure the remainder.

From thence he sent forward his cavalry, with orders to make quick and silent marches into the countries he meant to lay waste, and himself followed with the infantry. Hitherto Ambiorix and his countrymen, who were the principal objects of all these operations, had taken no alarm, and had enjoyed such perfect security, that the leader himself, upon the arrival of Cæsar's horse in his quarters, narrowly escaped, and had no more than time, by a general intimation, to warn his people to consult their own safety. They accordingly separated, part hid themselves in the contiguous marshes, others endeavoured to find refuge with some neighbouring nations, or fled to the islands

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islands that were formed at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine.

Cæsar, as if he had been forming a party of hunters, separated his army into three divisions; sent Labienus with one division to pursue those who fled to the confluence of the two rivers; Tribonius with the second up the course of the Meuse; and he himself, in pursuit of Ambiorix, directed his march to the Scheld. His orders were, that each division should put all they met to the sword, and calculate their time so as to return to the place of general rendezvous in seven days.

To render this execution the more complete, all the neighbouring nations were invited to partake in the spoils of a country that was doomed to destruction. Among the parties who were allured by this invitation, two thousand German horse had passed the Rhine, and continued in a body to ravage all the country before them, without even respecting the Roman posts. Cæsar, in making a disposition for his present march, had lodged the whole baggage of his army at the station (supposed to be Tongres), which in the preceding winter had been fortified for the quarters of Sabinus. Here the works being still entire, he left a guard with his baggage under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero.

The Germans, in the present instance, knowing no distinction of friend or enemy, ceased to plunder the natives of the country, and turned all their thoughts on seizing the baggage of the Roman army. Their coming was so little expected, that the



the traders and futtlers who had erected their stalls and displayed their merchandise, as usual, without the intrenchment, had no time to save their effects. Numbers of the guard which were posted with Cicero to cover the baggage were gone abroad in search of forage. The remainder with difficulty manned the avenues of their camp, and must have been forced, if the foragers, upon hearing the noise with which the Germans began the attack, had not returned to their relief, and forced their way through the enemy, who, mistaking them for a vanguard of the whole army, thought proper to consult their own safety by an immediate flight.

Cæsar, upon his return to the post at which the baggage of his army had been so much exposed, censured the officer commanding the guard for having divided his party, and for having omitted, on the supposition of any degree of security whatever, any part of the precautions usual upon such a duty. At the same time he continued to pursue the revenge he had projected against the unhappy followers of Ambiorix, sending parties in every direction to burn the houses, and to lay waste the fields which had been formerly spared or overlooked; and this being done on the approach of winter, made the destruction complete, as the few who might have escaped the sword must inevitably perish by famine, or by the asperity of the season.

The Roman general having in this manner made an example, which he supposed was to overawe all

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all the nations of that neighbourhood, withdrew with his army from a country in which he had made it impossible for any numbers of men to subsist; and having stationed two of his legions on the Moselle, and the remainder on the Marne, on the Seine, and the Loire, he himself hastened into Italy, where all his views and preparations ultimately centred. The scene of political intrigue, in which Crassus had hitherto bore a part with Pompey and himself, was now, in consequence of recent events on the other extremity of the empire, about to undergo a change, which was likely, in addition to the death of Julia, to affect the conduct of parties concerned.

In the spring, Crassus had taken the field on the frontier of Syria, with seven legions, four thousand horse, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he passed the Euphrates, was joined by an Arabian chieftain, who is mentioned by historians under different names, of Acbarus<sup>1</sup> or Ariamnes, in whom, on account of his supposed knowledge of the country, the Roman general had placed great confidence. Here he expected likewise to have been joined by Artabazes, King of Armenia; but Orodes, now on the throne of the Parthians, had prevented this junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in person, while he left Surena, a young warrior of great reputation, in Mesopotamia, to oppose the Romans.

Crassus

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch et Dion. Cass.

Crassus intended to have followed the course of the Euphrates to where it approaches nearest to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom ; but was dissuaded by his guide and confident Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his march eastward on the plains, where he might easily force the post of Surena, and at once effect his entrance into the enemy's country. Some parties too, that were advanced to examine the route which the army should take in that direction, reported, that they had been on the tract of departing cavalry, but that no enemy was any where to be seen. Thus Crassus was induced to quit the Euphrates, and, agreeably to the directions of his guide, took the route of Carræ to the eastward. This place he fortified in his way, and occupied with a garrison. From thence, in a few marches, he arrived on sandy and barren plains, without trees, herbage, or water. While the army, though discouraged by these appearances, still continued its march, a few horsemen belonging to the advanced guard returned to the main body with signs of terror, and brought an account that their division had been surrounded by numerous bodies of horse, and to a few cut off: that the enemy was advancing apace, and must soon appear. Crassus at first fearing to be outflanked, extended his front as far as he possibly could ; but recollecting that the Parthians were all on horseback, and by the rapidity of their motions might easily gain either or both his flanks, however extended, and

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on this account supposing it necessary to present a front in every direction, he changed his disposition from a line to a square, having his cavalry placed on the angles.

The Roman army being thus compacted, the Parthians soon after appeared on every side, came within reach of an arrow shot, and galled them without intermission. The weapons of the Romans, in this situation, availed them nothing; even the shield could not cover them from arrows, that showered from every quarter, and in many different directions. They stood however in their place with some degree of courage, in hopes that the quivers of the Parthians might soon be exhausted, and that this enemy would be obliged either to join them in close fight, or to retire. But they found themselves deceived in this expectation, observing that the enemy had a herd of camels in their rear, loaded with arrows, and that the quivers of those in the front were continually replenished from thence. At the same time Ariamnes, the supposed associate and guide, disappeared, or was perceived to go over to the enemy. The desertion of this traitor, by discovering that his pretended attachment, and his counsel, which had been unhappily followed, was only a piece of barbarous treachery to draw the army into its present situation, completed the general dismay which the Romans had already begun to feel. They crowded together in despair, and oppressed with heat and thirst, or stifled with dust,



dust, continued for a while, like beasts caught in a snare, to present a passive and an easy prey to their enemies. CHAP.  
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In this extremity, Crassus determined to make an effort with his cavalry to drive the enemy to such a distance, as not to be able to reach his infantry with their arrows. His son Publius accordingly formed the Roman horse into one body, and made a general charge, to which the Parthians, according to their usual practice, gave way in seeming disorder. The young man advanced with great impetuosity as against a flying enemy, and in hopes of completing his victory : but the Parthians, under cover of the dust which every where arose on the plain, instead of flying before him, as he supposed, were actually turning on his flanks, and even falling behind him to encompass his rear. The legions at the same time, happy to be relieved from the attack of an enemy who galled them, quitted their ground, and for a little resumed their march, a movement which enabled the Parthians the more effectually to surround the cavalry ; but the father, recollecting the danger to which he exposed his son, again prevailed on his columns to halt. In this situation, a few of the horse arrived, with accounts that they had been surrounded, that Crassus, the son, was slain, and the whole cut off, except a few who escaped to the father with these melancholy tidings.

Night, however, was fast approaching, and the Parthians, on a sudden, withdrew, sensible that their way of fighting might expose them to suffer

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many disadvantages in the dark. It was indeed their general practice to retire at night to a considerable distance from the enemy whom they had harassed by day, and upon these occasions they generally fled like an army defeated, until they had removed so far, as to make it safe for them to pasture their horses, and to store up their arms. Crassus apprised of this practice, took the benefit of the night to continue his retreat, and abandoning the sick and wounded of his army, made a considerable march before it was day. But the advance he had gained, was not sufficient to hinder his being overtaken by the same flying enemy, and again involved in the same distress. Having his defeats and his flights in the same manner renewed on every succeeding day, he arrived at last at the post which he had fortified at Carræ, and there found some respite from the attacks of the enemy. At this place, however, it was not possible to make any considerable stay, as the whole provisions of the army were lost or consumed, and such supplies as the country around might have furnished, were entirely in the power of the enemy. Nor was it convenient to depart immediately. The moon was then at the full, and night was almost as favourable to the Parthians as day. In these circumstances, it was determined to wait for the wain of the moon, and then, if possible, to elude the enemy again by marches in the night.

In this interval, the army mutinied against their general, and offered the command to Caius Cassius; but he, although desired even by Crassus himself,

himself, declined to accept of the charge<sup>1</sup>. The troops of consequence no longer obeyed any command whatever, and separated into two bodies. The first went off by the plains on the nearest way into Syria: the other took the route of the mountains; and if they could reach them before the enemy, hoped to escape into Cappadocia or Armenia. The first division was accompanied or commanded by Cassius, who, though with considerable loss, led them back into Syria. The other, with Crassus himself, was pursued by Surena, and harassed on every ground where the Parthian horse could ply on their flank or their rear. Being exposed to frequent losses, they suffered a continual diminution of their numbers, and were not likely to be long in condition to avoid the enemy, or make any resistance.

Surena, apprehending that these remains of the Roman army might gain the mountains before he could force them to surrender, sent a deputation to Crassus, proposing at some intermediate place, between the two armies, a conference, to which they might severally bring a stipulated number of attendants. While this message was delivering, Surena himself appeared at a little distance on an eminence, waved with his hand, and in token of peace, unbent his bow. Crassus distrusting the faith of a barbarous enemy, who was supposed to hold perfidy lawful, as a mere stratagem of war, declined the interview; but his troops,

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weary

<sup>1</sup> Dio. lib. iv. c. 28.

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weary of continual fatigue and danger, and flattering themselves that by an accommodation an end might be speedily put to their sufferings, expressed such a desire of the proposed conference, as their general, in this situation, could not safely withstand. He put himself therefore, with a few friends, under the direction of Surena's messengers, and submitted to be led to their general; but on the way, finding himself treated as a prisoner, he refused to proceed, and having made some resistance, was slain. The army separated into sundry divisions, a few escaped into Armenia or Syria, the greater part fell into the enemy's hands<sup>1</sup>.

Thus died Crassus, commonly reputed a rare instance of ambition, joined with avarice, and a mean capacity. It is not to be doubted, that in point of ambition he even rived Pompey and Cæsar; and it is probable, therefore, that his avarice was merely subservient to this passion. It is quoted, as a saying of his, that no man who aspired to a principal place in the republic should be reputed rich, unless he could maintain an army at his own expence<sup>2</sup>. Such was the use of wealth, which, in place of equipages, horses, and dogs, occurred to a rich man of that age at Rome. Of his capacity we cannot form any high estimation either from the judgment of his contemporaries, or from his own conduct<sup>3</sup>. It appears indeed, that he

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<sup>1</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. Plutarch in Crass.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero de officiis, lib. i. c. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Is Igitur mediocriter a doctrina instructus; angustius etiam a natura. See. Cicero de claris oratoribus, c. 66. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 13.



owed his consequence more to his wealth, than to his genius or personal qualities of any kind. On account of his riches, probably, he was considered by Cæsar and Pompey as a person, who, if neglected by them, might throw a weight into the scale of their enemies; and he was admitted into their councils, as a person fit to witness their transactions, and, on occasion, to moderate or to suspend their animosities. These circumstances placed him among the competitors for the principal influence at Rome, and makes his death an epoch in the history of those factions which were hastening to overwhelm the republic. By this event, his associates Cæsar and Pompey, already disjoined by the dissolution of their family connection, were left to contend for the superiority, without any third person through whom they might occasionally reconcile or explain their pretensions.

The calm which had succeeded the late election of Consuls, was but of short duration. The time of electing their successors was fast approaching, and the candidates, Scipio, Milo, and Hypsæus, were already declared. Clodius, at the same time, stood for the office of Prætor. This Scipio was by birth the son of Metellus Pius, adopted into the Cornelian family by Scipio Nasica. His daughter, in consequence of this adoption, bearing the name of Cornelia, the widow of young Crassus, was recently married to Pompey, who, upon this connection, supported Scipio, his father-in-law, in his pretensions to the Consulship. Milo had a powerful sup-

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port from the Senate, in whose cause he had resorted to the arts and violences of the seditious demagogues against themselves. Clodius had great interest with the populace, and from inveterate animosity to Milo and to his party, joined all his interest with Scipio and Hypsæus against him.

It is in the nature of human things to advance, in accumulating the good or evil to which they tend. And there is ever accordingly either a progress or a decline in human affairs. These competitors, in contending for the Forum, and the usual places of canvassing the people, joined to the former arts of distributing money, and of exciting popular tumults, the use of an armed force, and a species of military operations in the streets of Rome. Three parties in arms every day were on the parade in different quarters of the town, and wherever they encountered, violence and bloodshed ensued. The opposite parties of Hypsæus and Milo had fought a battle in the *Via Sacra*; many of both sides were killed, and the Consul Calvinus was wounded in attempting to quell the riot.

These disorders continued so long to obstruct the elections, that the term of the present Consuls in office expired, before the nomination of any successors; and every legal power in the commonwealth being suspended, the former state of anarchy returned, with accumulating distractions. The Senate, and the other friends of Milo, would gladly have hastened the elections, but were hindered by the partizans of the other candidates. The  
populace

populace too enjoying this season of gratuities, of entertainments, and of public shews, in which the competitors continued to vie with one another, and to waste their fortunes, were glad to have the canvas prolonged <sup>1</sup>.

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When the Senate proposed to have recourse to the remedy usual in such disorders of the state, by naming an Interrex, the only title under which any person could preside in restoring the magistracy by an election of Consuls, they were restrained by the negative of the Tribune Munatius Plancus, who was supposed to co-operate with Pompey in some design, which was not understood; but supposed to be favoured by the delay of every measure proposed for the restoration of order.

In the midst of this scene, which kept the minds of men in fear of some general calamity, an accident happened, which brought the disorder to a height, and forced every party to accept of a remedy. On the 13th of the kalends of February, or the 20th of January, Milo going to Lanuvium, a town about fifteen miles from Rome, of which he was chief magistrate, about three o'clock in the afternoon, met with Clodius returning from his country-seat at Aricia. Milo was in a carriage with his wife Fausta, the daughter of Sylla, and a friend Fufius. He had a numerous escort, amounting to some hundreds of servants in arms, and, in particular, was attended by two noted gladiators, Eudamus and Birria. Clodius was on horseback,

<sup>1</sup> Pædianus in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

CHAPTER. horseback, with a retinue of thirty servants like-  
XXIII. wise in arms. It is likely that this encounter was altogether accidental; for the companies continued on their way without any disturbance, till Birria, the gladiator, unwilling to pass without giving some specimen of his calling, as he straggled a little behind his party, quarrelled with some of the followers of Clodius. A fray ensued: Clodius himself returned to quell it, or to punish the authors of it; but meeting with little respect among the gladiators, received a wound in the shoulder, and was carried to be dressed in the inn at Bovillæ, near to which place the disturbance began. Milo being told of what had passed, likewise returned to the place; and thinking it safer to end their quarrels there, than await the revenge of an enemy thus provoked, who would not fail, at the head of his faction in the city, to rouse the fury of the populace against him, encouraged his people to pursue their advantage: they accordingly forced their way into the inn, dragged Clodius from thence, and having killed him, and dispersed his followers, left him dead of many wounds in the highway.

Sextus Tedijs, a Senator, happening to pass, put the body into his own carriage, and sent his servants with it to Rome. They arrived before six at night, and proceeding directly to the house of the deceased, which stood on the Palatine hill over the Forum, laid the corpse in the vestibule.

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The servants of the family, and multitudes from the streets, immediately crowded to see this spectacle. Fulvia, the wife of Clodius, stood over the body, and with loud lamentations uncovered and pointed out the wounds of her deceased husband. The crowd continued to increase all night, and until break of day, when Q. Munatius Plancus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus, Tribunes of the People, likewise repaired to the same place, and gave orders to carry the dead body naked to the market-place, and there to leave it exposed to public view on the Rostra; and at the same time accompanied this spectacle with inflammatory harangues to the people.

Sextus Claudius, kinsman of the deceased, soon after removed the body from the market-place to the Senate-house, meaning to reproach the order of Senators as accessory to the murder. The populace, who still followed in great numbers, burst into the place, tore up the benches, and brought into a heap the materials, with the tables and desks of the clerks, the journals and records of the Senate, and having set the whole on fire, consumed the corpse on this extraordinary pile. The fire soon reached the roof, and spread to the contiguous buildings. The Tribunes, Plancus and Rufus, who were all this while exhorting the people to vengeance, were driven from the Rostra by the flames which burst from the buildings around them. The Senate-house, the Porcia Basilica, and other edifices, were reduced to ashes.

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The same persons by whom this fire had been kindled, repaired to the house of M. Lepidus, who, upon the first alarm of an insurrection, had been named Interrex, forced into the hall, broke down the images of the family ancestors, tore from the looms the webs, in weaving of which the industry of Roman matrons was still employed, and destroyed what else they could reach. From thence, they proceeded to attack the house of Milo, but there met with a more proper reception. This house, during the riots, in which the master of it had borne so great a part, was become a kind of fortress, and, among the other arrangements made for its defence, was manned with archers, who plied the aggressors with arrows from the windows and terrace, in such manner as soon obliged them to withdraw.

The rioters being repulsed from the house of Milo, crowded to the Temple, in which the Consular Fasces, during the Interregnum, were kept, seized them by force, and carried them to the houses of Scipio and Hypsæus, the present popular candidates for the Consulate; these, without any other form of election, they pressed to assume the ensigns of Consular power. But not having prevailed in this proposal, they proceeded to the house of Pompey, saluting him, with mixed shouts of Consul or Dictator, according as they wished him to assume the one or the other of these titles or dignities.

From

From this time, for some days, an armed populace, mixed with slaves, continued, under pretence of searching for Milo and his adherents, to pillage every place they could enter<sup>1</sup>. And the partizans of the candidates, Hypsæus and Scipio, thinking they had Milo at a disadvantage, beset the house of the Interrex; and, though it was not customary for the first in this nomination to proceed to the elections, they clamoured for an immediate assembly of the People for this purpose. The party of Milo, though professing likewise to join the same clamour for an immediate election, came to blows with their opponents, and protected the house and the person of the Interrex from farther violence.

Milo himself, who was at first supposed to have fled or gone into exile, hearing of the excesses committed by the opposite party, and of the general inclination of the more sober part of the citizens to check and disappoint their violence, ventured again to appear in the city, and at the head of his friends, renewed his canvass. A succession of officers, with the title of Interrex, continued to be named at the expiration of every usual term of five days; but such was the confusion and distraction of the scene, that no election could be made. The Senate, under the greatest alarm, gave to the Interrex, and to the Tribunes of the People, to whom they joined Pompey, who by virtue of his proconsular commission as Purveyor of Corn for the

<sup>1</sup> Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

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the People, held a public character in the State, the usual charge given to the Consuls, to watch over the safety of the republic. They even recommended to Pompey to make the necessary levies throughout Italy, and to provide a military force to act for the commonwealth, in repressing the disorders which were committed by the candidates for office.

Under the protection of such temporary expedients, to restrain the violence with which all parties endeavoured to do themselves justice, some applied for redress, in the way of prosecution and civil suit. The two Claudii, nephews of the deceased Publius Clodius demanded that the slaves of Milo, or those of his wife Faufta, should be put to the torture, in order to force a discovery of the manner in which their uncle was killed. The two Valerii, Nepos and Leo, with Lucius Herennius Balbus, joined in the same demand. On the opposite party, a like demand against the slaves of the deceased Publius Clodius was made by Cælius, one of the Tribunes; and a prosecution for violence and corruption was entered by Manlius Cæcianus against Hypsæus and Scipio, the competitors of Milo, for the office of Consul.

Milo, in answer to the demand that was made to have his slaves put to the torture, pleaded, that the persons, now demanded as slaves, were actually freemen, having received their liberty as a reward for their faithful services in defending his person against a late attempt made by Clodius on his



his life. It was alleged, on the other hand, that they were manumised merely to evade the law, to preserve them from the torture, and to screen their master from the evidence which they might in that manner be obliged to give. M. Cælius and Manlius Cænianus being Tribunes, and disposed to favour Milo, had ventured to vindicate him to the People, and to load Clodius as the aggressor, and the intended assassin in the fray which cost him his life. Cicero too, with great zeal and courage, while the friends of Milo were yet unsafe in the streets, maintained the same argument in the Senate, and before the People<sup>1</sup>. Milo, however, would have been glad to make a composition; and as Pompey had all along, in the competition for the Consulship, favoured not only Scipio but likewise Hypsæus against him, he offered to drop his pretension in favour of those candidates, if Pompey would agree to suppress the prosecutions that were commencing against him. To these proposals Pompey refused to listen. He probably thought the election secure for his friends, and by affecting a zeal for justice, hoped to increase his authority with the People.

The partizans of Pompey, in the midst of this wild and disorderly state of affairs, were busy in renewing the cry which they had raised in the former interregnum, that he should be named Dictator, for the re-establishment of order, and the restoration of the public peace. Such an extraordinary

<sup>1</sup> Ascen. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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traordinary remedy had never been at any time more wanted in the republic; but the times, in which it might be safely applied, were no more. The name of Dictator recalled the memory of Sylla's executions, and it appeared to be uncertain against whom they might now be directed. To avoid the title more than the power of Dictator, Bibulus moved in the Senate, that all the present candidates for the Consulate should be set aside, and that the Interrex should assemble the People for the election of Pompey sole Consul. Cato, to the surprise of every body, seconded this motion. He observed, that any magistracy was preferable to none, and that if the republic must be governed by a single person, none was so fit for the charge as the person now proposed. Pompey being present, thanked Cato for this declaration of his esteem, and said, that if he accepted the charge, it should be in hopes of being aided by his counsel. Cato made answer, in terms, meant to be literally interpreted, but which, in other instances of the same kind, under an aspect of sullenness, have been intended to flatter, That he meant no favour to Pompey, and deserved no thanks from him; that his intention was to do the best that the times could allow for the republic.

It was resolved, in terms of this motion, that Pompey should be presented to the People as sole candidate for the Consulship, and that after two months were elapsed, he might propose any other person

person to be joined with himself in this office <sup>1</sup>. CHAP.  
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 The election was accordingly brought on by the Interrex Servius Sulpitius, on the twenty-fourth of February, and Pompey declared sole Consul <sup>2</sup>, Pompey sole  
Consul.  
 with a commission from the Senate to arm, if necessary, the inhabitants of Italy, for the better establishment of order in the city.

The first object of Pompey, in the high and unprecedented dignity which was now conferred upon him, appears to have been the framing of laws to restrain for the future such disorders as had lately prevailed, and to bring the persons convicted of such crimes to justice. For this purpose, he obtained an act to enforce the laws already subsisting against the practice of violence or corruption in the contest for office; and to regulate the form of proceeding in trials on such criminal accusations.

By the regulations now suggested, every trial was to end in four days. The examination of evidence might occupy the three first of those days; the hearing of parties, and the judgment, the fourth. The prosecutor was allowed two hours to support his charge, and the defendant three hours to make his defence. The number of advocates was restricted, and the use of commendatory characters prohibited <sup>3</sup>. The Quæstor, or Judge Criminal, was to be chosen from among those who were of Consular dignity, and eighty-

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<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Pomp. et Catonis, Dio. lib. xl.

<sup>2</sup> Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

<sup>3</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 53.

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one judges or jurors were to be impannelled, and obliged to attend the trial. After the evidence and pleadings were heard, the parties were then allowed each to challenge and to reject fifteen of the jury or judges, or five from each of the orders of which they were composed; when the court being thus reduced to fifty one, was to be inclosed and to give judgment<sup>1</sup>.

Corruption was become so frequent, and supposed so unavoidable in conducting elections, that it was difficult to find any one willing to prosecute the crime. To remedy this defect, a clause was enacted in the law of Pompey, by which any person formerly convicted of bribery, might obtain a remission of the penalties he had incurred, by convicting any one else of an equal crime, or by convicting two persons, though of an offence less heinous than his own. By these means, it was proposed that a first conviction should lead to many more in succession. That conviction, in every instance, should be attended with infamy; but that the pains of law should ultimately rest only on such person as could not find another on whom to shift the burden from himself<sup>2</sup>.

Some of these regulations were made with a particular view to the trial of Milo, now arraigned on the statutes both of corruption, and of violence or assassination. They were accordingly opposed by the friends of the person whose case they were likely to affect, on the ground of their partiality

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<sup>1</sup> Ascon. Pæd. *ibid*.<sup>2</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. 52.



as acts of attainder, having a retrospect or application to matters which passed before they were enacted. Cælius the Tribune, and Cicero, maintained this argument. Pompey replied with impatience, That if he were hindered to proceed in a legal way, he should employ force<sup>1</sup>. He appeared to entertain some animosity to Milo, such at least as they who love to govern, have to others who appear not to be easily governed. He either had, or affected to have, apprehensions of danger to his own person, confessed or alleged this apprehension in the Senate, and retired, as for safety, to his own house in the suburbs: there he retained, for the guard of his person, a party of armed men; and there too, under the same affectation of withdrawing from violence, he caused the assemblies of the Senate to be held.

The Aristocratical or Senatorian party was much interested in the preservation of Milo: they had been frequently assailed by the popular rioters, who set the laws at defiance; and as the laws had not always been of sufficient force to protect their own persons, it was their interest to protect those who, on occasion, had defended them, though by means not agreeable to law. The argument, in equity, indeed, was strong on the side of Milo. During the late suspension of government, the factions were rather separate parties at war, than subjects enjoying the protection, and amenable to the jurisdiction, of any civil power whatever. They

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<sup>1</sup> Ascon. Pædian, in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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alone who procured or prolonged this state of anarchy, were chargeable with the consequences. In this contest, which could not be maintained without force or violent measures, the friends of the Republic and of the Senate were badly circumstanced. They contended for laws, and a constitution, which might be turned against the irregularities which had been necessary to their own preservation, while the opposite faction, if defeated, might claim the protection of those very forms, which they themselves had endeavoured to subvert.

It would have been fair, perhaps, to have closed the late scene of confusion with a general indemnity, and to have taken precautions for the regular uninterrupted exercise of legal administration in future. This, however, would not have calmed the resentments of those who were aggrieved, and Pompey determined to signalize his government by a more specious appearance of justice. Domitius Ahenobarbus was chosen Commissioner for the trial of Milo, on the charge of murder; and the other judges, taken from among the most respectable of each order in the commonwealth, were impannelled in terms of the late statute. The defendant was cited to answer this charge on the fourth of April; and on the same day, to answer a charge of corruption brought against him in the ordinary court of the Prætor Manlius. Marcellus appeared for him at the bar of the Prætor, and procured a delay until the other trial should be ended.

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The court, as usual, was held in the Forum or open market-place. There was a tribunal or bench railed in for the judges. The whole space was crowded with multitudes of the People. The prosecutors began with examining Cassinius Schola, who had been in company with Clodius when he was killed. This witness gave direct evidence to the fact, and exaggerated the atrocity of the crime. Marcellus would have cross-questioned him; but the populace, and many others assembled in the crowd who favoured the prosecution, raised a menacing cry, which alarmed the accused and his counsel so much, that they claimed the protection of the court. They were accordingly received within the rails, and the Judge applied to the Consul, who had taken his station near to the place of assembly, in order to restrain, by his presence, any disorders that might arise at the trial. Pompey, who was then attended only by his Lictors, was himself likewise alarmed by that disorderly shout, and said, that, for the future, a proper force should be provided to keep the peace. He accordingly, on the following day, filled every avenue, which led to the Forum, with men under arms; and, upon some tumult among the populace, gave an order that the place should be cleared. And in the execution of this order, numbers were killed.

Under the impression made by this vigorous exertion of power, the witnesses continued to be examined for two days without any disturbance. Among these the inhabitants of Bovillæ, the fa-



CHAP. maily and relations of Clodius, with his wife Fulvia,  
XXIII. were examined on the several circumstances that  
fell within their knowledge, and left no doubt remaining with respect to the fact. The minds of men every day became more intent on the issue: so that, on the fourth day, when the parties were to plead, the shops and offices were shut, and all other business was suspended in the city.

There appeared for the prosecutors Appius Claudius, M. Antonius, and Valerius Nepos. They began at eight, and spoke till ten. For the defendant appeared Q. Hortensius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Faustus Sylla, M. Cato, and M. T. Cicero, of whom the last only attempted to speak. Some were of opinion, that, as the fact was undeniable, it ought to be justified on the plea of political necessity or public expedience. Cicero himself thought this too bold a plea, and therefore chose that of self-defence, alleging that Clodius was the aggressor, and intended to assassinate Milo. It is remarked of this celebrated orator, that, practised as he was, he began all his orations under considerable solicitude and awe of his audience. On this occasion, when he stood up to speak, the partizans of Clodius, who were likewise inveterate enemies to himself, endeavoured to disconcert him with clamours and menacing cries. The unusual parade of military guards, commanded by an officer, who was supposed to be prejudiced against his client, it is said, so far overcame and sunk his spirit, that he spoke feebly, and concluded abruptly;



ly; and that the speech he actually made, was far CHAP.  
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short of that masterly oration which he composed, and afterwards published under the title of Milo's defence.

The accused however, even in this alarming scene, stood at the bar with an undaunted countenance; and while every one else, in imitation of the Senators, appeared in mourning, he alone appeared in his ordinary dress. When judgment was given, and the ballots inspected, it appeared that, of the Senators, twelve condemned, and six, or perhaps rather five, acquitted; of the Knights, thirteen condemned, and four acquitted; of the Tribuni Ærarii, or representatives of the Plebeian order, thirteen condemned, and three or four acquitted. And Milo, upon the whole, was condemned by thirty-eight against thirteen.

Before sentence was pronounced, being still at liberty to withdraw, he retired into exile, and fixed his residence at Marseilles. Thither Cicero sent him a copy of an oration in his defence, composed at leisure, as an effort of his eloquence, and a specimen of what could be urged in the cause. The packet containing this writing, it seems, was delivered or read to Milo while he sat at dinner. "How lucky it was," he said, "that this oration was not actually spoken, I should not now have been eating these excellent fish at Marseilles!" These marks of indifference make a striking con-

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1 Asconius Pædianus et Argument. et Notis in Orat. pro Mil. Dio, Cass. lib. xl. Plut. in Pompeio, Catone, &c.

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trast to the figure which Cicero himself had exhibited in his exile. If he could have thus trifled with apparent or unmerited disgrace, that single addition of constancy and force to his character would have undoubtedly placed him as high in the order of statesmen, as, by the other parts of his character, he stands in the list of ingenious men and virtuous citizens.

Milo was likewise soon after condemned, in absence, by the Prætor, upon a charge of bribery and corruption. Some of his competitors, particularly Hypsæus and Scipio, were brought to trial for the same offence. The Tribune Munatius Plancus and Pompeius Rufus were, at the expiration of their office, tried and condemned for the share which they had in the assault which was committed on the house of M. Lepidus the Interrex, and in lighting the fire which consumed the Senate-house.

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## C H A P. XXIV.

*Conduct of Pompey in his quality of sole Consul.—Pretensions of Cæsar to be admitted as Candidate for the Office of Consul, without resigning his Province.—General Revolt of the Gauls.—Operations in that Country.—Blockade and Reduction of Aleſia.—Distribution of Cæsar's Army in Gaul.*

POMPEY, in his dignity of sole Consul, having joined a legal authority to the personal elevation which he always affected, possessed much of the influence and consideration of a real monarch; and it would have been happy, perhaps, for the State, if he could have made such a dignity hereditary, and a permanent part of the constitution, or given to the commonwealth that reasonable mixture of kingly government, of which it appears to have stood so greatly in need. In his present elevation he rose for a while above the partialities of a factious leader, and appeared to adopt that interest which the well advised sovereign ever has in the support of justice. He even seems to have stepped into the character of a prince, or to have considered himself as above the rank of a citizen. Among other instances of this sort, is mentioned his haughty saying to Hypsæus, late candidate for the Consulate, now under prosecution for bribery, who, as Pompey passed from the bath to supper, put himself in his way to implore his protection, "Detain me not," he said, "you only make supper  
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CHAP. "to cool for no purpose<sup>1</sup>." In the midst of the  
 XXIV. solicitations of his courtiers and flatterers, he even  
 ventured to dispense with his own regulations. Contrary to the rule he himself had laid down for the direction of criminal trials, he furnished Munatius Plancus, when arraigned at the Prætor's bar, with a commendatory testimony. "I cannot prefer  
 "this writing of Pompey," said Cato, "to the law  
 "of which he himself is the author." On account of this saying, Plancus, when the Judges came to be inclosed, thought proper to include Cato among those he rejected: the accused was nevertheless condemned<sup>2</sup>.

Besides the measures taken to punish past offences, or to deter those who might be inclined to violate the laws, it was thought expedient also to lessen the temptation to crimes, by which the public had of late been so much aggrieved. The principal source of the late disorders appeared to be the avidity of candidates for those offices of State, which led immediately to the government of lucrative provinces. To remove this temptation, it was ordained, at the suggestion of Pompey, that no man could have a lucrative appointment till five years after the expiration of that office, whether of Consul, Prætor, or Quæstor, in consequence of which he claimed a proportionate station in the provinces.

Before the enacting of this law, however, Pompey had the address to procure for himself a pro-  
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<sup>1</sup> Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 484.



longation of his government in Spain for five years. This circumstance, which continued to give him the command of an army abroad, while he likewise bore the highest civil office in the State at home, set a very dangerous precedent for the commonwealth, of which Cæsar was not slow to avail himself.

The commission which was held by this adventurer in Gaul was soon to determine; and, according to the laws then in force, he must even resign it before he could aspire to the Consulship, or pretend to cope with his rival in civil preferments. It had been wisely ordained by the laws, that the persons offering themselves as candidates for the office of Consul, should appear in person to sue for it; and that no man, without resigning his military command and dismissing his army, could enter the city, or even go beyond the limits of the province in which he had governed. By this regulation it was intended to prevent the conjunction of civil power in the State with the command of an army. Pompey, however, though vested with such a command in Spain, had contrived to be exempted from the observance of this law; and, under pretence that his office of general purveyor of corn for the Roman People did not confine him to any station, or if it did not extend to the whole empire, had at least a particular reference to Italy, he still continued to occupy the seat of general administration at Rome.

Cæsar, to keep pace with his rival, openly aspired to the same privilege which Pompey had enjoyed,

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joyed, and claimed, as a mere instance of equal treatment, what the other had obtained ; but what, if bestowed on himself, with his other advantages, must give him a great and immediate superiority. The army attached to his person was already in the most advantageous situation for commanding the empire. The addition of Consular power at Rome, to that of general in both the Gauls, was joining Italy, and the city itself, to his provinces, and putting him at once in possession of the whole. Any opposition made to his authority as Consul would be construed as rebellion against the State, and justify recourse to the arms which he bore at the very gates of Rome. Pompey would be driven at once from the helm of affairs to the command of a distant province, in which he, at most, could only defend himself ; but not be in condition to contest the sovereignty, either in behalf of the Senate or himself.

With these objects in his view, Cæsar instructed his partizans among the Tribunes to move, That being continually engaged in a hazardous war which required his presence, and being necessarily detained abroad in the service of his country, he might be exempted from the law, which required the candidates for office to attend their canvass in person, and might therefore be admitted as candidate for the Consulship, without appearing at Rome, or divesting himself of his power in the province.

This proposition was sufficiently understood by the leading men of the Senate, and by the few  
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who joined with them in support of the commonwealth. It was known to be intended that Cæsar should have a privilege of being elected Consul, without resigning his province, or dismissing his army; and they withstood the motion as of the most dangerous consequence. But Pompey, who ought likewise, for his own sake, to have been alarmed at the progress of Cæsar, and at the uncommon advantage which he now attempted to gain, was either lulled into security by the artifices of his rival, or thought himself sufficiently raised above any danger from this or any other quarter. He had accepted, in his own person, many unprecedented honours; and was possibly unwillingly to contend for forms, which, at some future period, might limit his own pretensions. Cato loudly renewed the alarm which he had frequently given on the subject of Cæsar's designs. Cicero could not be neutral in any dispute that should arise between Cæsar and Pompey. He had been banished by the one, and restored by the other. Besides the personal obligation he owed to Pompey, his natural bias was on the side of the Senate, and for the support of the forms which were provided for the safety of the commonwealth. On this occasion, however, he appears again willing to deceive himself, and dazzled with the court which Cæsar had paid to him for some time, with a view to this very question: he condemned the indiscreet zeal of Cato, who, in his opinion, was ruining the cause of the republic by setting both Cæsar and Pompey at defiance, while he himself,

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by temporising, and by managing the inclinations of these parties, had secured them both in its interests. He stated the danger of a quarrel with Cæsar at this time, supported as he was by a powerful army, and in the bowels of Italy; but did not consider that he was then giving up, without a quarrel, all that, in the issue of any quarrel, could be extorted.

The army of Cæsar was not then so well prepared to follow him against his country, nor he himself furnished with the same colours of justice, under which, upon the recall of the privilege now granted him, he afterwards made war on the commonwealth. To temporise, therefore, in this instance, was to give an enemy the time necessary to ripen his plans for execution, or rather, in effect, to deliver up the republic, without a contest, to that fate which the councils which Cicero now flattered himself were so prudent, rendered almost inevitable. Under colour of this prudence, nevertheless, Cicero, as well as Pompey, supported the Tribunes in their motion, and obtained for the Proconsul of Gaul the dispensation he desired, to retain his army, while he offered himself a candidate for the highest office of the state at Rome.

Cæsar, immediately upon his arrival within the Alps in the beginning of winter, observing the distractions which upon the murder of Clodius took place in the city, affected much zeal for the laws which had been so grossly violated in that instance; and, under pretence of furnishing himself with the means of supporting the State against those



those who were inclined to disturb it, ordered new levies in every part of his provinces, and made a considerable addition to his army; but, contented for the present with the privilege he had obtained of suing for the Consulate, without quitting his province, or resigning his military power, he left the State, as before, apparently in the hands of Pompey; and, in the middle of winter, on the report of a general defection of all the Gaulish nations, repassed the Alps.

Most of the nations that lay beyond the mountains of Auvergne, the original limits of the Roman province, roused by the sense of their present condition, or by the cruel massacre lately executed in a part of their country, were actually in arms. They had submitted to Cæsar, or were separately gained by him, under the specious pretence of alliance or protection against their enemies; and with the title of ally, suffered him to become their master. But the violence with which he had threatened the canton of the Carnutes<sup>1</sup>, for absenting themselves from the congress which he had formed on the Seine, and the merciless severities executed by him against the unfortunate natives of the tract between the Rhine and the Meuse<sup>2</sup>, convinced all the nations of Gaul, whether the voluntary or forced allies of Rome, that they were reduced to the condition of slaves; and that every exertion they made for liberty was to

<sup>1</sup> Now Chartres.

<sup>2</sup> Now chiefly Liege and Guelderland.

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be punished as a crime. They saw the folly of their former dissensions, and suspended all their animosities to enter into a general concert for their common safety. The occasion, they said, was favourable for the recovery of their country. The Romans were distracted at home, and Cæsar had sufficient occupation in Italy. His army could not act in his absence. The present time, they concluded, was the favourable opportunity to shut out the Romans for ever beyond the Cevennes, or even force them to retire within the Alps.

All the nations on the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, quite round to the coast of the British channel, received these representations with joy. They held private meetings, and instead of exchanging hostages, which would have been too public a measure, and have led to a discovery of their designs, they plighted their faith by a more secret form, commonly practised among them on great occasions, that of pressing their banners together.

The people of the Carnutes<sup>1</sup> undertook to begin hostilities; and accordingly, on a day fixed, surprised the town of Genabum<sup>2</sup>, where they put many Roman traders, together with the commissary-general of the army, to death.

It was the custom of the Gauls to convey intimation of such events by means of a cry which they raised at the place of action, and repeated wherever the voice was heard, till passing almost with the velocity of sound itself, it gave the speediest

<sup>1</sup> Chartres.

<sup>2</sup> Orleans.

diest information of what was done. In this manner intelligence of what had been transacted at Genabum at the rising of the sun, was, before night, propagated in every direction to the distance of a hundred and sixty miles, and put all the nations within this compass in a ferment. Its first and principal effects, however, were produced in the country of the Arverni<sup>1</sup>. Here Vercingetorix, a youth of heroic spirit and great capacity, assembled his retainers, took possession of Gergovia, now Clermont, the capital of his country, and from thence sent messengers in every direction to urge the execution of the measures lately concerted for the general freedom of Gaul. He himself, in return for his zeal, being chosen the common head of the confederacy, fixed the quota of men and of arms to be furnished by each separate canton, and took hostages for the regular observance of the conditions to which the several parties had agreed.

This general, commander of the Gauls, having assembled a considerable army, sent a part of his force to act on the Garonne, and to harass the frontiers of the Roman province on that side, while he himself moved to the Loire, in order to rouse the nations of that quarter to a proper sense of the occasion; and he accordingly brought to his standard all the warriors of those cantons which lay on the left of that river. His party on the Garonne, at the same time, were joined by all the nations of

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Aquitania,

<sup>1</sup> Auvergne.

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Aquitania, and, in formidable numbers, threatened with immediate destruction the cities of Thou-louse and Narbonne, or such parts of their districts at least as were open to invasion.

Thither Cæsar, with all the forces he could assemble upon his return from Italy, immediately repaired; and, having put the province of Narbonne in a condition not to be insulted, proceeded to give the enemy an alarm in their own country. His object was, if possible, to effect a junction with the legions which he had left on the northern frontiers of his new acquisitions. Those legions could not be moved from their present position to favour his junction, without being exposed to be cut off by the natives. Nor was it easy for himself, with the force under his command, to penetrate through so many enemies as lay in his way to join them. It was yet winter, and the mountains were deeply covered with snow. This circumstance, although it increased his difficulties; as it was likely to render the enemy secure, still encouraged him to make his attempt. He accordingly passed the mountains<sup>1</sup> which lay in his way, at a time when the snow, in many places, being six feet deep, was to be removed with shovels, and when that passage was supposed to be entirely impracticable. After he had surmounted this difficulty, his object being to divert the attention of his enemy, he sent his cavalry abroad in numerous parties, with fire and sword, to lay waste the country,

and

<sup>1</sup> The Cevennes.



and destroy the people, with their habitations and effects. When he thought the alarm was sufficiently spread, and must have reached the Gaulish army on the Loire, pretending, that his presence was required in the province behind him, he gave the command of the troops in Auvergne to Decimus Brutus, then a young man; giving him orders at the same time to keep his parties abroad, and to continue to harass that district, as he himself had done.

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Having taken these measures to fix the attention of the enemy in one quarter, Cæsar, with a few attendants, made haste to pass in a different direction to Vienna on the Rhône, where he was received by a party of horse, which he had appointed at that place to wait his orders; and, under this escort, without halting by day or by night, he passed by Bibracté<sup>1</sup> and the country of the Lingones<sup>2</sup>, to the nearest quarter of his army in the north; and while he was yet supposed to be in Auvergne, had actually assembled his legions which had been distributed on the course of the Seine.

Vercingetorix having notice that Cæsar, in this manner, had passed him, and that the Roman army on the Seine was in motion, and perceiving that the invasion of his own country had been no more than a feint, and that the chief force of the enemy was to be expected from a different quarter, he resumed the operations which he had intermitted on the

M 2

Loire,

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun.

<sup>2</sup> Langres.

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Loire, and endeavoured to possess himself of a post in the territory of Bibracte, where the people still professed themselves to be in the alliance of Rome.

Cæsar, notwithstanding the difficulty of procuring provisions and forage so early in the season, thought himself under a necessity of opposing the progress of the enemy. For this purpose he left his baggage, under the guard of two legions, at Agendicum<sup>1</sup>; and from thence, with the remainder of the army, proceeded to Genabum<sup>2</sup>, leaving Trebonius by the way to take possession of a town which the natives, after a little show of resistance, had surrendered.

Upon his arrival before Genabum, the Gauls, who were in arms at that place, resolved to abandon the town; and shutting the gates against the Romans on one side, endeavoured to escape by the bridge of the Loire on the other. But Cæsar, having intelligence of their design, while they were busy in the execution of it, forced open a gate, of the town in their rear, and overtook them, while crowded together in the entrance and passage of the bridge, and in the narrow streets which led to it, put the greater part to the sword, and, under pretence of revenging the massacre of the Roman traders, who had been cut off at this place, ordered that the town should be destroyed. From thence he penetrated into the country of the Bituriges,

<sup>1</sup> Sens.

<sup>2</sup> Orleans.

ges <sup>1</sup>, on the left of the Loire ; and, on his way to Avaricum <sup>2</sup>, the principal strong-hold in that quarter, forced every place that opposed his passage.

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Vercingetorix, observing the rapid progress of the Romans, and knowing that the Gauls, being without order or discipline, could not withstand them in battle, declined an engagement, but endeavoured to distress the enemy by delays and want of provisions. He had authority enough with his countrymen to prevail on them to lay their own country waste every where within many miles of Cæsar's route. And in compliance with his orders, twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt in one day. Avaricum alone, contrary to his opinion, and at the earnest request of its inhabitants, who undertook to defend it to the last extremity, was spared.

Thither, accordingly, Cæsar advanced as to the only prize that was left. He attacked the place, under great disadvantage, in the midst of a country that was entirely laid waste, and trusting for the daily subsistence of his army to the Ædui beyond the Loire, who, notwithstanding their professions, were far from being hearty in his cause, or diligent in sending their supplies of provisions to his camp. Such as they sent were intercepted by Vercingetorix, who had occupied a strong post with his army, and infested the highways with his parties. In these circumstances, the Romans were

M 3

sometimes

<sup>1</sup> Now Berri.

<sup>2</sup> Bourges.

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sometimes reduced to great distress; Cæsar himself, to pique the resolution of his men, affected a willingness to raise the siege, whenever they were pleased to intimate, that they could not endure their fatigues any longer: "We are got in to a difficult situation," he said; "but if the troops are discouraged, I shall withdraw." To this affected tenderness for the sufferings of the army, he was every where answered, with intreaties that he would not dishonour them, by supposing that any hardships could oblige them to forfeit the character they had acquired by the labour of so many successful campaigns. He accordingly continued the attack of Avaricum, under all the discouragements to which he found himself exposed.

The place, situate in an angle, was covered on two sides by a river and a morass, and was accessible only on the third. The walls of the town were ingeniously constructed with double frames, forming compartments or pannels of wood, filled up with masonry and large blocks of stone. The masonry secured the timber from fire, and the frames preserved the masonry against the effects of the battering ram, which could act only on the stones contained within a single pannel or division of the frame, without ruining at once any considerable part of the wall, or effecting a breach. The Roman army had to attack this wall by methods the most laborious and difficult, then practised; having a way to make, by a mound of approach,



proach, before they could ascend to the level of the battlements, or touch the walls, a work to be begun at a considerable distance, in order to have an easy slope or ascent, and requiring a breadth of above eighty feet, to admit sufficient numbers in front \*. The earth on the sides of this mound was to be supported by timbers, hurdles, and faggots, and the workmen upon it were to be covered with mantlets and moveable pent-houses. The besieged, as this fabric arose, that they might still overtop the besiegers, raised their walls by additional frames of wood, which they covered with raw hides, as a security against the arrows and burning shafts which were darted against them.

In this contest the works on both sides were mounted up to the height of about eighty feet, and the besieged still endeavoured to preserve their advantage, not only by raising their own battlements, but likewise by undermining and sinking the mound of the besiegers. They made galleries under the foundation of their own rampart to the bottom of the enemy's mound, by which they endeavoured from below to remove the earth and other materials of the mound, as fast as they were accumulated above. They came at the same time from their sally-ports on different sides of the mound, and endeavoured to set fire to the wood by which the earth was supported. In all these particulars showing that they possessed the

M 4

arts

\* The Agger.

CHAP. arts of defence in common with ancient nations <sup>1</sup>,  
 XXIV. Vercingetorix, also, continued to harass the Roman army from without, intercepted their supply of provisions, and, by passing the river or the morafs, maintained his communication with the town, and sent in frequent relief.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Cæsar by degrees brought forward and raised his mound of approach to the height of the battlements; so that by a single assault he might determine the fate of the town. And while both parties were preparing for a last effort, he took his opportunity to storm, as he frequently did, in the midst of a heavy fall of rain. The besieged, as he supposed, had taken shelter from the weather, and were in that instant put off their guard. He accordingly got possession of their defences with little resistance, and forced the parties who manned to retreat. The inhabitants, being driven from the walls, formed in the streets, and the Romans who had entered on the ramparts, extending their line to the right and the left, were about to occupy the battlements over the whole circumference of the place, when the garrison, observing their danger, began to escape by the gates. In the confusion that followed, the town was sacked, and could make no resistance. Of forty thousand persons who had taken shelter in it, no more than eight hundred escaped. This massacre was joined to that lately performed

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 22, &c. Vid. Thucidid. lib. ii. in the siege of Platæa.

performed at Genabum; and under the pretence of completing the vengeance which was due for the murder of the Roman traders who were put to death at the breaking out of the present revolt, all the inhabitants of this place, without exception, were put to the sword.

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The Gauls, as usual on every calamitous event, were greatly disheartened, and were about to despair of their cause, when their leader reminded them, that, contrary to his judgment, they had reserved this place from the general devastation of the country, and had themselves undertaken to defend it; but their loss in this instance was the effect of mistake, and might be retrieved by abler conduct. His authority as usual rose on the ill success of councils which he had not approved, and brought an accession of numbers to his standard.

Cæsar, finding a considerable supply of stores and provisions at Avaricum, remained some days to relieve and to refresh his army. The country around him, however, being entirely laid waste, or occupied by parties of the enemy, it became necessary for him to repass the Loire, and to open his communication with a country of which the inhabitants still professed to be in alliance with the Romans, and having had their possessions covered by the river from the incursions of the enemy in their late devastations, were still in condition to supply his camp. As in this movement he seemed to retire and to give up the ground he had

disputed

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disputed with the prince of the Arverni, he pretended that he was called to settle a dispute which had arisen among the Ædui, relating to the succession of the chief magistrate, or head of their canton. Having repassed to the right of the Loire without any loss, he made a demand on his allies of that side for ten thousand men on foot, and all the horses they could furnish.

The Romans now had enemies on every quarter, and it was good policy to keep them divided, and to occupy them separately. For this purpose Cæsar sent four legions towards the Seine; while he himself took the route of Noviodunum<sup>1</sup>, at the confluence of the Loire and Allier; and there leaving his money, spare horses, and unnecessary baggage, he continued his march on the banks of the Allier, with intention to pass that river, and to invade the Arverni, from whom this revolt had originated, and whose chief was now at the head of it. This prince, knowing that the river Allier is never fordable till autumn, and till the melting of snows on the Cevennes begin to abate, ordered all the bridges upon it to be demolished, and hoped to prevent the Romans from passing it during the greater part of summer. As soon as Cæsar marched from Noviodunum, he presented himself on the right of the Allier, and regulated his motions by that of the enemy on the opposite side. The two armies commonly decamped, marched and encamped again in sight of each other; and Cæsar never

<sup>1</sup> Nevers.



never affected to elude the vigilance of the Gauls, till he saw an opportunity to do so with advantage.

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It happened that one of the bridges on this river had been but imperfectly destroyed; most of the piles were yet fast in the ground and appeared above water; so that a passage might be effected in a few hours. The country around was woody, and furnished sufficient cover, or place of ambush, to any number of men. From these circumstances Cæsar conceived the design to over-reach his enemy. He put his army in motion as usual, but himself remained with a sufficient detachment in the neighbourhood of the ruined bridge, which he meant to repair. In order that the Gauls might not be led to suspect that any part of his army was left behind, he ordered that those who were to move should divide, and present the same number of separate bodies, the same distinction of colours and standards, which they were accustomed to show on a march of the whole army; at the same time, as he knew that the Gauls would endeavour to keep pace with his motions; in order to hasten and increase their distance from the place at which he meant to pass the river, he ordered his people to make a quicker and a longer march than usual. When he supposed that this feint or stratagem had taken its full effect, he began to work on the piles which were left in the river, and in a few hours repaired the bridge so effectually, that he passed with the division of the army he had reserved for  
this

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this purpose, and instantly fortified a post to cover them on the opposite bank. From thence he sent orders to recall the main body; and by the time the enemy were apprised of his design, had reunited all his forces on the left of the river.

Vercingetorix, as soon as he had intelligence that the Romans had passed the Allier, fell back to Gergovia<sup>1</sup>, the capital of his own principality, in order to take measures for the safety of that place. It being situate on a height, having an ascent of above a mile from the plain, and surrounded by other hills, which made part of the same ridge, he ordered a stone wall to be built six feet high about half way up the ascent to the town, and encamped as many as the space could contain within the circuit of this wall. He occupied the other hills at the same time with separate bodies, having communications with each other and with the town. By this disposition Cæsar found all the approaches of the place commanded, and no possibility of investing the whole by lines of circumvallation, or by any chain of posts. But he pitched his camp at some distance from the foot of the hill, and from thence in a few days got possession of a height in his way to the town, on which he posted two legions, with a line of communication, fortified on both its flanks, leading from his main encampment to this advanced station.

In

<sup>1</sup> Now supposed to be the neighbourhood of Clermont.

In this posture Cæsar foresaw, that all the heights in his neighbourhood being in possession of the enemy, while he pressed upon the town, he himself might be hemmed in, and cut off from all the supplies necessary for the support of his army. To preserve his communication therefore with the Allier and the Loire, he ordered his allies from the opposite side of these rivers to advance with the forces he had formerly required of them, to occupy the country in his rear, and to cover his convoys. They accordingly took the field; but their leaders having been for some time inclined to favour the general cause of their country thought this a favourable opportunity to declare their intentions. Being arrived within thirty miles of Cæsar's station, they halted; and, upon a report which was industriously spread by their leaders, that the Roman general had murdered some of their countrymen who were already in his camp, they put all the Romans who had joined them to death, and were resolved to take part with their countrymen who were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. They had not yet moved to execute this resolution, when Cæsar, having notice of what they had done, and what was intended, with his usual diligence arrived, after a march of thirty miles, with four legions and all his cavalry, in time to prevent their designs. Affecting ignorance of what had passed, he presented himself as a friend; or thinking it safest for the present to disguise his resentment, he produced into public view  
all

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all the persons who were said to have been killed by his orders, convinced such as had been deceived of their error, and brought them, with the seeming cordiality of allies, to his camp. He also made a merit with the Ædui of this act of clemency towards their people; but found that the spirit of defection was not confined to these detachments; that it had pervaded the nation; that the violence committed in the camp was an effect of the resolutions adopted by the whole people; that, in pursuance of the same measures, his purveyors and commissaries had been assaulted and pillaged even where they thought themselves secure, as in a friend's country; and that, in short, he could not any longer rely on the affections of any nation in Gaul.

The leaders of the Ædui, however, on hearing of the lenity that was shown to such of their people as were in the power of Cæsar, pretended to return to their duty; and Cæsar, not to break at once with the only supposed ally which remained to him beyond the Cevennes, affected to consider the late disorders as the effect of a mere popular tumult, and declared himself willing to rely on the wisdom of the State itself for the reparation of wrongs which a few ill-advised persons of their country had committed.

As to the immediate part he took in the war, this able commander appears, as usual on many occasions, to have trusted greatly to the superiority of his troops, as well as to that of his own reputation



reputation and conduct as a general. His confidence in both was required in the highest degree to support him in continuing, or even in attempting, a siege under his present difficulties, beset by enemies numerous, increasing, and in appearance ably conducted; while he himself was deserted by those who were reputed his friends.

In his last march to repress the defection of his allies, he had left his own camp exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and defended only by two legions against the whole force of so many nations as were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. These did not neglect their opportunity in his absence, made a vigorous assault on his lines, and must have prevailed, if he had not returned with the utmost celerity for the relief of the few by whom they were defended.

With the same confidence in the superiority of his men, Cæsar soon afterwards made an attempt to force the wall, which, as has been mentioned, the Gauls had built on the ascent of the hill which led to the town; and having made a feint on the opposite side with part of his horse, joined by the followers of the army mounted on horseback, who showed themselves at a distance to appear like cavalry, he drew the enemy from the place he meant to attack, actually passed the wall, and made himself master of part of their camp. A few of his men penetrated even into the town; but not being supported, were surrounded and slain; even those who had succeeded at first under favour of the feint

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feint by which he had diverted the enemy's attention, were, upon the return of the Gauls to the defence of their camp, repulsed with considerable loss. In consequence of this defeat, it was no longer doubtful that Cæsar would be under the necessity of raising the siege.

In order to begin his retreat without any appearance of fear, he formed his army two days successively on the plain before his intrenchment, with a countenance which might be interpreted as an offer of battle to the enemy. On the third day he decamped; and, with the credit he derived from this species of defiance or challenge, in three days he arrived at the Allier, repaired his bridge, and repassed undisturbed. His passage of the same river, a short time before, was esteemed as a victory, and his return, without having gained any advantage, and merely for the safety of his army, was undoubtedly to be considered as a defeat. The low state of his fortunes, checked and baffled by a Gaulish leader, yet a youth, and unexperienced, encouraged the nations on the right of the Loire, even while he was advancing towards them, to declare for the liberties of Gaul; and as a commencement of hostility, they carried off or rifled the treasure he kept for the pay of his army, and seized all the spare horses and baggage which he had left in Noviodunum<sup>1</sup>, as a supposed place of security, at the confluence of two rivers the Allier and the Loire,

He

<sup>1</sup> Nevers.

He himself being yet inclosed between these two rivers, having enemies on every side, and no magazines or stores for the supply of his army, deliberated whether he should not fall back on the province of Narbonne; but the danger to which he must expose Labienus, commanding a division of the Roman army on the Seine, the difficulty of passing the mountains of Auvergne, then occupied by his enemies, and the discredit which his arms must incur from such a retreat, prevented him. He determined therefore to advance; passed the Loire by a ford above its confluence with the Allier; found a considerable supply of provisions and forage in the country of the Ædui, and continued his march from thence to the Seine.

Labienus, with the troops he commanded in that quarter, had besieged Lutetia, the original germe from which the city of Paris has grown, then confined to a small island in the Seine, and had made some progress in the siege, when he heard of Cæsar's retreat from Gergovia, of the defection of the Ædui, and of preparations which were making by the nations on his right against himself. In these circumstances, he laid aside his design on Lutetia, and ascended by the left of the Seine to the country of the Senones, through which Cæsar was now advancing to meet him. In passing the river at Melodunum<sup>1</sup>, he was attacked by the enemy, but obtained a considerable victory; and, with the credit of this event in his favour, continued his

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march

<sup>1</sup> Now Melun.

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march to a place which is now called Sens, near to which he was soon afterwards joined by Cæsar.

While the Romans were thus reuniting their forces on the Seine, Vercingetorix had passed the Loire, and held a general convention of the Gaulish nations at Bibracté. He was attended by deputies of all the cantons from the Moselle to the Loire, except the Treviri, Remi, and Lingones. The first stood in awe of the Germans, who kept them in continual alarm. The two last professed an attachment to the Romans, who were still masters of the field in their neighbourhood.

The leader of the Gaulish confederacy being at this meeting confirmed in his command, made a requisition for an augmentation of force, chiefly of cavalry, and accordingly increased this part of his army to fifteen thousand. To the end that he might give the Romans sufficient occupation in their own defence, he projected two separate invasions of the province of Narbonne: one to be executed by the nations which lay between the Rhône and Garonne, towards Toulouse; the other from the Soane and the upper parts of the Loire towards Geneva and the left of the Rhône. He himself, though still determined to avoid any general action, was to harass the enemy in their movements, and to cut off their supplies of provisions.

Cæsar, on his part, wished to open his communication with the Roman province, that he might have access to cover it against the designs of the enemy

1 Now Treves, Rheims, and Langre.



enemy, and to avail himself of its resources for the subsistence of his army. For this purpose it was necessary for him to return, by the Soane and the Rhône, through a level country which was in possession of the enemy, to whom he was greatly inferior in cavalry. He therefore sent into Germany for a reinforcement of horse; and the natives of that part of the continent being already sensible, that wherever they were admitted to act as soldiers of fortune, they were qualifying themselves to act as masters, without scruple bestowed their services for or against any cause; two thousand of them joined Cæsar, but so ill mounted that he was obliged to supply them with horses, by borrowing such as belonged to his officers of infantry, and as many as could be spared from his cavalry. To compensate their defect in horses, the men were brave, and, in many of the operations which followed, turned the event of battles, and determined the fate of the war.

The Roman army being thus reinforced, Cæsar began his march to the southward; and having passed the heights at the sources of the Seine, found the Gauls already posted in three separate divisions, contiguous to the different routes he might take, and prepared with numerous flying parties of horse, to harass him in any movement he should make in their presence. By continuing his march, he soon gave their leader an opportunity to try his fortune in a sharp encounter, in which the whole cavalry of both armies came to be engaged. The

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Gauls were routed chiefly by the valour and address of the Germans, to whom even Cæsar himself ascribed his victory. This event was decisive in respect to the cavalry, that part of both armies on which it was supposed that the fate of the war must turn. And Vercingetorix, not to expose his infantry to the necessity of a general action, instantly retired to the heights from which the Seine, and a number of other rivers which mix with it before its confluence with the Marne, have their source. Cæsar, no longer apprehensive of the enemy's horse, resumed the confidence with which he always pursued his advantages, and followed his flying enemy into the ground he had chosen for his retreat.

Vercingetorix, with his very numerous assemblage from all the cantons of Gaul, took post at Alesia, a place raised on a hill at the confluence of two rivers; the point on which it stood being the termination of a ridge which separated the channels by which these rivers descended to the plain. The fields on one side were level, on the other mountainous. The Gauls were crowded together on the declivity of the hill of Alesia, under the walls of a town, and in that position thought themselves secure from attack. But not aware of the resources, enterprize, and genius of their enemy, while they endeavoured to render themselves inaccessible, they forgot that they had got into a place in which they might be cooped up; and Cæsar, unrestrained in his motions, immediately began to surround them,

them, making a proper distribution of his army, and employing working parties at once on a chain of twenty-three posts and redoubts. CHAP.  
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Vercingetorix, though too late, perceiving the disadvantage of his own situation, and the enemy's design, sent his cavalry to collect what provisions could be found in the neighbouring country; but these troops, in consequence of their late defeat, not being able to keep the field against the Roman and German horse, he proposed to diminish the consumption within his own lines by dismissing them altogether, giving them instructions to make the best of their way to their several cantons, and there to represent the condition in which they had left the army, and the necessity of making a great and speedy effort from every quarter to relieve it. He had eighty thousand men under his command, and might be able to subsist them for thirty days, and no longer.

Cæsar, from the enemy's having sent away their cavalry, concluded that they meant to act on the defensive, and to remain in their present position until they could be relieved. With little apprehension of disturbance, therefore, from an enemy so blocked up, he continued his operations; at once to secure his prey and to cover himself against any attempts which might be made to rescue them. This great commander owed many of his distinguished successes to the surprising works which he executed; so far exceeding the fears or apprehensions of his enemy, that they found themselves un-

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XXIV. were not prepared to contend.

The Roman armies in general, and those which served under Cæsar in particular, had learned to make war with the pick-ax and the shovel, no less than with the javeline and the sword, and were inured to prodigies of labour as well as of valour. In the present case they were made to execute lines of circumvallation and countervallation over an extent of twelve or fourteen miles. They began with digging, quite round the foot of the hill, a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular sides, in order to prevent any surprise from the town. At the distance of four hundred feet from this ditch, and beyond the reach of the enemy's missiles, was drawn the line of countervallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart twelve feet high, furnished, as usual, with a palisade. At a proper distance from this first line which fronted the town, so as to leave a proper interval for the lodgement and forming of his army, he drew another line, consisting of the same parts and dimensions, fronting the field. From the nature of the ground, part of these works were upon the hills, and part in the hollows or valleys; and the ditches, wherever the level permitted, or could not carry off the water, were allowed to be filled.

As he had reason, as soon as the distress of a blockade began to be felt, to expect from a garrison, which exceeded his own army in numbers, attempts to sally from within; and, by the united exertions



exertions of all the Gaulish nations in behalf of their friends, every effort that could be made to relieve them from without ; and as his own army, consisting of no more than sixty thousand men, could not equally man throughout all the works of so much extent, he thought it necessary to cover his lines with every species of outwork then practised in the art of attack or defence, the *Cippi*, *Lilia*, and the *Stimuli*.

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The first were forked stakes, or large branches of trees cut short and pointed to wound those who should attempt to pass them ; they were planted in rows in the bottom of a ditch five feet wide, and bound, or lashed together to prevent their being separately pulled up.

The second, or *lilia*, consisted of single stakes sharpened and made hard in the fire, planted in the bottom of tapering or conical holes, of which there were many rows placed in quincunx ; so that a person who had passed in the interval of any two must necessarily fall into a third. This device was commonly masked or concealed with slender brush-wood covered with earth.

The last, or the *stimuli*, were wooden shafts set in the ground and stuck thick with barbed hooks, to fasten or tear the flesh of those who attempted to pass them in the night, or without the necessary precautions.

All these several works, it appears, the Roman army completed, considerably within the thirty days for which Vercingetorix had computed that

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his provisions might last. Both parties concerned in this blockade, without any attempt to hasten the event, seemed to wait for the several circumstances on which they relied for the issue. Cæsar trusted to the effects of famine, and the Gauls to the assistance of their friends, who were in reality assembling in great numbers from every quarter to effect their relief. They are said to have mustered at Bibracté<sup>1</sup> no less than two hundred and forty thousand foot, with eight thousand horse. But if these numbers are not exaggerated, they may be considered as a proof how far those nations were ignorant of the circumstances on which the fortunes of armies really turn. The supreme command of this multitude was given to Comius, a chieftain of one of the northern cantons, who having some time made war in conjunction with the Romans, owed the rank which he held in his own country to the favour of Cæsar, but could not resist the contagion of that general ardour with which his countrymen now rose to recover their freedom.

While this great host was assembling, the unhappy garrison of Alesia received no tidings of relief. Their provisions being near exhausted, they began to despair of succour. A council was held to deliberate on the part they should take, and to form some plan of escape. Some were of opinion that they ought to surrender themselves, and to implore the victor's mercy. Others, that they

should

<sup>1</sup> Autun.

should make a general sally, endeavour to cut their way through the enemy, and escape or perish with swords in their hands. Critognatus, a warrior of rank from the canton of the Arverni<sup>1</sup>, treated the opinion of those who proposed to surrender as mean and dastardly; that of the second, as brave rather in appearance than in reality. "Bravery," he said, "does not consist in sudden efforts of impatience and despair, but in firmly enduring for any length of time what the circumstances of war may require. Shall we think merely, because we have no communication with our friends, that they have deserted us, and do not intend to make any effort to save us? Against whom do you think Cæsar hath constructed so many works in his rear? Against whom does he man them in your sight with so much care? He has intelligence, although you have not, that a powerful army is preparing to relieve you. Take courage, and wait the coming of your friends. Even if your provisions should fail, the example of former times will point out a resource. Your ancestors, being surrounded by the armies of the Cimbri and the Teutones, rather than surrender themselves, fed on the bodies of those who were unserviceable in the war; and by this expedient held out till the enemy was obliged to retire. And yet, on that occasion, our ancestors had less cause than we have to make every effort of constancy and fortitude.

*" Their*

<sup>1</sup> Auvergne.

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“ *Their* enemies were passing, and meant only to plunder a country which they were soon to abandon; *our* enemies come to bind us in perpetual chains, and to establish a dominion at which human nature revolts.”

The Gauls kept their resolution to hold out, but rejected the means that were proposed to supply their necessities, or reserved them for a time of greater extremity. The proposition of Critognatus is, by Cæsar, who was himself the unprovoked author of so much distress, and who continued, without remorse, to gratify his ambition, at the expence of so much blood, mentioned with horror as an act of nefarious cruelty<sup>1</sup>. So much are men affected with appearances which shock the imagination more than with the real measure of what is hurtful to mankind. What followed, however, was probably no less cruel on the part of the Gaulish army, than it was on the part of Cæsar himself; the first, to lessen the consumption of food, turned out the women, children, and unarmed inhabitants of the town, to the mercy of the enemy; and Cæsar, in order to accumulate the sufferings of the besieged, would neither relieve nor suffer these helpless victims to pass. From this circumstance we may presume, although it is not mentioned, that they must have perished a spectacle of extreme suffering and anguish in the presence of both armies.

In

<sup>1</sup> Nec prætereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter ejus singularem ac nefariam crudelitatem. De Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 76.



In the midst of these extremities, Comius, with the united force of the Gaulish nations, at last appeared for the relief of Alesia, and with their multitudes covered the neighbouring hills. Being favoured by the nature of the ground, they were enabled to advance within five hundred paces, or less than half a mile, of Cæsar's lines. On the following day the cavalry on both sides began to act. The Gaulish horse, trusting to their superiority in numbers, or to the defensive plan which the Romans were likely to follow on the present occasion, drew forth on the plain below the town, and proposed to encourage their friends by braving the enemy. Cæsar thought it necessary to repel this species of insult, and sent his cavalry to accept the challenge. An action began about noon, and lasted till the setting of the sun, when the Gaulish horse, who till then had maintained the fight with great obstinacy and valour, being taken in flank by the Germans who were in the service of Cæsar, were obliged to give way. Both sides, on this occasion, had mixed parties of infantry with their horse; and the Gaulish foot who were engaged in this action, being now abandoned to the swords of the enemy, fled in the utmost confusion to the rear of their own army.

After this action nothing passed for a day and a night; but it appeared that, during this interval, the Gaulish army in the field were collecting faggots and hurdles to fill up the trenches of Cæsar, and preparing grapplings to tear down the palisade and

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and the parapet; and that they only waited till these preparations should be finished to make a vigorous effort to open the way to their friends or raise the blockade. They accordingly came down in the middle of the night, and, with a great shout, the only signal they supposed could be understood by those who were shut up in the town, gave a general assault on Cæsar's line of circumvallation, as far as their numbers could embrace it, and without any choice of place.

Cæsar had assigned to every legion and separate body of men their station, and, to render them familiar with the disposition he had made, had repeatedly roused, and taught them to repair to their posts of alarm; he had placed Mark Antony and Trebonius, with a body of reserve, to succour any part of the lines that might be in danger of being forced. So prepared, he now received, without any surprise, the general assault of the Gauls. His men suffered considerably from the first shower of missiles that came from so numerous an enemy; but as soon as the assailants advanced to the outworks, and felt themselves entangled in the snares which had been laid for them, and against which they had taken no precaution, they were sensible that they fought at a great disadvantage, and desisted at once from this rash and inconsiderate attempt.

Meanwhile the besieged, in anxious expectation of what was to pass in the field, having heard the shout that was raised by their friends, and having returned it to make known their own intention,

to

to co-operate in every attack, instantly began to employ the preparations which they likewise had made to fill up the trenches, or force the lines. They continued, during the greater part of the night, to cast such materials as they could throw into the broad ditch or moat which covered the enemy's works; but, when day appeared, seeing that their friends had retired, without making any impression on the exterior line, they too, not to expose themselves in an attempt in which they were not to be seconded, withdrew to their station on the hill.

From this disappointment the Gauls, both within and without the blockade, were sensible of their error in having made an attack before they had examined the enemy's cover. To correct this mistake, they visited the whole circumference of Cæsar's lines. They observed, in a particular place, that the exterior intrenchment was interrupted by a hill which it could not embrace without making a great circuit. That Cæsar, to avoid so great an addition to his labour, and so much outline to defend, had stationed two legions in that place with their usual encampment, forming a kind of fortress on the summit of the hill, sufficient to compensate the discontinuance of his lines on that side.

This place was chosen by the Gauls for a second and better concerted attempt than the first; and they determined, instead of the night to make their attack at noon-day, when the enemy were most likely to be off their guard. Five-and-fifty thousand

CHAP. thousand men were selected for this service ; and  
 XXIV. they began their march early in the night, arrived at their ground before break of day, and lay concealed under a ridge of hills till noon. At this time they came forward, furnished not only with grappling-irons to tear down the palisade, which was formed on the parapet, but with hurdles and faggots to fill up the ditch, and to smother the stimuli from which they had suffered so much in their former attacks.

Cæsar, though not thrown off his guard, either by the time of the day, or by his former success, was sensible, that he was now attacked in his weakest place. He ordered Labienus instantly, with six cohorts, to support the legions that were posted in that station ; and as he had reason to expect, at the same time, a general assault, both from within and from without his lines, to favour this principal attack, he ordered every separate body to its post of alarm ; and he himself, with a considerable reserve, took a station from which he could best observe the whole, and be ready to sustain any part that was pressed. He had given Labienus instructions, in case he found that the intrenchment of the camp could not be defended, to sally forth, and bring the action to that issue, in which the Romans were generally found to have an advantage by mixing with the enemy sword in hand.

The Gauls, who were shut up on the heights of Alesia, being prepared to second the attempts of  
 their



their friends in the field, began the action on their part nearly about the same time; and the Romans, being alarmed with hostile cries and shouts, at once both in their front and in their rear, were in danger of being seized with a panic, from which the best troops, on occasion, are not exempted.

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Labienus was so much pressed where the Gauls made their principal effort, that Cæsar successively detached two several parties from his reserve to sustain him. First, a body of six cohorts under Decimus Brutus, and afterwards a body of seven cohorts under Fabius. At length, upon receiving information that Labienus had not been able to prevent the enemy from passing the intrenchment, but that he meant, with all the troops who had joined him from different stations, amounting to nine-and-thirty cohorts, to make a general sally according to his instructions, and to mix with the enemy sword in hand; Cæsar himself instantly moved to support him.

He had by this time observed, that the enemy, by a gross misconduct, had made no feint or no attempt on any other part of the lines to favour their principal attack; and he therefore, with those he still retained as a body of reserve, not only left the post of observation he had taken in the beginning of the action, but ventured even to unfurnish some other parts of the line as he passed, and advanced with great rapidity to join in the sally which Labienus was about to attempt. In his coming he was known from afar by the conspicuous

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spicuous dress which he generally wore in time of action ; and his arrival, on this occasion, with the reinforcement which he brought, greatly animated that part of his army which had begun to despair of the event. He had, in this critical moment, with his usual genius and presence of mind, ordered his cavalry to pass the intrenchment ; and, with a circuit in the field, while the foot were engaged in front, to take the enemy in flank or in the rear. If the event had been otherwise doubtful, this movement alone, it is probable, must have secured it in his favour. The Gauls, although in the attack they had advanced with ardour, yet lost courage entirely, when they found themselves assailed and put upon their defence. Without any attempt to resist the cavalry, which came upon their flank or rear, they took to flight, and were pursued with great slaughter.

This flight at once decided the fate of both attempts ; whether of the Gauls, who were shut up in Alesia, or of their countrymen, who had come to their relief. During the night, those in the field, discomfited by their repulse, were separating, and leaving their chieftains, or dispersing in different directions. Many fell a prey to the parties who were sent in pursuit of them. Those from within the lines, who had suffered so long a blockade, now seeing all their hopes of relief at an end, were no longer disposed to contend with their fate. Vercingetorix, having assembled the leaders together, told them, That, as he had undertaken

dertaken this war, not from motives of private ambition, but from an earnest desire to restore, if he could, the freedom of his country, so he was now ready to become a sacrifice for the relief of his countrymen, and in any manner they thought proper to dispose of him, whether alive or dead, was willing to be made the means of appeasing the victor's rage.

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At this consultation it was determined to surrender; and Vercingetorix suffered himself to be delivered up. With respect to the treatment he received, Cæsar is silent; but it is probable, that, like other captive chiefs, on such occasions, he was destined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror; though, upon a fair review of the parts they had severally acted, likely to furnish a comparison not altogether to his advantage, and in some respects fit to obscure his glory.

The prisoners in general, except those who belonged to the cantons of the Ædui and Arverni, underwent the ordinary fate to which captives, in those times, were destined, being exposed to sale, or distributed as plunder among the troops. As for the prisoners of the Ædui and Arverni, they were reserved by Cæsar, on the present occasion, as hostages for the submission of their respective cantons, and for an immediate supply of provisions exacted from thence.

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*Cæsar remains in Gaul.—Pompey assumes Scipio for Colleague in the Consulate.—Succession of Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus.—Arrangement for the Provinces.—Motion to recall Cæsar.—Continued Debates in the Senate.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul.—Intrigues in the City.—Affairs in the other Provinces.—Campaign of Cicero.—Succession of Consuls.—State of Parties in the City and in the Senate.—Arrival of Cæsar in Italy in the Spring.—Return to Gaul.—Parts with two Legions to Pompey and the Senate.—Alarm of Cæsar's March.—The Consul Marcellus commits his Sword to Pompey.*

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THE seventh and the most difficult campaign of the war in Gaul being now at an end, Cæsar sent Labienus, with two legions beyond the Soane<sup>1</sup>; Caius Fabius, with two more, to the sources of the Marne and the Meuse; other officers with separate bodies, amounting in all to three legions, into different stations beyond the Loire, and towards the Garonne; Quintus Tullius Cicero, with some other officers, to a station allotted them on the Soane<sup>1</sup>, to superintend the formation of magazines and the supply of provisions, which were chiefly transported by the navigation of that river.

Cæsar

<sup>1</sup> The Arar.



Cæsar himself not having any immediate object of equal importance with that of securing the possession he had gained of a country so extensive and populous, and which, though with the title only of a Roman Proconsul, gave him the state and resources of a great monarch; determined to pass the winter on this side of the Alps. His exclusion from the Consulate, whilst he retained his province with the command of an army, was dispensed with: But the time was not yet come for him to avail himself of his privilege; and he was willing, by remaining at a distance, to shun the notice of parties, who were known to observe his steps, and to state every advance he made to power as matter of public alarm. He nevertheless did not suffer any thing of moment to pass in the city, without taking some part in it by means of his agents and partizans, and was continually employed in gaining to his interests all those who were likely to come into office, or who, by their personal consideration, were of any importance in the State, and ever strove to exclude from the magistracy all such as were disinclined to favour his own pretensions, or who could not be gained to his party.

Pompey had now, for some months, exercised the office of sole Consul. In that time he had, in some measure, restored the energy of government, and had employed his own power with moderation, as well as vigour. He had shown himself qualified to act the part of an excellent prince, though ill qualified to endure the equality of pre-

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tension, which is claimed by the citizens of a commonwealth. His continual desire of unprecedented distinction was one of the evils that distressed the republic. This evil, however, was partly mitigated by the facility with which he resigned the powers to which his vanity, more than his love of dominion, made him aspire. Having enjoyed his present dignity from the first of March to the beginning of August, he took for colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, suspending the prosecution under which this senator then lay, for bribery, in soliciting votes at a preceding election.

The newly elected colleague of Pompey, desirous to signalize his Consulship by some act of reformation, moved and obtained the repeal of the law, in which Clodius had so greatly circumscribed the power of the Censors; and he attempted to revive the authority of this magistracy, but in vain. Few citizens, now in public view, could bear the rigorous inspection of this once awful Tribunal, as few had the courage to undertake or to exercise its trust. The institution accordingly had fallen into disuse, as being ill suited to the times. There being few of the People who were either fit to censure, or who could bear to be censured, it was not in the power of laws to revive what the general sense and manners of the age had abolished.

Disorders arising from the weakness of government had come to that extreme at which states must either correct themselves, or undergo some fatal

fatal change. The example of punishments inflicted, and of prosecutions still carried on against persons lately in public station, for the illegal methods employed at elections, deterred many from offering themselves for any of the offices of State; and the late law, debarring Consuls, Prætors, or other magistrates, from any provincial appointments for five years after the expiration of their term, removed one powerful motive by which citizens were induced to seek for such honours.

At the elections for the ensuing year only three candidates appeared; M. Marcellus, Servius Sulpicius and M. Cato: all of them supposed to be of the Senatorian party; but very differently considered by those who now endeavoured to rule the State. Marcellus had, in fact, recommended himself to Pompey; and Sulpicius, as afterwards appeared, had been gained by Cæsar; and the interests of these candidates were warmly espoused by both their powerful patrons, in the present contest, in opposition to Cato, whose success might have proved a considerable obstruction to the designs of either.

It is observed of this competition, that it was carried on without bribery or tumult. As the competitors were supposed to be all of the Senatorian party, the Senators thought their interest secure whichever of the candidates should prevail. And as the Senatorian party divided upon the occasion, the influence of Cæsar and Pompey united against Cato, easily cast the balance on the side of Sulpi-

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cus and Marcellus. Their antagonist, during the competition, continued in the same habits of friendship as usual with both; and when the choice was decided in their favour, instead of withdrawing from public view, as was common under such disappointments, from the place of election, he passed to the field of Mars, stript, went to exercise as usual, and continued from thence forward to frequent the Forum in his common undress. To those who condoled with him, or pressed him to continue his suit for another year, as he had done when first disappointed of the Prætorship, he made answer, That he thought it was the part of a good man to undertake the public service, whenever he was intrusted with it, and to make his willingness known, but not to court the public for employments as a favour to himself. "The people," he said, "at the time that they refused me the Prætorship, were under actual violence: in this case, they have made a free choice, and it appears that I must either violate my own mind, or renounce their suffrage. My own mind is of more consequence to me than their favour; but, if I retain my character, I shall not be so unreasonable as to expect consideration from persons to whom it is not agreeable."

U. C. 702.  
Serv. Sulpicius, M.  
Claud. Marcellus, Coss.

When the new Consuls were received into office, their immediate predecessors being by the late act precluded for five years from holding any provincial government, it became necessary to fill stations



tions of this sort with those who had formerly been in office, and who hitherto had not been appointed to any commission abroad. Accordingly Bibulus, who had been the colleague of Cæsar in his Consulate, was appointed to the government of Syria, vacant by the death of Crassus. Cicero was named to succeed Appius Claudius in Cilicia and Cyprus, Atius Varus was appointed Prætor in Africa, and P. Cornelius Spinther in Achaia. Pompey, who had hitherto enjoyed a dispensation from the law, in continuing to hold by his lieutenants the government and command of the army in Spain, while he held the dignity of Consul in the city, now professed an intention to take possession of his Spanish province in person, and he actually took his departure from Rome for this purpose; but was induced to suspend his journey by a motion, which was made in the Senate by Marcellus, soon after his accession to the office of Consul, on which he was then entered.

This motion related to Cæsar, who was now in possession of a very important privilege, entitling him to sue for the Consulate, without resigning the command of his army. His view in coveting this privilege; his continual augmentation of the troops in his province; his address in attaching the army to himself; his insinuation; his liberality; his assiduity to gain every person that could be won, and to preclude from power every one likely to oppose himself: the whole tendency of his conduct, and the enormous power he had acquired, began to

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be noticed by the most inattentive, and gave a general alarm. What Cato had so often represented, without any effect, began to be generally perceived; and persons, who had formerly temporised, or thought to conciliate Cæsar by concessions, were desirous now to recall their gifts, or to remove him from the post of enormous advantage he had gained.

Many members of the Senate had become remiss in their attendance, and regardless even of their own political interests. The few who exerted themselves, were distracted with personal jealousies and distrust of each other. Cicero in particular, who before his banishment had been strenuous on the side of public order, now grown timorous from the sufferings he had incurred, was chiefly attentive to his own safety, which he studied by paying his court to the prevailing powers. There was no bar in Cæsar's way, beside the great consideration and the jealousy of Pompey, who had been hitherto subservient to his designs, and even assisted him in procuring his privilege to stand for the Consulate in absence; but now saw its tendency, and wished to withdraw it. It was probably, therefore, with the approbation of Pompey, though after his departure from Rome, that the Consul Marcellus, while the Senate was deliberating on other removes and appointments in the provincial governments, proposed that, the war in Gaul being finished, Cæsar in particular should be recalled; or, if his friends insisted on his being continued in his command, that he should not be admitted on the list of candidates for the Consulate, until he com-  
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plied with the law, and presented himself personally for this purpose. CHAP.  
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This motion gave rise in the Senate to warm debates, which were frequently adjourned, and as often resumed. The Consul Sulpicius, supported by such of the Tribunes as were in the interest of Cæsar, opposed the motion. Pompey himself, under pretence that he waited the issue of these debates, stopped short in his journey to Spain, passed some time at Ariminum in reviewing the new levies which were destined to reinforce the troops of his province; and at last, being summoned to attend the Senate on the fifteenth of August, to consider of the provincial arrangements<sup>1</sup>, he returned to Rome.

On this day, Pompey affected to censure the violence with which it had been proposed to recall, before the expiration of his term, an officer legally appointed. He at the same time acknowledged his opinion, that Cæsar ought not to unite the government of a province, and the command of an army with the dignity of Consul; but dissuaded the Senate from taking any immediate resolution on that head. The debate was adjourned to the first of September<sup>2</sup>. Then no meeting of the Senate could be formed; but as soon as the subject was again resumed, the late Consul Cornelius Scipio, the father-in-law to Pompey, proposed, that on the first of March, when the persons destined to succeed the

<sup>1</sup> Cic. Epist. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 4, Dio. Cass. lib. iv. c. 58, 59.

<sup>2</sup> Cic. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

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the present Consuls must have entered on office, a day should be fixed specially to consider of the province of Gaul; and moved that this question should be then resumed in preference to any other business whatever<sup>1</sup>. Marcellus accordingly prepared, and laid before the Senate a decree for this purpose on the last of September. By the first clause of this decree, the Consuls elected for the ensuing year were required, on the first of March, to move in the Senate the consideration of the Consular provinces, to admit no other business to precede or to be joined with this, and to suffer no interruption in the meetings of the Senate, even on account of the assemblies of the people. By the same clause, it was resolved, That the three hundred Senators, appointed judges for the year, might be called off from their sittings in the courts to attend the Senate on this business; and if it should be necessary to make any motion on this subject in the assemblies of the People at large, or of the Plebeians<sup>2</sup> separately, that the Consuls Sulpicius and Marcellus, the Prætors, the Tribunes, or such of them as shall be named for that purpose, should move the people accordingly.

To this clause were prefixed, in the usual form, the names of twelve Senators, as the authors or movers of the act.

By a second clause, bearing the same names, a caution was entered against any obstruction to be given in this business by persons empowered to controul

<sup>1</sup> Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ad Populum Plebemve ferrent. Ibid.



controul the Senate's proceedings; and it was resolved, That whoever should put a negative on this decree, should be declared an enemy to his country; and that the Senate, notwithstanding any such negative, should persist in recording its own act, and in carrying its purpose into effect. In the face of this resolution, the Tribunes C. Cælius, L. Venicius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Panfa, interposed their negatives.

By another clause, the Senate resolved, That on the same day, the case of the armies of the republic should be taken into consideration, and all who claimed their dismissal, either on account of the length of service, or any other consideration, should be heard; and that this likewise should be entered on the journals of the Senate, notwithstanding any negative interposed to the contrary. Here the Tribunes C. Cælius and C. Panfa, again forbade the decree. The last clause related to the mode of carrying into execution the purpose of the Pompeian law, with respect to the nomination of Pro-prætors to the province of Cilicia, and the other eight Prætorian provinces; and on this clause likewise, the two last mentioned Tribunes entered their negative<sup>1</sup>.

Thus the resolutions of the Senate, though preserved on their own records, were, by the continual interposition of the Tribunes, prevented from having any real effect. And Cæsar, from the disputes which had arisen on his own account, had sufficient

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 8.

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sufficient warning, if this had been necessary, to prepare himself for an approaching conflict. It is indeed likely, that though in action the principal characters of his mind were decision and rapidity, yet no man ever laid his designs more deep, looked forward to consequences more remote, or waited with more patience the proper time for the execution of his projects. He had now, by the unremitting application of eight years, acquired the advantage, for the sake of which he had coveted the command in Gaul; he was at the head of a numerous army, which he had gradually augmented from two or three legions the establishment of his province, to twelve, well inured to service, and attached to his person. He was in possession of a privilege to stand for the Consulate, without disbanding his army; and when he should unite the first civil and political authority in the state, with an army at the gates of the capital, there is no doubt that he might be considered as sovereign of the empire. His apparent right to the advantages he had gained was such, that the resolutions of the Senate against him, however necessary to the preservation of the commonwealth, might have the semblance of injustice, and were likely to engage both his own army and the populace of Rome in his quarrel. He himself prepared for the issue, by removing every cause of embarrassment in his province, and by farther attaching the legions under his command with gratifications and bounties.

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He had dispersed or destroyed all the great armies, which the utmost efforts of the Gaulish nations, in the preceding campaign, had been able to assemble against him ; but he had not reconciled the spirits of that people, nor inured them to his government. In this therefore he had a plausible ground, from which to refute the allegations of the Senate, who proceeded in their resolutions to recal him, on a supposition, that the war in his province was ended ; and at the same time, had a fair pretence to gratify his army with the spoils of the country. For these purposes, soon after he had placed the legions in separate quarters, he had intelligence, or affected to believe, that the war was likely to break out afresh in his province ; and under this pretence, he took occasion to carry different bodies successively into action. Leaving M. Antony to command at Bibracté<sup>1</sup> on the right of the Loire, he himself, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, passed that river, took the canton of the Bituriges by surprise, plundered their habitations, carried many of the people into captivity, and continued to lay waste the country, until they and all the neighbouring cantons on the left of the Loire, to avert these calamities, surrendered themselves at discretion.

From this expedition, in which he spent forty days, he returned to his quarters, and ordered the two legions, which had been thus employed, a gratuity of two hundred sesterii, or about thirty shillings

1 Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun.



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shillings a man to the private soldiers; and of about two thousand sesterii, or sixteen pounds to the Centurions. This money, it is observed by the historian<sup>1</sup>, was not immediately paid; but was retained by Cæsar as a pledge in his own hands, or remained as a debt due to the army, giving to every individual a special interest in the safety and success of his general, on whom he depended for this and other emoluments.

About eighteen days after this first division of the army had returned to its quarters, other two legions were employed on a like expedition between the Loire and the Seine<sup>2</sup>. The inhabitants of this tract were to suffer military execution, upon a complaint that they infested the recent acquisitions of Cæsar beyond the Loire. He accordingly marched to protect his new allies; and being arrived in the country, from whence they were said to be invaded, found the supposed enemy, by the devastations of the preceding campaign, which had ruined their towns and villages, reduced to live in temporary huts, in which they withstood with difficulty the inclemency of the season, and were rather objects of pity than of hostile resentment. On the approach of the Romans, they fled to the woods, where they perished in great numbers, from the effects of famine and cold. To force them to an immediate surrender, or to cut off all hopes of advantage from delay, Cæsar made a disposition to prevent their having any respite from their present sufferings. For this purpose,

<sup>1</sup> Hirt. de Bell. Gallico.

<sup>2</sup> To the country of the Carnutes.



purpose, he ordered the ruins of Genabum<sup>1</sup> to be repaired as a place of arms, quartered his legions there, and kept the horse and irregular infantry in the field to pursue the natives, to seize their persons, or otherwise to multiply the evils to which they were exposed. In this service too, it was likely that the army was rewarded by the distribution of captives, and were allowed to have a claim upon Cæsar for gratuities equal to those which had been granted to the eleventh and twelfth legions.

These operations led on to the spring, when a more real service took place on the frontiers of the low countries. From that quarter, the people of the Remi<sup>2</sup> had given information, that the Bellovaci, or inhabitants of what is now called the Beauvois, with other cantons on the right of the Oise, were actually arming, and meant to make war on the Romans and their allies.

On this intimation, Cæsar thought proper again to call forth the eleventh legion into service; and it is remarkable that this legion, though now in its eighth campaign, is expressly said to have been thus employed out of its turn, in order to improve a discipline, in which, when compared to the older legions, they were deemed to be still defective. The eighth and ninth legions, the one from the station of Fabius, and the other from that of Labienus, were ordered to join them in the country of the Suesones<sup>3</sup>, near the confluence of the Oise and

<sup>1</sup> Now Orleans:<sup>2</sup> Rheims.<sup>3</sup> The Soissons.

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and the Aisne. With this force Cæsar passed the Oise; but arrived too late to stifle the intended commotion. The Bellovaci<sup>r</sup>, with some of their neighbours, apprehending, from the fate of the nations on the Loire, that they could not rely for safety on their own innocence, nor on the care which they had taken to avoid giving offence to the Romans, had already taken arms for their own security, and with all their effects had retired to a strong post. They had a hill in their front, beyond which there lay a morass, and in that situation they thought themselves sufficiently secure without any artificial work.

Cæsar posted himself in their neighbourhood and supposing, as in some former instances of the same kind, that the superiority of their own numbers would inspire the enemy with confidence, he took measures to augment their presumption, and to derive some advantage from the errors they were likely to commit, under the effects of this disposition. For this purpose he affected unusual caution, fortified his camp with uncommon care, scarcely ventured abroad to cover his foragers, and seemed to be entirely occupied in securing himself.

The Gauls however continued to avoid any general action, and were satisfied with the successful war they were suffered to make on the foraging parties which were sent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horse, they attacked and destroyed the cavalry, which had

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<sup>r</sup> The Beauvois.

come to the assistance of Cæsar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones<sup>1</sup>, and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loss he might have been in a little time reduced to great distress, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a speedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately stationed at Genabum<sup>2</sup>, and a third from Avaricum<sup>3</sup>, to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great accession of strength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Alesia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this resolution in the night, by removing their sick, wounded, and baggage; but had made so little progress at break of day, that their intention was discovered, and Cæsar, before they began their march, had time to pass the morass, and to take possession of the rising ground in their front. This he did with the greatest dispatch; and though he did not think it expedient to attack them in their present position, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they should make, and accordingly continued to awe, and to keep them in suspense.

The Gauls therefore, instead of being able to depart as they expected in the night, were obliged to remain a day in presence of their enemy, to cover the retreat of their wounded and baggage. They

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still

<sup>1</sup> Rheims and Langres.<sup>2</sup> Orleans.<sup>3</sup> Bourges.

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still flattered themselves, that the Romans, seeing them remain on their ground, would think proper to fall back to their former camp ; but observing, that while the greater part of the legions continued in readiness for action, others began to intrench themselves where they stood, they had recourse to a stratagem under cover of which they might themselves retire. For this purpose they brought forward the wood and straw, which remained, as usual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and having set them on fire, produced such a line of smoke, as darkened the fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæsar could venture to penetrate the cloud of smoke in pursuit of them, had gained a considerable distance. On the first sight of this uncommon appearance, he suspected their intention, and began to advance ; but the precautions, which he was obliged to take, in order to guard against any possible ambuscade or surprise, gave the Gauls the time which they wanted to effect undisturbed the first part of their movement.

Before night they halted again, about ten miles from their former station, and with their flying parties recurred to the same means they had hitherto employed to distress the Roman army. They succeeded in most of their attempts on the small parties which were sent abroad by Cæsar to procure him provisions ; and having reduced him to the necessity of depending entirely for the subsistence



ence of his army on what a single district in his rear could supply, they formed a design, with the choice of their army, to surround and to cut off the parties, which they expected he must employ on that particular service. Cæsar had intelligence of their design, and prepared, in his turn, what seldom fails to succeed a counter surprise. He placed his army in a proper position to cut off or command their ambuscade; and having thus taken or destroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into despair by so great a loss, to surrender themselves at discretion. In consequence of this surrender, the Romans had entire possession of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The Belgic nations being thus finally subdued, and Cæsar having no longer any enemy to oppose him in the field, except a few desperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his severity, or aversion to his government, had deserted their own settlements, he determined to act against the refractory in different quarters at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in case of distress, this remnant of the nations who lately opposed him mutually gave to one another. He sent C. Fabius, with twenty-five cohorts, to act on the left of the Loire; the twelfth legion, towards the sources of the Garonne, with orders to cover the approaches to Narbonne from the incursions of any stragglers, whom his intended severities might force upon desperate attempts on that side. He himself, with Labienus and Mark Antony, proceeded

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to the Meuse, where the territories of the late unfortunate Ambiorix<sup>1</sup>, beginning to be re-peopled, and the nation reinstated under its former leader, were become again the object of his vengeance. To convince this unhappy people, that they were not to enjoy peace under the government of a Prince who had presumed to circumvent and to destroy a part of the Roman army, he renewed his military execution against them, issuing his orders, as in the former instance, to spare neither sex nor age.

While Cæsar himself was employed in this manner, C. Fabius being arrived at the place of his destination, between the lower parts of the Loire and the Garonne, found a considerable force in arms against Caninius Rebilus, the Roman officer, who was stationed in that quarter. The natives had besieged fortress which was in possession of the Romans; but alarmed by the approach of Fabius, they withdrew, and endeavoured to pass the Loire to the northward. In this attempt, being intercepted in their march, and obliged to fight the Roman detachment, they were defeated with great slaughter. After this calamity, about five hundred, who escaped from the field under Drapes, a prince of that country, formerly distinguished in the war, took their flight in the opposite direction, and proposed to attack the Roman province of Narbonne, in order, with its spoils,

to

<sup>1</sup> Now Liege, Juliers, and Guelderland.

to compensate the losses which they themselves had sustained.

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Meantime Fabius, in consequence of his victory, received the submission of all the nations from the Loire to the Seine, and quite down to the sea coast. And having taken measures to secure his conquest, followed Drapes to the southward, overtook him beyond the Garonne, and obliged him, being no longer in condition to make any attempt on the Roman province as he proposed, to take refuge at Uxellodunum<sup>1</sup>, a place of strength, situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of some of those streams, which, falling from the Cevennes, form the Garonne by their junction.

Here Caninius and Fabius having joined their forces together, made dispositions to invest their enemy; but before their works were completed, Drapes, while he had yet access to the fields, willing to spare the magazines which he had made up in the fortress, ventured abroad with a detachment, at the head of which he was surprised and taken. The natives, however, who remained in the place, being supplied for a considerable time with provisions, resolved on a vigorous defence; and, by baffling the Roman army for some time in its attack, began to raise up anew the hopes and expectations of the nations around them. Cæsar thought the reduction of this place an object that called for his own presence. Having therefore sent Labienus to the Moselle, and having left M. An-

P 3

tony

<sup>1</sup> Supposed to be Cadenau.

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tony to command in the low countries, he himself, with his usual dispatch, traversed great part of Gaul, and appeared on the Garonne, equally unexpected by his own people, and by the enemy who were besieged in the fortrefs of Uxellodunum.

The place being strong by nature, and in no want of provisions, could be forced only by intercepting its supply of water. For this purpose Cæsar lined the banks of the river with archers and slingers, and effectually prevented the besieged from supplying themselves from thence. He proceeded next to exclude them from the use of a spring which burst from the rock in the approach to their town; for having got the command of the ground, he pushed a mine to the source from which the water came, diverted it from its former direction, and, by depriving the besieged of this last resource, obliged them to lay down their arms, and trust to his mercy. In this, however, they experienced what the author<sup>1</sup>, from whom these accounts are taken, considered as more than the usual severity of ancient war. Cæsar, according to this historian, having given proof of his clemency, be-thought himself now of an example of justice; and for this purpose ordered such as had carried arms in defence of Uxellodunum to have their hands struck off<sup>2</sup>. And this refined act of cruelty.

<sup>1</sup> Hist. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

<sup>2</sup> Cæsar quum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret.—Omnibus qui arma tulerant manus precidit. Vitam concessit quo testator esset pœna improborum. De Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.



ty being joined to the many barbarous executions with which the conquest of that country had been atchieved, thus ended the war in Gaul. CHAP.  
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The usual time of putting the troops into winter quarters not being come, Cæsar thought proper to visit the nations upon the Adour, or what is now called Gascony <sup>1</sup>; the only part of his new conquests in the acquisition of which he had not acted in person. He marched through this country at the head of two legions, and was every where received with the most perfect submission. From thence he repaired to Narbonne, the capital of his original province, held the usual conventions for the dispatch of civil affairs, and made a disposition for the quarters of his army during the winter. By this disposition two legions were stationed in the high country, towards the sources of the Garonne and the Loire, or in the territories of the Limovaci and Arverni <sup>2</sup>: two at Bibracté between the Soane and the Loire; two between the Loire and the Seine <sup>3</sup>; and the remaining four under the command of Trebonius, Vatinus, and Quintus Tullius Cicero, in different parts of the low countries. To this quarter of his new conquests he himself repaired, and fixed his residence at Nemetocenna <sup>4</sup>, in the centre of his northern stations.

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By

<sup>1</sup> Aquitania.

<sup>2</sup> Limoges and Auvergne.

<sup>3</sup> At Tours and Chartres.

<sup>4</sup> Supposed to be Arras.

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By this distribution of his army, Cæsar formed a kind of chain from the frontier of his original province, quite through the heart of his new acquisitions to the Meuse and the Scheld. And by his seeming anxiety for the safety of his northern extremity and still more by his own distance from Italy, he probably lulled for a while the vigilance or jealousy of his principal opponents at Rome. His own attention, however, to the state of politics in the city was never less remitted or slack.

Mark Antony, a person notoriously profligate and dissipated; but when the occasion required exertion, daring, strenuous and eloquent, as will appear on occasion in the sequel of this history, now began to be employed by Cæsar in the affairs of the city; and, under pretence of standing for the priesthood, was sent from Gaul, where he had recently served in the army, to bear a principal part among the agents and emissaries of his general at Rome. These agents were continually busied in extolling the merits of their employer, and in gaining to his interest every person of consideration who could in any degree advance or obstruct his designs. In the conquest of Gaul, they alleged that he added to the patrimony of the Roman People a territory of no less than three thousand miles in circumference, and a revenue of forty millions Roman money<sup>1</sup>. They took care at the same time, in his name and by his directions,

under

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, p. 268. Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 25. Between about three and four hundred thousand pounds.

under the pious pretence of celebrating the memory of his daughter, the late wife of Pompey, to cajole the people with public entertainments and feasts ; and proceeded to execute, at a great expence, the splendid works which he had formerly ordered.

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Cæsar himself, at the same time, was careful to secure the affections of the army ; doubled their pay, and was lavish in all the other articles which were derived from his bounty. Besides his occasional liberality to the legions in time of the war, he gave, or engaged himself to pay, to each particular soldier, what to persons of that condition was a considerable object. In the city he even entered into the secrets of every family, and, as has been mentioned, gained the master by courting the mistress or favourite slave. His purse was ever open to gratify the covetous with presents, to relieve the necessitous, and to silence the creditors of those who were oppressed with debt. He encouraged the prodigal to squander their patrimonies, and freely lent them the aids which their extravagance rendered necessary to them. He kept a correspondence at the same time with dependent and foreign princes ; and took upon him the protection of provincial towns, in order to secure their attachment and their confidence<sup>1</sup>.

While the Proconsul of Gaul was thus extending his influence in the empire, he had amused Pompey by assigning to him, in all their arrangements.

<sup>1</sup> Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 26, 27, 28.

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ments, what was apparently the place of honour and of importance at the head of affairs at Rome ; as he had gratified Crassus likewise by leaving him to choose the most lucrative government, while he himself submitted to be employed as a mere provincial officer, to explore a barbarous country, and to make war with its natives. But by thus yielding the supposed preference of station to his rivals, he actually employed them as the willing tools and ministers of his own ambition. The former, with all his disposition to emulation and jealousy, for some time the dupe of these artifices, imagined that Cæsar had risen in the State by his permission, and that the present condition of parties was the fruit of his own address. As he himself, for the most part, endeavoured to obtain his ends by means indirect and artificial, he was the more easily duped by those who affected to be deceived, and who by that means were able to overreach him. Although it was impossible for him now to remain any longer insensible to the superiority which Cæsar had acquired, or to those still more important objects at which he was aiming, yet he had not hitherto taken his part openly nor directly against him, but contented himself with employing others in placing ill-concerted and ineffectual obstructions in his way, which he sometimes disowned, and always feebly supported. At last, and in the prosecution of the measures of which we have observed the beginning in the Senate, he hazarded the whole authority of that body  
against



against Cæsar, without having provided any military power to enforce their commands.

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Pompey himself, while most under the influence of ambition, and when he had it most in his power to trample on the civil constitution of his country, had shewn a respect for the commonwealth, which kept him within bounds that were consistent with this species of government ; and he imagined that no man could presume to surpass himself in pretensions to rise above the ordinary level. In the course of debates relating to the present state of affairs, he generally spoke ambiguously, or affected to disbelieve the designs that were imputed to Cæsar ; but finding, on the last motion which was made to recall him from Gaul, that the eyes of the whole Senate were turned upon himself, he was forced to some explanation ; in which, with apparent embarrassment, he said, that although it was his opinion, that the Proconsul of Gaul could not, in consistence with justice, be instantly recalled, yet that after the first of March he should have no difficulties on the subject. “ But,” says one of the Senators, “ What if this motion should “ then have a negative put upon it ? ” “ I shall “ make no distinction,” replied Pompey, “ between Cæsar’s refusing to obey the order of the “ Senate, and his procuring some one here to forbid that order.” “ But what if he persist in “ demanding the Consulate while he retains his “ province and his army ? ” “ What,” replied Pompey,

CHAP. Pompey, "if my own child should offer me vio-  
XXV. lence?"

After the attempt which had been made to fix the question of Cæsar's recall for the first of March, Pompey being at Naples, was taken ill, and supposed to be in danger. His recovery gave a general satisfaction, of which he had afterwards very flattering proofs in his progress through Italy. He was every where met by processions, found the ways strowed before him with flowers, and was received by multitudes, who appeared to be frantic with joy for the return of his health.

Whatever part Pompey himself or his emissaries may have had in procuring these demonstrations of respect and affection, it is probable he was highly flattered with them, and either mistook them himself, or hoped that others should mistake them, as the proofs of a consideration and power which no attempt of his rival could overset or impair.

The principal attention of all parties, during this summer and autumn, as has been mentioned, had been turned to the affairs of Cæsar, and the dangerous tendency of the course he pursued: and they were but for a little while diverted from this object by an alarm on the side of Syria. The Parthians, encouraged by their late success against Crassus, passed the Euphrates with a great army, commanded by Pacorus, son to Orodes, under the direction of Osaces, a veteran or experienced leader. They had, during the preceding winter,  
made

made an alliance with the king of Armenia, and in this invasion were to be joined by his forces. CHAP.  
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The disaster of Crassus had rendered the Parthian name terrible at Rome; and this intelligence struck a momentary panic in the city, as if an enemy were already at the gates. Some proposed to give Pompey the command in Syria; some to send Cæsar thither; and others, to send both the present Consuls to the army with a proper reinforcement<sup>1</sup>.

But before these measures could be adjusted, or before any reinforcement could be ready to join the army in Syria, the people were relieved of their fears by Caius Cassius, the general then commanding under Bibulus in that province. This officer having obliged the Parthians to withdraw from Antioch; in their retreat attacked and routed them with great slaughter. Ofaces in that action received some wounds, of which, in a few days afterwards, he died; and the Parthian army remained inactive during the following year in their retreat beyond the Euphrates; sensible, in their turn, that a war carried over the wastes of that desolated frontier might be ruinous to any power by whom it was attempted.

Bibulus, the Proconsul of Syria, soon after the defeat of the Parthians, arrived in his province, and, according to the established practice of the Romans, laid his pretensions to a triumph for the victory which, under his auspices, though before his arrival, had been obtained by his lieutenant.

This

<sup>1</sup> Cicer. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 10.

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This invasion of Syria, as well as some disturbances in his own province, furnished Cicero, at the same time, with the occasion of some military operations, of which we have a particular account, in his letters, and which, though not material to the military history of the times, are not unworthy of notice, as they relate to this eminent personage. He had taken possession of his command in Cilicia, and however better fitted by his habits for the Forum and the political assemblies at Rome than for the field, possessed abilities to qualify him for any station, put himself at the head of an army, and prepared for the defence of his province. He had set out from Rome in May; and having had a conference with Pompey at Tarentum, arrived at Brundisium on the twenty-first of that month<sup>1</sup>.

The military establishment of Cilicia being no more than twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, Cicero applied for an augmentation of it, and on the fourth of June was still at Brundisium, waiting for an answer to this application. But finding that his request, having been opposed by the Consul Sulpicius<sup>2</sup>, was unsuccessful, he set sail from that place, arrived at Actium on the fifteenth of that month, and, passing through Athens, reached his province on the last of July. Here he found the troops, in consequence of a mutiny which had recently broke out amongst them, separated from their officers, dispersed in places of their own choosing, the men of entire cohorts absent from their

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. iii. ep. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



their colours, and considering themselves as exempt from any authority or government whatever.

In these circumstances the new governor trusting to the respect that was due to the name and commission of Proconsul, ordered M. Annius, one of his lieutenants, to assemble as many as he could of the mutinous troops, and to encamp at Iconium in Licaonia. There he joined them on the twenty-fourth of August; and, having intelligence of the Parthian invasion, took measures for the security of his province; marched, without loss of time, to Cybistra, on the frontier of Cappadocia; took under his protection the king Ariobarzanes, who was then by a powerful faction in his own kingdom threatened with a revolt, and by receiving him as a prince in alliance with the Romans, dispelled the storm which had been gathering against him. He accepted, at the same time, of the offers which were made by Dejotarus to join him with all his forces; and being in this situation when he received accounts that the Parthians had presented themselves before Antioch, he supposed that his presence might be wanted to cover his own frontier on the side of Syria. He accordingly moved to that quarter, in order to secure the passes of the mountains. Here however he learnt, that the storm had blown over; that the enemy obliged to withdraw, and had sustained a considerable loss in their retreat; and that Bibulus was then at Antioch. This intelligence he communicated to Dejotarus, intimating, at the same time, that his assistance was no longer necessary.

The

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The province of Cilicia had been for some years subject to the Romans ; but the inhabitants of the mountainous parts had never acknowledged their authority, nor even that of their own national sovereigns. Cicero, being now with an army in the neighbourhood of those mountains, and finding that the people had retired to their strong holds, with a resolution to oppose his authority, formed a design to surprise them ; and, for the better execution of his project, made a feint to withdraw to Epiphania, where he halted for a day, as if to refresh his troops. On the day following, which was the eleventh of October, in the evening, he put his army again in motion towards the mountains, and before morning arrived in the midst of his enemies, who by this time had returned to their usual habitations ; cut them off separately, pursued such as fled, forced their strong holds, and in about sixty days reduced to submission a number of towns and a considerable tract of country, which had never before acknowledged the Roman government.

The troops, on this occasion, saluted their commander with the title of Imperator ; which being usually given to victorious leaders<sup>1</sup>, was commonly understood as the suffrage of the army for obtaining a triumph. Cicero himself, accordingly, on this circumstance, together with the service which gave occasion to it, afterwards grounded his claim to that honour. This claim, indeed, he scarcely seems

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 4.

seems to have seriously entertained ; he even treats it as a jest in some of his letters : yet the triumph being in these latter times considered rather as the means of acquiring a certain rank in the commonwealth, than as a measure or acknowledgment of military service, he submitted his pretensions to the Senate, and urged his friends to support them. His conduct as governor of a province, at a time when this station was supposed to give a licence to every species of rapine and oppression, did honour to his own disposition, and to those literary studies in which he was taught to choose the objects of his ambition and his habits of life. In this character he declined, both for himself and for his attendants, all those presents, contributions, and even supply of provisions, of which custom or law had authorised Roman officers of State to avail themselves in passing through the provinces. In his command he distinguished himself by his humanity, condescension, and disinterestedness ; was easy of access and hospitable ; open, in particular to all persons of reputed ingenuity, whom he entertained without ostentation. In such situations Roman officers, though of great merit, indulged themselves in what was the custom of their times ; they drained the provinces to accumulate their own fortunes, or placed their money there at extravagant interest. He was governed by different maxims, and wished to rise above his contemporaries by the fame of his disinterestedness, as well as by that of his ingenuity and civil accomplishments.

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complishments. Other citizens might possess greater steadiness, and force or elevation of mind ; but his fine genius, his talents, and preference of reputation to profit, of which his weakness indeed often prevented the full effect, still rendered him an important acquisition to either of the parties in the commonwealth. And as they endeavoured to gain, so they even seemed to acquire, his support in their turns.

Whilst the concerns of State in the provinces were thus administered by the commanders to whom they were intrusted, the usual time of elections at Rome being arrived, L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus, were elected to succeed in the Consulate of the following year.

Soon after these elections attempts were made, though without effect, to carry into execution some of the regulations devised by Pompey, in his late administration, to check the corruption of the times. Calidius had been engaged in the last competition, and immediately upon his disappointment was brought to trial for illegal means employed in his canvass. He was acquitted ; but, in return for the prosecution he had undergone, retorted the charge on Marcellus, and wished to annul his election ; but failed in the attempt.

Of those who were now elected, Caius Marcellus, as well as his relation and immediate predecessor Marcus Marcellus, was understood to be in the interest of Pompey. Æmilius Paulus, a Senator of high rank, and of course interested in the preservation

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tion of the republic, the honours of which he was so well entitled to share, was expected to support the measures of the Senate, and adhere to the established forms. And thus together with internal peace, the government seemed to recover its ancient severity. Appius Claudius, late Proconsul of Cilicia, and Calpurnius Piso, were appointed Censors, and seemed to have authority sufficient to carry into execution the powers lately restored to this office by the ordinance of Scipio. It was particularly expected that these Censors would hold an even balance between the factions. Appius favoured Pompey, but Piso, from his relation of father-in-law to Cæsar, was entrusted to check the partiality of his colleague. The hopes of the Senate were likewise considerably raised by the unexpected nomination of Caius Scribonius Curio to be one of the Tribunes. Servius Pola, after being elected into this office, had been convicted of bribery, his election therefore was set aside, and that of Curio was sustained. This young man being of an honourable family, and possessing talents which qualified him for the highest preferments, naturally set out on a foot of independence, and indifference to party, or joined only with those who professed to maintain the freedom of the commonwealth, and their own equal pretensions to preferments together with power. Being active and bold, as well as eloquent, the Senators were fond of a partizan who was likely to take upon himself much of that fatigue and danger which too many of them were willing

CHAP. ling to devolve upon others, even where their  
XXV. own estates and dignities were at stake.

U. C. 703. The new magistrates accordingly entered on  
L. Ænilius office with high expectations that the dangerous  
Paulus, and pretensions of ambitious citizens, particularly those  
C. Claudius of Cæsar, would be effectually checked. The Con-  
Marcellus. suls were in possession of a decree, requiring them  
to proceed to the business of Cæsar's province  
by the first of March. This recall wanted only  
the consent of the Tribunes to render it a for-  
mal act of the executive power, of which this  
branch was by the constitution lodged in the Se-  
nate. But one of the Tribunes having forbid  
the proceeding; M. Marcellus, late Consul, moved  
that application might be made to this officer  
to withdraw the negative, which prevented the  
effect of what the Senate had resolved. But the  
motion was rejected by a majority of the Senate  
itself; and many other symptoms of Cæsar's great  
influence, even over this order of men, soon after  
appeared.

This able politician, probably that he might not  
seem to have any views upon Italy, had fixed his  
quarters, and that of his army, chiefly in the low  
countries, or at the farthest extremity of his recent  
conquests. And; instead of seizing every pretence,  
as formerly, for making war on the natives of Gaul;  
endeavoured to quiet their fears, and to conciliate  
their affections<sup>1</sup>; but while he kept the whole pro-  
vince in a state of profound tranquillity, he collected  
money;

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 13

<sup>2</sup> Hirt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 49.

money, provided arms, and completed his legions, as if preparing for a dangerous and important war. His distance from Italy lulled the jealousy of his opponents, and enabled him to carry on his operations unobserved. He spared no expence in gaining accessions to his interest; and when those he would gain, accepted of promises, he seemed to make them with unbounded confidence in the means on which he relied for performance. In this he acted as on the eve of a great revolution, the event of which was to raise him above the want of resources, or above the necessity of a scrupulous faith with private persons. He actually remitted at this time great sums of money to Rome; and no less than fifteen hundred talents, or about L. 289,500, to the management of the Consul Æmilius alone, who was intrusted to lay out this money in erecting public buildings for the decoration of the city. But not being superior to corruption, at least not to that sort of insinuation which was addressed to his vanity, and which was now artfully practised in his nomination as agent and trustee for so popular a leader as Cæsar, he disappointed the hopes of his friends, and in all the contests which arose during his Consulship, became an active partizan for the person who had honoured him with so flattering a trust.

It was likewise very early observed in these debates, that the zeal of Curio, who set out with violent invectives against Cæsar, began to abate;

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that



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that he for a while endeavoured to divert the attention of the public to other objects ; and at last fairly withdrew himself from the support of the Senate, and espoused the interest of Cæsar in every question.

This interest was now likewise strengthened by the accessions brought to it in consequence of the disputes of the Censors. These magistrates concurred in expunging from the Rolls of the Senate such as were of servile extraction, and some even of noble family, on account of any infamy or blemish in their character. But Appius, having carried his affectation of zeal beyond what the age could bear, and being suspected of partiality to Pompey's friends, gave offence to Piso, who, by protecting many citizens who were stigmatized by his colleague, gained them to the interest of Cæsar. From these several causes this party became very numerous even in the Senate, and continued to suspend any decrees that were proposed to deprive their leader of his command, or to recall the extraordinary privilege with which he had been formerly vested.

It was afterwards discovered, in the sequel of these transactions, that Curio, some time before he openly declared himself for Cæsar, had been actually gained by his liberalities. This young man, with the youth of that age in general, had dissipated his fortune, and incurred amazing debts. His popularity was the effect of his profusion ; and the  
load



load of his debts made him a very uncertain friend to that order of things, and to those laws which supported the just claims of his creditors against himself. He readily listened to Cæsar, who offered to relieve him of this burden, and actually paid his debts to a great amount<sup>1</sup>; according to some reports, to the amount of ten millions Roman money<sup>2</sup>; according to others, of six times that sum<sup>3</sup>.

Curio, even after he took his resolution to join Cæsar, continued to speak the language of his former party, and to persist in their concerts, until he should find a plausible excuse for breaking with them. Such a pretence <sup>4</sup> he sought by starting many subjects of debate without consulting them, and by making proposals in which he knew that the leading men of the Senate would not concur. To this effect he devised a project for the reparation of the highways, offering himself to have the inspection of the work for five years. And when much time had been spent in fruitless debates on this subject, he insisted, that a considerable intercalation should be made to lengthen the year of his Tribunate, that he might have sufficient time to ripen his projects. Being opposed in this by the College of Augurs<sup>5</sup>, he employed his Tribunitian power to obstruct all other business, and separated himself entirely from his late friends in the Senate. Having in this manner withdrawn himself from his former party, he did not at once openly join

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their

x Plutarch. Dio. Sueton. Appias.

2 Velleius, lib. ii. c. 48.—80,729 l. See Arbuthnot's Tables.

3 Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. i.

4 Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 61. Appian. de Bello Civile.

5 Cicero ad Familjar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

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their opponents ; but, with professions of independence, affected to reprobate the errors of both ; and, by this artful conduct, seemed to have received the instructions, or to have imitated the policy of his leader.

When the great question of Cæsar's recall was revived, Curio inveighed, as formerly, against the exorbitant powers which had been committed to this general, and urged the necessity of having them revoked ; but subjoined, that the powers granted to Pompey were equally dangerous, and proposed, that both should be ordered to disband their armies, and return to a private station. The partizans of Pompey observed, that the term of his commission was not yet expired ; nor that of Cæsar's, replied Curio. If either is to be disarmed, it is proper that both should be so ; of two armies, if one invade the other may defend us : but if only one be disbanded, we are certainly the slaves of that which remains.

There were probably now three parties in the State ; one devoted to Cæsar, another to Pompey, and a third that wished to support the republic against the intrigues or violence of either. The latter must have been few, and could not hope to be of much consequence, except by joining such of the other two, as appeared by the character of its leader least dangerous to the commonwealth. Cæsar had shown himself in his political course a refractory subject, and an arbitrary magistrate. In the first of these characters, he had supported every party that was inclined to commit disorder

disorder in the State, or to weaken the hands of government. In the second, when Prætor, it had been necessary to suspend his functions; when Consul, he had violated the treasures of the commonwealth, and alienated the most valuable part of its demesne, to ensure the support of a disorderly faction against the laws of his country; and it was the general opinion of considerate persons, that his thirst of power and emolument was not to be satiated without a total subversion of all civil or political institution: that if, in the contest which seemed to impend, his sword should prevail, a scene of bloodshed and rapine would ensue, far exceeding what had ever been exhibited in the prevalence of any faction that oppressed the republic. The description of his adherents<sup>1</sup>, and the character of persons who crowded to his standard, justified the general fear and distrust which was entertained of his designs. All who had fallen under sentence of the law, all who dreaded this fate, all who had suffered any disgrace, or were conscious they deserved it; young men who were impatient of government; the populace who had an aversion to order; the bankrupt, to whom law and property itself were enemies; all these looked for his approach with impatience, and joined in every cry that was raised in his favour.

Pompey, the leader of the opposite party, had indeed never ceased to embroil the State with his intrigues, and even invaded the laws by his impatience for extraordinary and unprecedented distinctions;

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.

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inctions; yet, when possessed of power, he had employed it with moderation, and seemed to delight in receiving these singular trusts by the free choice of his country; not in extorting them, not in making any illegal use of them, nor in retaining them beyond the terms prescribed by his commission. It appeared, that in nothing he had ever injured the commonwealth so deeply, as in caballing with Cæsar while he rose to his present elevation, from which he was not likely to descend, without some signal convulsion in the State<sup>1</sup>.

This comparison of the parties which were now to contend for power at the hazard of the republic, made it easy for good citizens to choose their side. But they nevertheless naturally wished to prevent the contest from coming to extremities; as in the event of a war, which they dreaded, it was scarcely possible to avoid a military government. They considered the proposal of Curio as a mere pretence to justify Cæsar in keeping possession of his army: but they saw that there was no force in the republic sufficient to resist him. They wished to arm Pompey for this purpose; but were prevented, either by the confidence which he still gave them of his own superiority, or by their fear of precipitating the State into a civil war, by seeming to take any precautions against the danger with which they were threatened.

Cæsar would have considered every attempt to arm the republic as a declaration of war against himself; and was ready to commence hostilities before

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 3.



before such a measure could be carried into any effect. The proposal for disarming at once both Cæsar and Pompey, in the mean time, was extremely acceptable to the popular party, who perpetually founded the cry of liberty against the Senate, and lately too against Pompey himself, who, on account of the spirit of his administration when last in office, and the severity of his prosecutions against bribery and other offences, which are not odious to the vulgar, was become in a considerable degree unpopular, and supposed to aim at a tyranny. With such powers as Pompey already possessed, it was reckoned an effort of courage to brave his resentment. And Curio, in coming from the Senate, with the lustre of having acted so bold a part, was received by the populace with shouts and acclamations, was conducted to his own house over ways strewed with flowers, and, like a victor in the Circus, presented with chaplets and garlands, in reward of his courageous, patriotic and impartial conduct. This happened about the time that Pompey, as has been observed, was making a shew of his great popularity in the country towns, where he was received with feasts, processions, and acclamations, on occasion of his recovery from a supposed dangerous illness. Cæsar too had a like reception in the towns of the Cisalpine Gaul; but it is likely, that of these three pretenders to popularity, Pompey was most elated with his share of the public favour, and the most likely to mistake these appearances of consideration for the stable foundations of power. Under this mistake probably it was,

CHAP. XXV. was, that when one of his friends asked him, with what force he was to oppose Cæsar if he should march into Italy with his army? "In Italy," he answered, "I can raise forces with a stamp of my foot." He was, however, greatly alarmed by the motion which had been made by Curio, and by the reception it met with, whether in the approbation of the Senators, or in the acclamations of the People. He wrote a letter, on this occasion, to the Senate, in which he acknowledged the services of Cæsar, and mentioned his own. "His late Consulate," he said, "was not of his seeking; it was pressed upon him to save the republic in the midst of great dangers; for the present command he bore, it had devolved upon him in consequence of his having been Consul, and was given for a term of years, yet far from being expired; but he was ready, nevertheless, without waiting for the expiration of his term, to resign with alacrity what he had accepted with reluctance." He continued, on every occasion, to repeat the same professions, adding, "That he made no doubt, his relation and his friend Cæsar would cheerfully make a like sacrifice to the fears and apprehensions of his fellow-citizens; and that, after many years of hard struggle with warlike enemies, he would now hasten to retire with honour, and to solace himself in the midst of family endearments, and domestic repose."

Pompey, for the most part, inclined to dissemble his sentiments, and advanced to his purpose by indirect

direct means; he was therefore, like most artful men, easily over-reached by persons who affected to be thrown off their guard, while they penetrated, and took measures to thwart his designs; on the present occasion, probably, he was the only dupe of his own cunning, and a prey to the artifices which were employed against himself. Curio, in the Senate, openly attacked this part of his character, insisting that actions, and not professions, were now to be regarded: that the army of Cæsar was, to the republic, a necessary defence against that of Pompey; that nevertheless, under pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, enemies to their country, both should be ordered to disband; and that an army should be instantly levied to enforce these orders. "Now," said he, "is the time to reduce this assuming and arrogant man, while you have a person who can dispute his pretensions, and who can wrest those arms out of his hands, which he now affects to resign, but which he never would have willingly dropped."

The friends of Cæsar, in the Senate, offered to compromise the dispute; and provided Pompey retired to his province, and Cæsar were allowed to retain the Cisalpine Gaul with two legions, they proposed, in his name, to disband the remainder of his army, and to resign the other part of his provinces. "Observe the dutiful citizen and good subject," said Cato, "how ready he is to quit the northern parts of Gaul, if you only put him in possession of Italy and of the city; and how  
" ready



CHAP. "ready to accept of your voluntary submission,  
 XXV. "rather than employ your own army against you  
 "to enforce your surrender<sup>1</sup>."

In the result of these debates, the Senate, upon the motion of the Consul Marcellus, came to a vote on the following questions, which were separately stated, relating to the appointments both of Cæsar and of Pompey. On the first question, Whether Cæsar should disband his army? the *Ayes* were general throughout the house. On the second, relating to Pompey, the *Noes* greatly prevailed. Curio and M. Antony insisted, that the questions were not fairly put; and that they did not collect the sense of the Senate: that the majority might be of opinion, that both should disband; and that both, therefore, should be included in the same question. To this purpose, accordingly, a third question was put; and the Senate having divided, a majority of three hundred and seventy *Ayes* appeared against twenty-two *Noes*<sup>2</sup>. Whether these proceedings of the Senate were annulled by any informality, or were deprived of effect by any other circumstance, does not appear. It is probable, that neither of the parties wished to have them carried into effect. And the only immediate consequence they seem to have had, was an order to Pompey and Cæsar, requiring each of them to march a legion to reinforce the army in Syria, where the Parthians, though

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Catores.

<sup>2</sup> Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Plutarch in Cæsar, p. 134.



though repulſed from Antioch in the preceding year, had wintered in the Cyrrheſtica, a diſtrict of that province, and threatened to repeat their invaſion in the preſent ſpring and ſummer; and this appears to have been no more than a feeble attempt on the part of Pompey or his friends, to ſtrip Cæſar of two legions, of which, when it came to be executed, he well knew how to diſappoint the effect.

While the ſubject of Cæſar's appointments occupied all parties at Rome, he himſelf, with his army, paſſed a quiet ſeaſon in Gaul; and at the end of winter, or early in the ſpring, ſet out for Italy. He employed, as a pretence for this journey, the election to a vacant place in the College of Augurs, which was faſt approaching; and for which his friend Mark Antony was a candidate. Many votes were to be procured in the colonies and free cities bordering on that part of his province which was within the Alps; and he made his journey with uncommon ſpeed to ſecure them: but being informed, on the road, that the election of Augurs was paſt, and that his friend Antony had prevailed, he nevertheless, with the ſame diligence as before he received this information, continued his journey, ſaying, It was proper he ſhould thank his friends for their good offices, and requeſt the continuance of their favour in his own competition for the Conſulate, which he propoſed to declare on the following year. He alleged, as a reaſon for this early application, that his enemies, in order

CHAP. der to oppress him, or to withstand his just pre-  
 XXV. tensions, had placed C. Marcellus and P. Lentulus  
 in the magistracy of the present year, and had re-  
 jected the pretensions of Galba, though much bet-  
 ter founded.

He was met in all the provincial towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul with more than a kingly reception, with sacrifices and processions every where made by innumerable crowds, who were assembled to see and admire him. Having made the circuit of this province, and sounded the dispositions of the People; he returned with great dispatch to his quarters at Nemetocenna<sup>1</sup>, in the Low Countries, where he likewise wished to know the disposition as well as the state of his army; and, for this purpose, ordered the whole to assemble on the Moselle. He foresaw, that the Senate might possibly pass a decree to supersede him; and that he must then depend upon the humour of his legions, and make war, or submit as he found them inclined; in this, however, it is probable that he was already in a great measure resolved, or had no doubt of their willingness to become his partners in a military adventure for the sovereignty of the empire.

In this state of affairs he assigned to Labienus his station within the Alps; and seeming to have conceived a suspicion of this officer, or rather knowing that he was not disposed to follow him, in case his commission should be withdrawn by

<sup>1</sup> Arras,

the Senate, nor to co-operate in any act of hostility against the republic, he wished to prevent the disputes which might arise on such an occasion, and to avoid the difficult task of determining how he should deal with a citizen, who being an offender against himself, was nevertheless in his duty to the State, and who either, by his impunity or by his sufferings, might start dangerous questions, and divide the opinions and affections of the army itself. He detached him, therefore, from the legions in the northern Gaul, to command on the Po, a station from which, if he should be so disposed, he could easily quit the province, and join the forces of the republic; and by this means rid him at once of a person on whom he could not rely, and whom he would scarcely dare to punish for defection. But in whatever manner we understand this separation, it is noticed, that while Cæsar himself remained with the army upon the Moselle, and made frequent movements merely to exercise the troops, to change their ground, and to preserve their health, a rumour prevailed, that his enemies were soliciting Labienus to desert him, and to carry off the troops that were under his command. At the same time it was reported, that the Senate was preparing a decree to divest Cæsar of his government, and to disband his army. These rumours he affected to treat as groundless; observing, that he could not believe such an officer as Labienus would betray his trust; and that for himself, he was at all times ready to submit his cause

CHAP. to a free Senate. The proposals of Curio, and his  
 XXV. other friends, he said, had been so reasonable, that the Senate would have long since adopted them, if that body had not been under the improper influence of his enemies.

In these dubious times of jealousy and suspense, Cæsar received the famous order of the Senate, to detach a legion from his province to reinforce the army of Syria, now threatened with invasion from the Parthians. And at the same time had a demand from Pompey, to restore the legion which, as formerly mentioned, he had borrowed from the new levies which were made for the service in Spain. These orders and demands in the present circumstances had a suspicious aspect; and although Cæsar affected, with cheerfulness, to comply in every particular, yet he afterwards complained of this measure, as he termed it, on the part of his enemies, as a mere artifice to turn his own forces against him. In obedience to the orders of the Senate, he sent the fifteenth legion, then upon the Po, and relieved it by one from his present camp in the northern Gaul. In restoring the legion he had borrowed from Pompey, he was at pains to ingratiate himself, and under pretence of gratitude for services past, was most lavish of his caresses and thanks; as an earnest of future liberality, he ordered each private man a gratuity of two hundred and fifty denarii<sup>1</sup>. By this artful conduct, while he parted with the men, he

took

<sup>1</sup> About 5 l.



took care to retain their affections, and, together with the fifteenth legion, which he still called his own, he sent them, as at best but an uncertain and precarious accession of strength to his enemies <sup>1</sup>.

The officers, who were sent on this commission, with instructions to conduct these troops into Italy, brought to their employers a very flattering report of the state and disposition of Cæsar's army : that they longed to change their commander ; had a high opinion of Pompey ; and, if marched into Italy, would surely desert to him : that Cæsar was become odious on account of the hard service in which he had so long, and without any adequate reward, employed a Roman army, and still more on account of the suspicion that he aimed at the monarchy <sup>2</sup>. It is in the highest degree probable, that their crafty leader employed proper persons to hold this language to the commissioners of the Senate, and to the officers of Pompey ; and to utter complaints of their commander, and of the service, on purpose that they might be repeated in Italy. His own preparations were not of more importance to him than the supine security into which he endeavoured, by this and every other artifice, to lull his enemies.

On the approach of winter he conducted his army back to their quarters in the Low Countries,

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or

<sup>1</sup> Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii. Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 435.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. in Vita Cæsaris, p. 133. et in Vita Pompeii, p. 486.

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or the interior parts of Gaul. Trebonius was stationed with four legions on the Scheld and the Meuse; Fabius, with other four legions, between the Soane and the Loire, or in the canton of Bibracte, now Autun. This disposition, like that of the former winter, was calculated to avoid giving any alarm to his opponents in Italy. He himself intended to winter within the Alps, but had no troops on that side of the mountains that could give rise to suspicion; one veteran legion only is mentioned, the thirteenth, which he had sent to replace the fifteenth; which, upon pretence of the Parthian war, had been called away from his province. Upon his arrival in Italy he affected surprise in being told that the two legions lately demanded from him had not been sent into Asia, but were kept in Italy, and put under the command of Pompey. He complained, that he was betrayed; that his enemies meant to disarm and circumvent him. "But while the republic is safe, and matters can be made up on amicable terms, I will bear," he said, "with any indignities offered to myself, rather than involve the State in a civil war."

While the factions that were likely to divide the empire were in this situation, C. Marcellus, now third of this name in the succession of Consuls, together with Publius Lentulus, were elected for the following year. Before they entered on office, a rumour arose, that Cæsar, with his whole army,

army, was actually in motion to pass the Alps. On this alarm Marcellus, Consul of the present year, assembled the Senate; laid the subject before them, and moved, that the troops then in Italy should be prepared to act, and that new levies should be ordered. A debate ensued, in which Curio contradicted the report, and, by his Tribunitian authority, forbade the Senate to proceed in any resolution to disturb the peace of the empire.

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On this interposition of the Tribune, the Consul Marcellus dismissed the assembly, pronouncing, together with other expressions of impatience, the following words: That if he were not supported by the Senate, in the measures which were necessary for the preservation of the commonwealth, he should put the exercise of his power into hands more likely to make the State be respected: and having spoken these words, he repaired, together with Lentulus, one of the Consuls elected for the ensuing year, to the gardens where Pompey resided; being obliged, on account of his military command, to remain without the city; and presenting him with his sword, bid him employ it for the defence of his country, and with it to assume the command of the forces then in Italy. To this address from the Consul, Pompey, with an air of modesty, made answer, "If nothing better can be devised for the commonwealth."

## C H A P. XXVI.

*Return of different Officers from their Provinces.*

*—Decree of the Senate to supersede Cæsar.—Forbidden by the Tribunes.—Commission to the Consuls and to Pompey.—Their Resolutions.—Flight of the Tribunes Antony and Quintus Cassius.—Speech of Cæsar to the Legion at Ravenna.—Surprise of Ariminum.—March of Cæsar.—Flight of Pompey and the Senate, &c.—Approach of Cæsar.—Embarkation and Departure of Pompey from Brundisium.—Return of Cæsar to Rome.—Passes by Marseilles into Spain.—Campaign on the Segra.—Legions of Pompey in Spain conducted to the Var.*

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**I**N this posture of affairs, the officers, who had been sent in the preceding year to the command of provinces, were returned to Rome, and some of them soliciting the military honours to which they thought themselves entitled by their services, remained with their ensigns of magistracy in the suburbs. Bibulus, though he had not been present in the action in which Cassius defeated the Parthians, yet being then governor of the province, and the advantage gained under his auspices, with the number of the enemy slain coming up to the legal description of those services for which the triumph was usually obtained, he entered his claim; and accordingly, upon the

motion



motion of Cato, who probably wished him this consolation for the mortifications he had received in his Consulate, he was found to be entitled to this honour. It had been long appropriated as the specific reward of victories, obtained by the slaughter of a certain number of enemies, and would have been preposterous in the case of any other merit: Cicero, nevertheless, now likewise applied for a triumph, partly in emulation to Bibulus, of whom he expresses some jealousy; and partly, that he might have a pretence for his stay in the suburbs, and for absenting himself from the Senate, or the assemblies of the People, being very much perplexed how to steer between the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, who had both applied to him by letters to join them in the present dispute \*. He had, some time before his departure from Cilicia on his return to Rome, sent an account of his military operations to Cato, and to some others of his friends, with an earnest request, that a thanksgiving might be appointed for the victory he had obtained. In this he was gratified as one of the greatest honours which a Roman officer could receive in absence, and which might lead to a triumph. To his letter Cato had replied in terms that were polite; but carrying some degree of indirect reproof for the improper ambition which Cicero betrayed in this request, and reminding him that his merit was not so much that of a warrior, as of a humane, upright, and able magistrate; say-

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ing,

\* Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 1.

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ing, at the same time, that he had moved the Senate to pass a decree to this purpose in his favour, as thinking it more honourable than a thanksgiving, which always had a reference to some event, depending on fortune or the valour of an army; but that, since Cicero had chosen to put his services on the last footing, he himself had a double satisfaction, that of having done what he thought his duty, and that of finding that the desire of his friend respecting the thanksgiving was gratified<sup>1</sup>.

Cicero at first received this declaration of Cato as a proper expression of friendship, and in the highest degree honourable to himself<sup>2</sup>; but on hearing of the military honours which, upon Cato's motion, were decreed to Bibulus, he was greatly provoked, and considered this conduct as partial to his rival, and invidious to himself<sup>3</sup>. He was infligated or confirmed in these sentiments by Cæsar, who gladly seized the opportunity to incite him against Cato. "*Observe*," he said, in one of his letters, which is quoted by Cicero on this subject, "*the malice of the man, he affects to give you the commendations of clemency and integrity, which you did not desire, and withholds a piece of common respect, which you had asked.*" "This conduct," continues Cicero to Atticus, "bespeaks the envy from which it proceeds. It is not sufferable, nor will I endure it. Cæsar, in his letter to me, has

" not

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiar, lib. xv. ep. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 2.

“not failed in the proper remarks.” Such were the concerns which distracted the mind of this ingenious but weak man, even while he himself foresaw an immediate conflict, in which the republic itself, and all the honours it could bestow, were probably soon to perish.

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In the present situation of affairs, every resolution which the friends of the republic could take was beset with danger, and every day increased their perplexity. To leave Cæsar in possession of his army, and to admit him with such a force to the head of the commonwealth, was to submit, without a struggle, to the dominion he meant to assume. To persist in confining him to one or other of these advantages, was to furnish him with a pretence to make war on the republic. The powers which were necessary to repel the present danger, might be equally fatal to the republic in the possession of Pompey, as they were in the hands of Cæsar himself. The only person, on whom the State was now to rely, even while his own consideration, with that of every other Senator, was at stake, did not seem disposed to act, until all the distinctions that were wanting to gratify his vanity should be united in his own person. With an appearance of ease and negligence, he went upon parties of pleasure through Italy, while every one else apprehended that Rome itself, as well as Italy, must soon become a scene of blood. At an interview with Cicero, whom, on his way to the city, he met near Naples, he himself spoke of a civil war

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war as unavoidable<sup>1</sup>. Upon his return to Rome, on the twenty-sixth of December, he even seemed averse to any accommodation of parties. He declared his mind openly, that if Cæsar should obtain the Consulate, even upon laying down his arms, the State must be undone; that in his opinion, whenever a vigorous opposition appeared, Cæsar, in making his option, would choose to retain his army, and drop his pretensions to the Consulate; but, continued he, if he should persist to run headlong, and bring matters to the decision of the sword, how contemptible must he appear, a mere private adventurer against the authority of the State, supported by a regular army under my command.

To justify this security, or presumption on the part of Pompey, who was surely a warrior of the first order, it must be remembered that while Cæsar was forming an army in Gaul, Pompey, by means of his lieutenants, likewise formed a great army of six complete legions, and many auxiliaries, in Spain; and must have foreseen, that if Cæsar should make any attempt upon Italy, he should then be in condition to order his army to pass the Pyrennees as fast as that of Cæsar could pass the Alps, occupy his province, cut off his resources, and while Pompey himself received him with the forces of Italy, that the Spanish army should press upon his rear, and place him at once between two such formidable attacks. It ought likewise to be considered,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 8.



considered, that although few troops were then actually formed in Italy, yet this was the great nursery of soldiers for the whole empire, and multitudes could, on any sudden emergency, be embodied in every part of the country<sup>1</sup>. CHAP.  
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Pompey, with these securities in his hands for the final success of his views against Cæsar, suffered this rival to run his career, leaving the Senate exposed to the dangers which threatened them, and under the influence of apprehensions, which he expected would render them more tractable, than he had generally found them in times of greater security, and more ready in every thing to comply with his own desires.

In the same strain of policy, Pompey had frequently ventured to foment or to connive at the growing troubles of the republic, in order to render himself the more necessary, and to draw from the Senate and the People offers of extraordinary trust and power. By the address of Cato, and of other active men in the Senate, he had been obliged on a late occasion, when he aimed indirectly at the powers of Dictator, to be content with those of sole Consul. It is probable, that he had entertained the same views on the present occasion, and permitted the evils to accumulate, until the remedy he wished for should appear to be necessary. He continued accordingly, with votes and resolutions of the Senate, to combat Cæsar, who was at the head of a numerous army, ready on the first plausible pretence

<sup>1</sup> Cic. ad Famil. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

CHAP. tence to fall upon Italy, to seize the seats of go-  
 XXVI. vernment, and of consequence to wrest from his  
 opponents, that name and authority of the republic, on which Pompey himself so greatly relied, for the ascendant which he hoped to preserve.

U. G. 7<sup>th</sup>.  
 C. Claudius  
 Marcellus  
 & L. Cornelius Len-  
 tulus.

Meantime, the new year commenced, and C. Claudius Marcellus with L. Cornelius Lentulus, entered on their office as Consuls. Both parties were prepared for a decisive resolution on the subject of Cæsar's claims. He himself for some years had wintered near to the northern extremity of his provinces. He was now at Ravenna, the nearest station of his army to Romē; but without any troops, besides what appear to have been the usual establishment of the Cisalpine province; that is, the thirteenth legion, which, as we have said, had been sent thither to replace the legion, with which he had been required to reinforce the army in Syria, and together with these three hundred cavalry detached, making in all between five and six thousand men<sup>1</sup>. Soon after his arrival at Ravenna, he had been visited by Curio, who, at the expiration of his Tribunate, made this journey to receive his directions in respect to the future operations of the party; and after their conference, returned to Rome with a letter from Cæsar, addressed to the Senate, and which was accordingly presented on the first of January, at the admission of the new Consuls into office<sup>2</sup>.

On

<sup>1</sup> Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 447. Plut. in Cæfare.

<sup>2</sup> Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 1.

On this occasion the Consul Lentulus moved, CHAP.  
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 " Cæsar should not be disturbed in possession of the  
 " honours which the Roman People had bestowed  
 " upon him; that he should be left upon a foot  
 " of

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

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“ of equality with other officers, who were allowed to join civil office at Rome with military establishments in the provinces ; and that he should not be singled out as the sole object of their distrust and severity <sup>1</sup>. ”

This letter was considered as an attempt to prescribe to the Senate, and unbecoming the respect due to their authority. It was by many treated as an actual declaration of war. The debates were renewed on this subject for some days successively, from the first to the seventh of January. On the last of these days, a resolution was framed, ordering Cæsar to dismiss his army, and by a certain day to retire from his provinces, or in case of disobedience, declaring him an enemy to his country. The Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, interposed with their negative.

The hands of the Senate being thus tied up by the prohibition or interdict of the Tribunes, it was moved that the members should go into mourning, in order to impress the People with a deeper sense of the calamity which was likely to ensue from the contumacy of these factious officers. This likewise the Tribunes forbade ; but the Senate being adjourned, all the members, as of their own accord, returned to their next meeting in habits of mourning, and proceeded to consider in what manner they might remove the difficulty which arose from this factious interposition of the Tribunes. In the conclusion of this deliberation, it was determined

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<sup>1</sup> Suetonius in Cæfare, c. 29.



to give to the Consuls and other magistrates, together with Pompey, in the character of Proconsul, the charge usual in the most dangerous conjunctures; *to preserve the commonwealth by such means as to their discretion should appear to be necessary.* CHAP.  
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This charge suggested to the minds of the People, what had passed in the times of the Gracchi, of Saturninus and of Cataline. The Tribunes, who had occasioned the measure, either apprehended, or affected to apprehend, immediate danger to their own persons: they disguised themselves in the habit of slaves, and, together with Curio, in the night fled from Rome in hired carriages<sup>1</sup>. The Consuls repaired to Pompey in the suburbs; and, agreeably to the order of the Senate, claimed his assistance in discharging the important duties with which they were jointly intrusted. It was agreed, in concert with him, that they should support the authority of the Senate with a proper military force, that they should proceed to make new levies with the greatest dispatch, and in order to give effect to these preparations, that Pompey should have the supreme command over the treasury, and all the forces of the republic, in every quarter of the world.

Winter was now set in, or fast approaching. The season, although nominally in the month of January, being only about fifty days past the autumnal equinox, or about the twelfth of November, Cæsar had few troops on the side of Italy; the

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bello Civili, lib. ii. Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 3. Cicero ad Familiarem, lib. xvi. ep. 12.

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the force of his army was yet beyond the Alps, and the officers now intrusted with the safety of the commonwealth, flattered themselves that much time might be found to put the republic in a state of defence, before his army at this season could pass those mountains, even if he should be so rash, as to make war on the commonwealth; a supposition which Pompey did not even, in this state of affairs, appear to have believed.

When Cæsar received accounts of the Senate's resolution, he drew forth the troops then at Ravenna, and in a harangue enumerated the wrongs which for some years he alleged had been done to himself; complained that his enemies had now found means to excite against him even Pompey, a person whose honour he had always promoted with the warmest affection; that the interposition of the Tribunes, in behalf of the army and of himself, had been defeated by means of threats and of actual force; that their sacred persons had been violated, in order to oppress him; that resolutions, which had never been taken but in the most dangerous and threatening conjunctures, to prevent ruinous laws from being carried by insurrection and violence, were now formed against peaceable magistrates, and in times of profound tranquillity; he therefore now called upon his audience to maintain the honour of an officer, together with whom they had now, for nine years, faithfully served the republic; with whom they had gained many victories in Gaul and in Germany, and reduced a most warlike

warlike province into a state of absolute submission. He was answered with a shout of applause, and a general acclamation from the ranks, that they were ready to avenge the injuries done to their general, and to the Tribunes of the People.

On receiving these assurances from the troops then present, Cæsar immediately dispatched an express to the quarters of the twelfth legion, which, from the time at which it afterwards joined him, appears to have been already within the Alps with orders to march. The remainder of his army, in the mean time, being supposed in the low countries, or in the interior of Gaul, it would not have appeared to an ordinary capacity, that, even in case of hostilities, any decisive operation could take place before the spring. By the return of that season, indeed, the measures now taken by both parties seemed to threaten a dangerous convulsion; but it is not to be doubted that Cæsar had foreseen, or prepared, many of the most important circumstances of the present conjuncture; that he had already brought his affairs into that posture, in which he had projected that hostilities should commence; and that the seeming neglect with which he suffered himself to be taken with so small a force on the side of Italy, was probably the best concerted preparation he could have made for the war. For while he brought no alarming force towards Rome, his antagonists continued secure, and made no effectual provision to resist even the small force with which he was to begin his attack.

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He apprehended more danger from the legion which Pompey had formed in Spain, than from any force then subsisting in Italy; and he made his disposition against those legions, by having the strength of his army to be exerted between the Pyrennees and the Alps. There the troops he had formed in Gaul, served him sufficiently in his design against Italy, by securing him from any interruption on that quarter. And when the war actually broke out, being well aware that the effects of surprise are often greater than those of force, even if he had wished for more troops in Italy, it is probable that he would not have awaited their coming.

On the very day that he delivered the harangue just mentioned to the legion which was quartered at Ravenna, he ordered parties of chosen men, in the manner of stragglers roving for pleasure through the country, and armed only with swords, to take the road separately, and without any appearance of concert, to Ariminum, the first fortified place of Italy beyond the Rubicon, which was the limit of his province; there to remain, and at a certain time of the night to seize upon one of the gates. He likewise ordered a party of horse to parade at some distance from Ravenna, and there to wait for an officer who was to deliver them his further commands. He himself passed the day, as usual, in forming combats of gladiators, and in attending the exercises of the legion; at night he went to supper at the usual hour, and after he had taken his place at table, pretending business, or some slight indisposition,



position, which called him away from the company, he mounted a carriage that waited for him, drove through a gate opposite to that of Ariminum, and having travelled for a little time in that direction, turned into the road on which he had posted the party of horse; and having joined them, marched about thirty miles before break of day, entered Ariminum by a gate of which the parties he had sent before him in the night were in possession, and thus without any resistance, became master of a fortress which opened his way towards Rome.

It was of importance, that the first report of hostilities in the city should carry an account of his success; not merely of his having made an attempt. This circumstance may justify the measures which he took to surprise a place which, without so many precautions, might have been easily reduced, though at the hazard perhaps of delay for a few days. He himself indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no mention of any such measures, nor of the doubts and hesitations under which he is said to have halted on the banks of the Rubicon, by the passing of which he was to enter into a state of war with the commonwealth, a subject on which his doubts were probably long since resolved.

At Ariminum his little army, on the following day, arrived from Ravenna, and the Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius joined him from Rome. He presented them to the army in the

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disguise in which they affected to have escaped from the violence of a tyranny then established in the city. "Observe," he said, "to what extremities persons of noble birth, vested with the sacred character of Tribunes, are reduced, for having supported their friend, and for having pleaded the cause of an injured army<sup>1</sup>." The occasion was suited to popular eloquence; and this eminent master of every art did not neglect the opportunity. He is said to have acted his part with great vehemence; to have torn open his vest from his breast, and to have shed tears; frequently held up to view the hand on which he wore his ring, the well known ensign of noble birth among the Romans, and declared, that he would sacrifice all the honours of his rank to reward those who were now willing to support the public cause, and who adhered to himself on the present occasion. From these signs, and the display of his ring in particular, where he was not distinctly heard, it was supposed that he had promised the honours of nobility, and a large sum of money, to every soldier in his army<sup>2</sup>.

Lucius Cæsar and the Prætor Roscius, who while the decree against Caius Cæsar was depending in the Senate, made offer of their good offices to treat with him, and bring matters to an amicable issue, were now come without any public commission, probably to hinder their friend from taking

<sup>1</sup> Appian. de Bell. Civile, lib. ii.

<sup>2</sup> Sueton. in Cæs. c. 33.

taking any desperate resolution. They brought, at the same time, a private message from Pompey, with some expressions of civility, and an apology, taken from the necessity of the public service, for the hardship which he supposed himself to have put upon Cæsar. Pompey, in this message, protested, "That he himself had always preferred the public to private considerations;" and subjoined, "That he hoped Cæsar would not suffer any passion to carry him into measures hurtful to the State, nor, in avenging himself of his private enemies, stretch forth his hand against the republic."

Such professions had little credit with Cæsar; but if they were to be of any weight with the public, he was not likely, in his turn, to fail in the use of them. He desired those persons, by whom Pompey had favoured him with this message, to carry for answer, "That the republic had always been to him dearer than his fortune or his life; but that he could not suffer the honours which the Roman People had bestowed upon him in public, to be contemptuously torn away by his private enemies. His commission, he said, would have expired in six months; his enemies, in their eagerness to degrade him, could not bear even with this delay, but must recall him immediately. The Roman People had dispensed with his attendance at the elections, yet he must be dragged to town at that time, to show the superiority of his enemies, and to gratify private malice."

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“ These personal insults he had patiently borne  
 “ for the sake of the public; and being resolved  
 “ to disarm, requested the Senate only that others  
 “ should disarm as well as himself; that even this  
 “ was refused, and while he was commanded to dis-  
 “ miss the troops of his province, new levies were  
 “ ordered in Italy; that two legions which had  
 “ been called off from his army, under pretence  
 “ of the Parthian war, were now retained against  
 “ himself; that the whole State was in arms; for  
 “ what purpose but for his destruction? that, ne-  
 “ vertheless, he would suffer any thing for the  
 “ good of the commonwealth. Let Pompey re-  
 “ pair to his province; let all parties disband, and  
 “ no army whatever be assembled in Italy; let no  
 “ one pretend to overawe the city; let the assem-  
 “ blies of the People and of the Senate be free;  
 “ and, in order the more speedily to terminate  
 “ these disputes, let the parties meet and confer  
 “ together; let Pompey say where he will be wait-  
 “ ed on, or let him name a proper place of meet-  
 “ ing; at a friendly conference every difficulty may  
 “ soon be removed.”

From this time forward Cæsar affected, on every occasion, to have no object in view but to prevail on his enemies, by some reasonable accommodation, to save the republic from a ruinous war, and to stop the effusion of innocent blood<sup>2</sup>. He continually repeated his proposals of peace, while he urged his military operations with uncommon rapidity.

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i.

<sup>2</sup> Cæsar. Appian. in lib. viii. Ad Atticum, post ep. 13.



pidity. He ordered new levies at Ariminum, and sent Antony to occupy Arretium<sup>1</sup>, a pass in one of the branches of the Flaminian Way through the Apennines; and as fast as troops could march he seized Pisaurum<sup>2</sup>, Fanum, Auximum, with the town of Ancona, and all the places necessary to give him the command of that district, or to open his way to Rome.

A general consternation spread in the country before him; the people fled from their habitations, and communicated the alarm, with every sort of exaggeration, to the city. Pompey had relied much on the name and authority of the commonwealth, and no less on his own. Others thought themselves secure while this renowned and experienced commander gave them assurances of safety. Now, like a person awake from a dream, he seemed to perceive the whole was illusion. Cæsar paid no regard to the authority of the Senate, nor stood in awe of the State. He was at hand, with the reputation of a general equal to Pompey, at the head of troops fresh from service, and injured to blood. The republic was but a name; and they who composed it, though respectable at a distance, were, on the approach of an enemy, irresolute, disunited, and incapable of the exertions which such an occasion required. Orders had gone forth to raise troops in every part of Italy; but no great progress in so short a time could yet have been made in that service. Besides the two legions which had served so long under Cæsar

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himself,

<sup>1</sup> Arrego.

<sup>2</sup> Pisaro, Feno, and Osimo.

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himself, there were not any forces actually embodied in the country. These were justly suspected of inclining to favour their former general; and, instead of enabling Pompey to meet the danger which threatened the commonwealth, furnished him, at the head of such troops, with particular reasons for his keeping at a distance from the enemy. In a letter to Domitius Ahenobarbus, "I sent you word," he writes, "that with these two legions I did not like to be near Cæsar<sup>1</sup>. If I should retreat, therefore, at his approach, be not surprised<sup>2</sup>."

Domitius had been appointed to succeed Cæsar in the government of Gaul; and, with some other officers in the Picenum<sup>3</sup>, had made some progress in raising troops. Their numbers, perhaps, surpassed those of Cæsar. If Pompey, therefore, had thought it possible to defend the city, he must have hastened to that quarter, and have put himself at the head of those troops. But he was timorous in hazarding his own reputation, a weakness from which Cæsar was altogether exempt, and which was unworthy of the great military talents of either. Pompey seldom committed his fame where the prospect was unfavourable, or events extremely uncertain. Cæsar, on such occasions, never chose to trust his affairs in any other hands than his own.

Pompey, acting under these motives, assembled the Senate, and informed them that it was necessary

<sup>1</sup> Meaning probably that he did not choose to give them an opportunity to desert

<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. viii. ep. 2. Ad Domitium.

<sup>3</sup> March of Anconia.

fary to abandon Rome ; that he would meet them again at Capua, where he proposed to assemble his forces ; that he should consider all those who remained in the capital to countenance or to witness the violences of Cæsar as equally guilty with those who should be found in his camp.

It being unlawful for the officers of the republic to absent themselves from the city during their term in office, the Senate passed an act to dispense with their attendance at Rome, and to enable them to exercise the powers of magistracy wherever the necessities of the State might require their presence. These preparations for dislodging the government, together with the actual flight of Pompey himself, damped all the courage that yet remained in any order or class of the People. It made Cæsar appear at once more odious and more terrible<sup>1</sup>. It was generally expected<sup>2</sup>, that he would exceed either Cinna or Sylla in rapacity and cruelty<sup>3</sup> ; and that the city, if he should surprise his opponents there, would become a scene of blood. The Consuls, and most of the other officers of State, set out with their ensigns of power. All night the gates were crowded with Senators and other persons of rank who fled on this occasion ; some with their families and most valuable effects, others alone, and distracted by the general panic, without knowing whether they were to retire, or to what fate they were leaving their families.

Cæsar,

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. ep. 12. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.

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Cæsar, in the mean time, making a rapid march through Umbria, or what is now the dutchy of Urbino<sup>1</sup>, and the Picenum, or March of Ancona<sup>2</sup>, not only took possession of every place as he passed, but gained daily accessions of strength by the junction of the new levies which were raising to oppose him. Soldiers are averse to the losing side; and Pompey's flight put an end to his military power in Italy. The Prætor Thermus had, with five cohorts, amounting, if complete, to twenty-five hundred men, taken post at Iguvium<sup>3</sup>, among the Apennines, on the Flaminian Way. Observing that Pompey's party in general was retreating, and that Curio was advancing towards him with a part of Cæsar's forces, he resolved to abandon his post; but as soon as he began to execute this purpose, and was on the road to Rome, the troops deserted him on the march, returned to the post from which he had removed them, and declared for Cæsar.

The dispositions of the towns of which Cæsar had got possession, made it unnecessary for him to leave any garrison behind him, and permitted him to advance with all his force. Auximum<sup>4</sup> declared for him before his arrival, and obliged Atius Varus, who held that post for the republic, to abandon it. This officer was overtaken by Cæsar's advanced parties, and, like Thermus, was deserted by his people.

At

<sup>1</sup> Umbria.<sup>3</sup> Gubio.<sup>2</sup> Picenum.<sup>4</sup> Osimo.



At Cingulum, in the Picenum, Cæsar was joined by the twelfth legion, to which, on his first motion from Ravenna, he had sent orders to march. With this accession of force, he advanced to Asculum<sup>1</sup> on the Fronto; and having dislodged from thence Lentulus Spinther, who commanded ten cohorts, the greater part of these troops deserted to him. The remainder put themselves under the command of Vibullius, who was just arrived from Pompey to support the hopes of the cause in that quarter.

As Cæsar made his principal push on the Adriatic side of the Apennines, the troops that were suddenly raised for the republic were, without any well-concerted plan, drawn together upon that coast. And Pompey himself had not yet openly laid aside the design of making head against Cæsar in those parts. Vibullius having assembled in all about fourteen cohorts, fell back to the Aternus, now called the Pescara, and joined L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, a pass in the Apennines that commanded the Valerian Way to Rome. This officer having assembled twenty-five cohorts, meant to have joined Pompey wherever he should be found, and had ordered Thermus to follow with five cohorts more<sup>2</sup>; but imagining probably that Pompey still intended to cover Rome from the incursions of Cæsar, and that Corfinium was an important post for this purpose, he

<sup>1</sup> Ofale.

<sup>2</sup> Pomp. ad Cicer. in lib. ad Att. post. ep. 11.

he determined to observe the motions of the enemy from that place.

Pompey by this time had moved from Capua to Luceria, and seemed to have taken the resolution not only of abandoning the posts that covered the access to Rome, but even all Italy, to Cæsar. The Consuls, the greater part of the magistracy, and the Senate, had followed him to Capua. Here was received the message which Cæsar had given to Roscius and to L. Cæsar. It contained several reflections and insinuations in the highest degree provoking to Pompey; and to this circumstance Cæsar probably trusted, that he should not be bound by any of the offers he had made, and that the odium of rejecting the peace would fall upon his enemies. But the friends of the commonwealth, deeply impressed with the necessity of their own affairs, gladly listened to any terms of accommodation. They objected indeed to the proposed interview between Pompey and Cæsar, remembering the dangerous concerts which at their meetings had been formerly entered into against the commonwealth.

Pompey himself was so sensible of the disadvantage at which he was taken, that he dissembled his resentment of the personal reflections cast on himself, and consented to conditions which he had hitherto rejected with disdain. It was agreed accordingly; that he should repair to Spain, and that, his province being in profound peace, he should reduce his military establishment. Cæsar, on his

part,

part, besides the conditions he himself had offered, was required to evacuate all the towns which he had lately seized in Italy; and it was proposed that the Consuls, Magistrates, and Senators, should return to the city, and from the usual seat of government give all the sanction of public authority to these arrangements. From such appearances it was not doubted that an accommodation must follow. And in this belief Cato, though appointed to command in Sicily, chose to abide by the Senate while the treaty remained in suspense. And Cicero, with all his penetration, yet unacquainted with the parties concerned, thought the agreement almost concluded. "The one," he wrote to his friend Atticus, "begins to repent of his precipitation, and the other is sensible he has not a force sufficient to support such a war<sup>1</sup>." In this probably his notion of Pompey was correct, but fell greatly short of the views and apprehensions of Cæsar.

This politician, however, so far as the propositions he made were adopted, was himself likely to be caught in the snare he laid for his enemies, or obliged to lay aside the disguise which he had assumed in affecting such earnest desires of peace. To avoid either of these inconveniences, he objected to some of the conditions which the opposite party had subjoined to his proposals, and complained of the silence which they kept on others, as proceeding from a deliberate purpose to circum-

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<sup>1</sup> Ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 14.

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vent and betray himself. "Pompey will repair to Spain," he said, "but when? I am required to evacuate all the towns of Italy, while Pompey and the whole State continue in arms against me, and while my enemies not only make new levies, but employ for my destruction legions which they have actually taken away from my own army. If Pompey be sincere in desiring a peace, why does he decline the personal interview which has been proposed for that purpose?"

Cæsar had, by this time, advanced with hasty marches to Corfinium, drove in a detachment from the garrison, which he found breaking down a bridge about three miles from the town, sat down under the walls, where he employed three days in fortifying his camp, and in filling the magazines with corn from the neighbouring country. Being joined by the eighth legion and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies from Gaul, with three hundred auxiliary horse, he ordered proper posts to be seized on every side of the town, and effectually shut up those who were within from any relief, or from any communication with their friends. When the works he was executing against the place began to appear, Domitius published a reward to any one who should carry letters to Pompey. Different messengers were dispatched for this purpose, and brought for answer, that Pompey disapproved of his having allowed himself to be invested by Cæsar, had foretold him the bad consequences of  
this



this measure, and now earnestly exhorted him, if possible, to extricate himself; for that it was not in his power, as he again repeated, with these doubtful legions, which had been so lately drawn from Cæsar's army, or with new levies so recently made, to force the hardy and veteran legions of the enemy<sup>1</sup>.

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This answer Domitius endeavoured to conceal from those who were under his command; encouraged them with hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey, and seemed intent on the defence of the place, while he was actually taking measures to get off in person, without any hopes of preserving the forces he had assembled for the commonwealth. This design being suspected, the troops surrounded his quarters in the night, secured his person, and to pay their court to Cæsar, while they delivered up their general and surrendered the town, made offer of their services in prosecution of war.

In consequence of these movements in the night, Cæsar took possession of the gates, manned the walls, and gave orders that no person whatever from his army should enter the place before it was day. This being the first instance in which he met with any shew of opposition, or had any pretence to act as an enemy; it gave him an opportunity to disprove or confirm the alarming reports which had gone abroad respecting the atrocity of the part he was to act; and as we have occasion to observe, in many other instances, in this

<sup>1</sup> Pompeius ad Domitium, lib. viii. Et ad Atticum, post ep. 12. Cæsar. de Bell. Civ.

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this he neither mistook nor neglected what was proper. Knowing, that besides Domitius and Vibullius, there were many Senators and Roman Knights now shut up in the town, these he ordered in the morning to be brought before him, expostulated with them on the subject of their enmity to himself, and their precipitation in hurrying the State into this unnatural war. He then dismissed them with the respect that was due to Roman citizens of their rank; and being told that a considerable sum of money, amassed at Corfinium for the support of the troops, had been seized by his people, to complete this scene of unexpected munificence, by an exhibition of disinterestedness as well as of clemency, and as afraid to defile his hands by the touch of what was not his own, he ordered this money to be restored to Domitius. The fame of this wonderful mildness and generosity, as he expected, was every where spread abroad; and though, by over-acting his part in abstaining from the public money, he furnished every thinking person with a sufficient comment on the other parts of his conduct; yet many were happy to understand, that, in this alarming contest, their lives and properties were, from any motives whatever, to be spared.

Rome was now open to Cæsar; but he thought the possession of the city of no moment, until he had suppressed the military arrangements that were making throughout all Italy, and had decided who was to have the possession of the country.

try. He therefore, on the very day on which he became master of Corfinium, detached to Sicily, under the command of Curio, the troops, by whom he had been joined, in gaining possession of this place<sup>1</sup>. He himself set out for Apulia, and, before sunset, accomplished a considerable march; but while he thus urged the war with unremitting energy and diligence, he continued his messages to the leaders of the opposite party, with the mildest professions of friendship and overtures of peace. To this effect, immediately after the reduction of Corfinium, he dispatched Balbus, an officer in his army, with a letter to the Consul Lentulus, containing earnest entreaties, that this magistrate would return to Rome, and prevent the disorders which were likely to arise from the suspension of government. To induce him to comply with this request, Balbus had secret instructions to assure the Consul of Cæsar's interest in procuring a proper appointment in the provinces at the expiration of his year in office. The bearer of this message, at the same time, declared it as his private opinion, that Cæsar desired nothing so much as to join Pompey, and to make peace with him on any equitable terms. And the father of this young man, one of Cæsar's retinue, wrote, at the same time, to Cicero, that Cæsar had no object but to enjoy peace and security under Pompey<sup>2</sup>. But while the fame of his clemency at Corfinium, and of this wonderful disposition to

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peace

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bello Civ. lib. i. c. 25.<sup>2</sup> Cicero, ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 9.



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peace was gone abroad, and had pacified the minds of many to whom he had been till then an object of terror<sup>1</sup>; and while he hoped to amuse his enemies, or to relax the diligence of their military preparations, he advanced with so much rapidity, that, in order to avoid him, they had no more than the time which was necessary to cross the mountains from Capua to Luceria, to fall back from thence to Canusium, and from this last place, without a halt to Brundisium.

Whilst Pompey moved in this direction, and had sent Metellus Scipio, with his own son Cnæus into Syria, to provide and assemble the necessary shipping to embark his army<sup>2</sup>; his intention to abandon Italy began to be suspected, and shook the great authority which he still derived from his military reputation. His officers were every where deserted on the march by the new levies, who hastened to offer their services to Cæsar. His own presence kept the other parts of the army together, and brought them safe to the port from which it was suspected they were to take their departure from Italy. Soon after his arrival at this port he effectually verified these suspicions, embarking a great part of his army with the Consuls, while he himself, not having sufficient shipping to transport the whole, remained with a second division to wait for the return of his ships.

Such

<sup>1</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 13. Si mehercule neminem occidet, nec cuiquam quicquam ademerit, ab his qui eum maxime timuerant, maxime diligetur.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio:



Such was the posture of Pompey, when Cæsar, with six legions, four of veteran troops, and two newly raised or completed from those who came over to him on the march, arrived at the gates of Brundisium. Even here, he never dropt the project of amusing his enemy with proposals of peace. Cn. Magius, an officer in the service of the commonwealth, having been taken on the march, was dismissed with great courtesy, and a message to Pompey, containing a request, that he would admit Cæsar to an interview. Differences, it was observed, are soon made up at a conference, which otherwise might occasion many journies and messages, without effect.

This pacific address, as in other instances, only constituted a part in the military plan of Cæsar, and was accompanied with the most effectual preparations for a blockade and a siege. It did not as yet appear, whether Pompey meant to transport all his troops, and to abandon Brundisium, or to keep possession of this post, in order to retain a passage into Italy, and to command both sides of the gulf. Cæsar, to sound his intentions, and either to shut him up, or to hasten his departure, observing, that the entrance of the harbour was narrow, and might be obstructed, began an alarming work for this purpose. He employed numerous parties to throw stones, earth, and other heavy materials, into the passage between the two moles, and expected, in a little time, to be able to join them,

CHAP. and thus effectually to shut up this port from all  
 XXVI. communication with the sea.

In this work the besiegers advanced, for some time, with a sensible progress; but being come in to deeper water, where the materials they threw in were absorbed, did not settle, or were displaced by the motion of the sea, they found it necessary to change their plan, and endeavoured to close the harbour by means of floating rafts and hulks firmly anchored in the passage. But in executing this project they were disturbed and interrupted by a continual discharge of arrows, stones, and other missile weapons from vessels properly placed, and on which the necessary engines were mounted for this purpose.

While the parties were thus, without intermission, engaged at the entrance of the port, Cæsar again made a shew of proposing a treaty. As he had received no answer to his former message by Magius, he affected to despair of making any progress by direct applications to Pompey himself, and sent into the town Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, who, being in great intimacy with Scribonius Libo, had directions to make application to him, and, in Cæsar's name, to entreat his good offices in bringing on a negotiation; particularly, if possible, in procuring an interview between Pompey and himself. Representing to Libo, that if an interview were obtained, some way might be found to stop the issues of blood, a blessing which, in that case, would for ever be mentioned

tioned as the effect of so essential a service performed by Scribonius Libo to his country.

Pompey, upon receiving these proposals, which, though addressed to Libo, were carried directly to himself, made answer, That, in the absence of the Consuls, he could not treat. In this instance, he perceived, no doubt, the insincerity of Cæsar's pacific declarations, and was not tempted to remit the vigilance of his defence, or the ardour with which he now at last prepared for the contest: yet he could not altogether prevent the principal advantage which Cæsar meant to reap from these repeated professions of moderation and desire of peace, that of appearing in the eyes of the People, not the author of the war, but a person forced into these extremities by the violence and obstinacy of his enemies.

After the works at the mouth of the harbour of Brundisium had been continued three days, and were considerably advanced, the transports which had carried the first division of the army returned from Dyrrachium, and, as the passage at the entrance of the harbour was still open, the ships were admitted, and preparations made to embark the remainder. But the inhabitants of the town, being disaffected to Pompey, were likely to give intelligence of all his motions; and he himself made no doubt that as soon as he should withdraw his guards, the people would throw open their gates, and expose him to be attacked in his rear, and possibly endanger the loss of such part of his

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army as might be overtaken on shore. To provide against this event, and to retard the entrance of Cæsar into the town, he built up the gates with masonry or solid stone and mortar, and traversed the streets with walls and large ditches replenished with sharp stakes, which were masked or hid with a slight covering of brushwood and earth.

When the troops began to move towards the harbour, the rear guard still endeavoured to present the usual appearances on the ramparts, by occupying every post with archers, slingers, and other light infantry. These being to remain in their post while the main body was embarking, had orders, at a signal given, to abandon the walls, and to repair on board the transports which were ready to receive them.

Measures to evacuate the town being thus begun in the night, and Cæsar, having immediate intelligence of what was passing, brought forward his scaling ladders, and, as soon as the ramparts appeared to be deserted, began to ascend them at once in several places, and effected one part of his purpose, by gaining the battlements without opposition; but when he was about to descend from thence into the streets, having notice of the snares and obstructions which were placed in his way, he was obliged to halt, or to advance with so much precaution, that the greater part of the enemy had time to put off from the mole, and got under sail. Only two transports, which struck and were aground on the banks that had been formed or begun at  
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the mouth of the harbour, fell into his hands. CHAP.  
XXVI.  
The remainder, with the greater part of the Senate, attended by the officers of State and the ensigns of magistracy, proceeded in their passage to Epirus; thus leaving Cæsar in possession of Italy and of the seats of government, from which the world could scarcely disjoin, in their idea, the right to command in the empire.

Cæsar having, in this manner, surprised the republic, and in sixty days obliged all his opponents to evacuate Italy, and to leave him sole master even of the forces which began to be mustered against himself, it is probable, notwithstanding the question he states relating to the expedience of following his enemy into Epirus, that he had already taken his resolution to consider the reduction of Spain, next to that of Italy, as the object of greatest importance. In that province, which was full of resources, a regular army of seven or eight legions had been some time on foot, with an evident purpose to keep him in awe. He was threatened therefore with the most immediate danger from thence. Some arrangements too were yet wanting for the security of Italy. The professions which he had made of pacific dispositions, and of zeal for the commonwealth, were to be confirmed by showing a proper respect to the forms of the republic, and by affecting a concern to restore a government which he had actually overthrown.

For these reasons, this successful adventurer contented himself, for the present, with having ordered

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shipping to be provided at the port of Brundisium, that he might amuse the enemy with appearances of his intending to continue the war on that side, or that he might be actually ready to do so, when he had elsewhere accomplished the purpose on which he was bent. Notwithstanding his pacific declarations, and his ostentation of clemency on every occasion, the People still trembled when they saw almost every citizen of reputation and honour obliged to fly from the seats of government, and, in their place, collected from different quarters of Italy, every bankrupt, every outlaw, and every person of infamous character<sup>1</sup>. These being at variance with the laws of their country, had flocked to Cæsar, and were received by him under the denomination of the injured and the oppressed citizens, whose wrongs he was come to redress.

With this company, still multiplying around him, having given orders to secure Brundisium from the sea, and having posted there, and at Sipontum and Tarentum, each a legion; and having ordered ships from every part of the coasts of Italy and Gaul, he set out for Spain, intending, while the troops, with whom he had over-run Italy, took some repose in quarters, and while those who were destined for the service in Spain were on the march, that he himself should visit the city, and observe the aspect of his party at Rome. His father-

<sup>1</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 19. Cave autem puteis quemquam hominem in Italiam turpem esse, qui hinc absit. Vidi ipse Ferriis universos, &c.; et Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 1. qui hic potest se gerere non perditæ vitæ mores ante facta ratio suscepti negotii, focii, &c.

father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso, although, by his relation to Cæsar, hindered from following Pompey, yet would not countenance his son-in-law so far as to remain in the city to receive him. Marcus Lepidus, then Prætor, was the officer of highest rank who remained in his place; and beside the Tribunes who had been the instruments in kindling this war, was the only magistrate who resigned himself entirely to the victor's disposal. Among the Tribunes, Cæcilius Metellus, though disposed to have followed the Senate, being detained in the city by the sacred duties of his function, had taken his resolution to employ the negative with which he was intrusted, in restraining the violations of law and government, which were to be expected in such a scene as was now to be opened in the capital.

Cicero, upon the commencement of hostilities, having still the ensigns of Proconsul, was appointed to inspect the levies and other affairs of the republic on the coasts of Campania and Latium. Upon Pompey's retreat, he remained in this station with a mind overwhelmed with perplexity and irresolution. He affected respect and gratitude to Pompey, though he surely owed him no obligation, bore him no real affection, and blamed him highly for his flight from Italy; but in the last perhaps he only meant to justify himself for not having immediately joined him in his retreat, and for not having embarked with more decision in the cause. He, sincerely lamented the state of  
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the republic, of which he now certainly despaired, and only wished to steer a course, the safest he could for his own reputation and his person.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this contest, had contributed much to perplex the resolution of Cicero, who ever after what he had suffered from the intrigues of party, generally saw so many objects in every question of State, that it was difficult for him to decide between them. He had been some time kept undetermined by means of a flattering correspondence, in which Cæsar affected to request his good offices towards preventing the present troubles. Being now in his way from Brundisium to Rome, he was made to expect a personal interview; at which, says Cicero to his friend Atticus, I shall study rather to appear an object of his respect than of his liking. He accordingly, on that occasion, resisted the flattery of Cæsar, and withstood his entreaties to attend a meeting of the Senate, which been had ordered to assemble by a messenger dispatched from Formiæ. Cæsar appeared to be piqued at this refusal: "It will be supposed you condemn me," he said, "and others will be led by your example." Cicero replied, "That his case was different from that of others who had less connection with Pompey." "Come, then," continued Cæsar, "and treat of an accommodation with Pompey."—"Shall I be at liberty to do so in my own way?"—"Who will restrain you?"—"Shall I move the Senate then, that the war shall not be carried  
" into



“ into Spain, nor into Greece? Shall I lament  
 “ the treatment which Pompey has received?”— CHAP.  
XXVI.  
 “ That indeed,” said Cæsar, “ I shall not like to  
 “ have said.”—“ I thought so,” replied the other,  
 “ and chose to absent myself.” At parting, Cæsar  
 desired him to consider of the matter. “ If you  
 “ desert me,” he said, “ I must have recourse to  
 “ other counsels, and know not what I may be  
 “ forced to do.”

Upon the arrival of Cæsar in the suburbs of Rome, such of the Senators as were in the city, or in the neighbourhood, assembled at his summons. He opened the meeting by enumerating the wrongs he himself had received, and by loading his opponents with the guilt of the present war. “ He  
 “ never had aspired,” he said, “ to unprecedented  
 “ honours. The office of Consul was now again  
 “ open to him by the laws of the commonwealth;  
 “ and the Roman People had dispensed with his  
 “ personal attendance in suing for it. An act to  
 “ this purpose,” he said, “ had been obtained in  
 “ the fairest and most legal manner. Ten Tri-  
 “ bunes had concurred in proposing it. His ene-  
 “ mies, particularly Cato himself, had been heard  
 “ at full length against it, and had practised his  
 “ usual artifice for disappointing the Senate or the  
 “ People, by prolonging the debates. Pompey  
 “ himself was Consul when this act was passed.  
 “ If he disapproved of the act, why did he not  
 “ oppose it then? If he approved of it, why rob  
 “ him

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“ him now of the privilege it bestowed? He re-  
“ minded this meeting of the moderation with  
“ which he himself had offered to resign his com-  
“ mand, while others were so tenacious of theirs ;  
“ or while they imposed conditions on him, to  
“ which they themselves would not submit, and  
“ chose to throw the State into confusion, rather  
“ than abate the least of their own pretensions.  
“ He observed, that his enemies had made use of  
“ a false pretence to call off two legions from his  
“ army ; that they had violated the sacred cha-  
“ racter of the Tribunes, who were guilty of no  
“ offence, but that of protecting him against the  
“ oppression of his enemies ; that they had rejec-  
“ ted all offers of an accommodation, or even of a  
“ conference.

“ He now exhorted the Senate not to desert the  
“ commonwealth, nor to oppose such as, in con-  
“ cert with him, might endeavour to restore the  
“ government ; but if they should shrink in this  
“ arduous task, he should not press it upon them.  
“ He knew how to act for himself. If his opi-  
“ nion were followed, deputies should be now sent  
“ from the Senate to Pompey, with entreaties that  
“ he would spare the republic. He knew, that  
“ Pompey had formerly objected to his having  
“ any such deputation sent to himself, considering  
“ such advances as a concession of right in him to  
“ whom they were made, or of fear in those who  
“ made them. These, he said, were the reflec-  
“ tions of a narrow mind ; for his own part, as  
“ he

“ he wished to overcome his enemies in the field,  
 “ so he wished to excel them in acts of genero-  
 “ sity and candour.”

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Such were the colours in which this profound and artful man endeavoured to disguise his cause; and while he took effectual measures to maintain it by force, employed likewise an insinuation, and an eloquence not less dangerous than his sword. The proposals of a treaty were received in this meeting with joy; but no man was willing, after having assisted at such a meeting of the Senate, to hazard his person in Pompey's camp: For while Cæsar, to reconcile all men to his cause, affected clemency even to those who were taken in arms against him, Pompey, supposing himself intrusted with the powers and severities of the law, had threatened to employ those powers and severities to the utmost extent against every person who staid behind him at Rome. *Proscription* and *massacre* of those who abandoned the commonwealth, were the ordinary language at his quarters'. He proposed to operate in this case by fear alone, and had forgotten, that legal government itself, on certain occasions, with all its authorities and powers, stands in need of insinuation and of popular arts.

Cæsar, in taking the opposite tone, and in affecting to commit his affairs to the issue of a fair negotiation and treaty, on which he by no means wished to enter, still relied for an evasion on the difficulties

1 Cicero ad Attic. lib. viii. ep. 11. *Syllaturit* is the expression with which Cicero marks this conduct in another place.

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faculties which were likely to occur in the conduct of any such business; and he presumed upon these evasions in making offers which he trusted that his enemies would not accept. His intention was to load his antagonist with the blame of a war which, it is probable, he had a long time been devising. If he had really meant to renew his former concert with Pompey, he would have employed again the same concealed methods by which those concerts had been formerly obtained, and would not have intrusted the mediation betwixt them to the Senate, a body which, however composed, had a natural claim to authority, and might have carried their negotiations farther than either of the parties approved. He had ever entertained a serious aversion to the name and pretensions of the Senate. Being altogether indifferent to public interests of every sort, the mediocrity of parts, that must ever appear in the majority of such a body, was to him an object of contempt. He had espoused the cause of every faction, of every tumult, of every criminal against them; and, at one time, rather than be subject to their authority, had proposed, that Pompey himself should transport his army from Asia to usurp the government. Even the few Senators, who, upon the present occasion, from indifference to public questions, or from a disposition to favour his cause, had remained in the city, became the objects of his disgust. Many of them, though willing to be his instruments, were not yet formed for his purpose. When he affected to treat them with respect



spect, they received his addresses as matter of right to themselves; when he proposed any measure, they took the matter into consideration, and affected to deliberate of what was to be done. "He detests the Senate," said Curio to Cicero, "now more than ever; he will leave them no authority. I meant to have held my commission by a fictitious decree of that body: but he said, I should hold it of him, and that every honour, and every power, should from hence forward be derived from himself<sup>1</sup>."

Cæsar, however, meant to make this remnant of a legal assembly the tools of every ungracious or improper measure he had occasion to adopt, and, in particular, to avail himself of their authority in seizing the public money. Pompey, before he left Rome, had been authorised to draw from the treasures of the commonwealth whatever money he wanted for the service. At his departure, he ordered the whole to be removed; and the Consul Lentulus was about to execute this order, when a sudden alarm of Cæsar's approach obliged him to desist, and left him time only to carry away the keys of the public repositories. Cæsar now moved the Senate, that the doors should be opened; and that the public money should be issued from thence to defray the expence of the war<sup>2</sup>. To this motion the Tribune Metellus Celer opposed his negative; and Cæsar, disdaining any longer to wear

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<sup>1</sup> Cicero, ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 17. and 18.

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a mask which subjected him to the observance of insignificant forms, proceeded to the treasury, and ordered the doors to be forced. The Tribune had the boldness to place himself in the passage, and was about to reduce Cæsar to the disagreeable alternative of being disappointed of his purpose, or of incurring some measure of popular abhorrence, by violating the sacred person of a Tribune, from a veneration to which, he himself professed to have undertaken the war. On this occasion, contrary to his usual character, he appeared to have lost his temper, and threatened Metellus with immediate death. "This," he said, "is easier for me to execute than to utter." It was thought, that if the Tribune had persisted, not only this officer, but numbers of Senators, and many of the more respectable citizens, whom he considered as enemies and promoters of the Tribune's contumacy, would have been involved in a general massacre. "Think not," said Curio, in relating these particulars to Cicero, "that his clemency proceeds from temper, or is secured to you by any real disposition of his mind. It is a mere effect of his policy; he is naturally indifferent to blood, and, if he is provoked, will make it to run in the kennels."

The Tribune Metellus, however, when matters were coming to this extremity, suffered himself to be removed. The doors were forced open, all the money was taken from thence, even the sacred deposit,

deposit was now carried off, though supposed to have remained from the time of the rebuilding of Rome after its destruction by the Gauls, and still kept as a resource for the utmost exigency of the State, in case of similar invasion or danger. I have subdued the Gauls, said Cæsar, and there is no longer any need of such provision against them. He is said on this occasion, to have carried off, in bars, 25,000 lb.<sup>1</sup> of gold, 35,000 lb.<sup>2</sup> of silver, and in coin, 40,000,000 Roman money<sup>3</sup>.

After this act of violence, it appears that Cæsar distrusted the affections of the people. He had proposed to harangue them in a public audience, which had been appointed for that purpose; but apprehending that he might be exposed to insult from some one in the crowd, he declined that solemnity, even avoided the public view altogether, and having passed but a few days at Rome, set out for Spain sullen and displeased. It was no longer a doubt, that his victories led to the subversion of the republic, and of every species of civil government whatever<sup>4</sup>.

Marcus Emilius Lepidus, who, as has been observed, was at this time Prætor, and the officer of highest rank then at Rome, was left to govern in the city. Mark Antony had the command of Cæ-

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According to Arbuthnot, chap. 18.

1 L. 678,125 0 0

2 94,937 10 0

3 322,916 13 4 Vid. *Bin. lib.* xxxiii, c. 3.

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L. 1,095,982 3 4

4 Cic. *ad Att. lib.* x. ep. 4.

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far's forces in Italy; and by the use which he made of his power, treating persons of the most respectable condition with great insolence, and indulging himself in all the extravagance of debauch, for which his temperament appears to have been peculiarly fitted, increased the dismal apprehensions of the public. He is said to have travelled through Italy himself in an open litter, with Citheridé, a celebrated actress, followed by seven other carriages replenished with female attendants, including Fulvia, the widow of the late famous Clodius, and now his wife, who, to enjoy her present husband's state, and partake with him in the licence of his military power, connived at his infidelities, and made a part in this scandalous train<sup>1</sup>. The whole, a lively display of the object for which the accomplices of Cataline, and many of the followers of Cæsar, wished to be masters of the republic, and a foretaste of the brutal caprice with which this overgrown community, so long a prey to outrageous faction, was now likely to be made the subject and the sport of a military usurpation.

Soon after hostilities had commenced, Cotta had been sent to command for the republic in Sardinia, and Cato to watch over its interests in Sicily. These islands appeared to Cæsar, when about to carry the war into Spain, of considerable importance, and he wished, if possible, to get the possession of them, as well as to reduce Pompey's forces in every other part of the empire. Having stationed Dolabella, with C. Antonius, on the coast of Il-

lyricum,

<sup>1</sup> Cic. ad Att. lib. x. et xiii.



lyricum, he ordered Valerius, with a proper force, into Sardinia, and Curio, with three legions, to prevent the establishment of Cato in Sicily. The Sardinians, hearing that one of Cæsar's officers was appointed, in his name, to take possession of their island, declared for his interest, took arms against Cotta, and obliged him to fly into Africa, where he joined Atius Varus, who had occupied that province in the name of the republic.

Cato, some time after his nomination to command in Sicily, and while there were any hopes of a negotiation, remained at Capua, then the quarters of Pompey, in order to give his assistance in forming an accommodation, the least ruinous that could be obtained for the commonwealth. But on Pompey's retreat into Apulia, he went into Sicily, and the province being unprovided with every means of defence, gave orders to repair, or to build ships in all the ports of the island, and in those of the neighbouring coast of Italy. He had likewise ordered all the towns to furnish their quota of troops; but had not been able to collect any considerable force, when Curio landed at Messina, with the two legions destined by Cæsar to take possession of the island. Sensible that any attempts to resist would only expose the lives of a few well-affected citizens or subjects, who might on this occasion be disposed to support him as an officer of the republic, he discontinued his military preparations, and withdrew from the island.

This officer had often disapproved of Pompey's

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conduct ; and on this occasion, particularly complained of the defenceless state in which he had suffered the republic to be surprised in all its possessions. Cæsar, who no doubt wished to have the suffrage of so respectable a person, and of his own enemy against Pompey, represents Cato as complaining that he was betrayed, that the Senate had been deceived, and that the war itself was unnecessary<sup>1</sup>. The conduct of Pompey, not only as a citizen, but as an officer of State and as a soldier, has been censured in many parts of this memorable contest ; and there can be doubt that in the outset, either from design to extort from the Senate the more ample powers of Dictator ; or from too much confidence in himself, as he supposed, at the head of the republic ; he suffered the State to be surprised or taken at a disadvantage on every quarter. Cæsar himself is said to have censured him for abandoning Italy ; and it is probable would have respected him more, if, in executing this resolution, instead of passing into Macedonia, he had gone to the head of his army in Spain. His celebrated saying, in leaving Brundisium, when he was about to carry the war into that country, implied an opinion to this purpose, “ We go,” he said, “ from this general who has no army, to an “ army that has no general.”

Cæsar’s own distribution of his forces, as has been already mentioned, in assigning what appeared to have been the reasons of his conduct, had been made with the greatest ability. The disposition,

indeed,

<sup>1</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. xxx.

indeed, on which Pompey relied was plausible: but that of Cæsar profound; and the more, that it gave him the appearance of a person acting without design, and suddenly forced to the measures he pursued. In talking of ordinary men, we may err in imputing too much to design and concert; but with respect to Cæsar, the mistake to be dreaded, is that of not perceiving the whole extent of his foresight and plan. He at once armed himself with a military force, and artfully guarded the appearances under which he was to use it. When the Senate passed their resolution against him, he seemed to be caught unprepared to resist; but the Senate was still less prepared to attack. He had artfully avoided giving them any cause of suspicion, by any unnecessary assemblage of forces on the side of Italy, while he had sufficient strength to take the full benefit of the consternation into which they were to be thrown by his first alarm. Though long meditating the invasion of Rome with an army, he contrived an incident, in the flight of the Tribunes, to make it appear the effect of a sudden provocation, and of his zeal in a popular cause. When we consider Mark Antony as the person who was to furnish this pretence of a Tribune's flight from violence, there is no doubt that Cæsar had his choice of the time at which the occasion should present itself.

At this conjuncture, the greater part of his army still remained beyond the Alps, but in the precise situation in which they were most likely to be

CHAP.  
XXVI.

wanted to encounter the first considerable difficulty that would probably arise in the war. This difficulty was to come from the veteran legions which had been levied for Pompey, and which were stationed under Afranius and Petreius in Spain. If these legions had attempted to pass the Pyrennees, the army of Cæsar was stationed in Gaul to intercept them, and he was accordingly secure of being able to finish the war in Italy, without any interruption from thence. When this service was effected, his army in Gaul remained in the most advantageous position, from which to enter upon what was likely to become the second object of his enterprize, the reduction of Spain.

The antagonists of Cæsar, without any apprehension from the measures he had taken, and perfectly secure until the moment that hostilities commenced, were completely surpris'd, overwhelmed, and routed in every quarter on which they attempted to make a defence. Armies indeed had been formed in Italy, according to the saying of Pompey, *at the stamp of his foot*; but they were armies that served the purpose of his enemies, not that of the republic, or his own; and though rais'd to secure Italy against Cæsar, became in the reduction of Italy itself an accession to his force, and were ready to be sent in separate divisions to occupy different provinces of the empire in his name; insomuch, that while Cæsar himself, with the strength of the veteran legions with which he had conquered Gaul, hastened into Spain to reduce

what



what was the most formidable part of his rival's power, his officers were detached with separate bodies of these newly acquired troops, to the easier conquests of Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa. CHAP.  
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Pompey, although he had never visited his government in person, nor fought for occasions of war, as Cæsar, in order to discipline his army or inure them to service, had done in Gaul, had nevertheless formed a great military establishment, consisting of seven Roman legions, with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry, equal in number to eight legions more; and Cæsar had reason to believe, that this great force, if the war could have been protracted in Italy, would have come upon his rear, cut off his resources in Gaul, or obliged him to defend himself on the north of the Alps. He accordingly, instead of bringing into Italy the legions that lay in the low countries, or the interior parts of his province, had moved them only to the neighbourhood of Narbonne, to be near the confines of Spain, from which this storm was to be dreaded; and meant, if the success of his affairs in Italy should admit of it, that these legions should cross the Pyrennees, and fix the scene of the war amidst the possessions of his rival.

Spain had been formerly divided into two provinces, under two separate Roman governors; but the whole being united under Pompey, was committed by him to three lieutenants, Varro, Petreius, and Afranius. The first commanded, from the ri-

CHAP. ver Guadiana westward to the extremities of Lusitania<sup>1</sup> and Gallicia; the second, from the Guadiana eastward to the mountains of Murcia; and the third, from thence to the Pyrennees.

Soon after the war broke out in Italy, Pompey sent Vibullius into Spain, with orders to these officers to assemble their forces, and to prepare for the defence of their province. Of the three Varro affected indifference in the quarrel, or an equal regard to the opposite parties concerned in it. An accident, he said, had placed him under the command of Pompey; but he had an equal attachment to Cæsar. The other two, from regard to the commonwealth, or from fidelity to their commander in chief, engaged with more zeal in the cause. They determined, in concert with Vibullius, to leave Varro in the western province, while they themselves drew the principal part of their force towards the eastern frontier; and by occupying the passes of the mountains, or some advantageous post on the Ebro, endeavoured to defend the country intrusted to their care, until Pompey should either arrive in person to take the command on himself, or until, having rallied his forces in Macedonia, he should bring the scene of the war again into Italy. For this purpose, they took post at Ilerda<sup>2</sup>, a place of strength on the Segra, and about twenty miles above the confluence of this river with the Cinca; Afranius with three legions,

<sup>1</sup> Portugal.

<sup>2</sup> Now called Lerida.

gions, Petreius with two more, together with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry. CHAP.  
XXVI.

Such were the dispositions that were making in Spain, when Cæsar, having expelled his rival from Italy, took possession of Rome, and having passed a few days in that city, in the manner above related, set out for his army in the province of Narbonne.

Being to pass by Marseilles, he intended to take possession of that city; but the inhabitants were already disposed to favour his antagonists, and shut their gates against him. These ancient Greek colonists, after having long defended their settlement against the rude tribes in their neighbourhood, had placed themselves at last under the protection of the Romans; but with a reserve of all their own immunities, and an exemption from all the burdens of a Roman province. Cæsar proposed to have entered their city as a neutral place, and to prevail on the People to receive him, cited the examples of Rome itself, and of all the other cities of Italy which had opened their gates, and given a passage to his army, without taking any part in the present disputes. To this proposal, the citizens of Marseilles made answer, That in every case where the Romans were divided among themselves, every ally in their situation must so far preserve their neutrality, as not to receive the forces of either party within their walls; and that in the present case particularly, they lay under such high obligations to

CHAP. to the leaders of both parties, that they must care-  
 XXVI. fully avoid giving offence to either.

It soon after appeared, however, that this plausible answer was intended merely to gain time. Vibullius had passed by Marseilles in his way to Spain, and had delivered to the people of that place a message from Pompey, with assurances of support; on which they fully relied. The receipt of this message was followed by a resolution, to admit the officers and men of Pompey's party into their town, and to exclude his antagonists.

Domitius Ahenobarbus, after he had been dismissed from Corfinium, no ways affected by the ostentatious clemency of Cæsar, had, in pursuance of the Senate's appointment to the government of Gaul, repaired to that province, raised some troops, with which he was expected to take possession of Marseilles, and actually, in a few days after this answer was given to Cæsar, entered the harbour of that place with seven ships, and some land forces on board. Upon his arrival, the people of this republic called into their assistance the force of some neighbouring cantons from the mountains; repaired their own fortifications; replenished their magazines; employed many hands in fabricating arms; and took every other precaution that was necessary, in case they should be attacked, to enable them to make a vigorous defence.

By this conduct on the port of Marseilles, Cæsar being greatly provoked, invested the town with an army of three legions; and having ordered some ships to be built on the Rhône, in its neighbourhood,



neighbourhood, prepared to assail it at once by sea and by land. He committed the attack by land to Trebonius ; and that from the sea to Decimus Brutus. While he was making these preparations, a report prevailed that Pompey was passing the seas into Africa, and intended, with the troops which were in that province, and a body of Numidian cavalry, to reinforce, and to take the command of his army in Spain. It is probable that Cæsar, in like circumstances, would have even taken a shorter road to the head of his army. He appears at least to have believed this report of his enemy, or to have thought it extremely probable, and to have been somewhat alarmed. As if the prospect of meeting with Pompey, having under his direction a well-appointed and regular force, had rendered him doubtful of the affections of his own men, he mentions an artifice practised by himself on this occasion, which may be considered as a specimen of his address, and of the influence which he employed with his army. He borrowed money from the officers, and gave it in gratuities to the soldiers ; thus taking a pledge for the fidelity of the one, and purchasing that of the others by his bounty.

While Cæsar was yet employed in opening the siege of Marseilles, he ordered Fabius, who commanded his forces at Narbonne, to advance into the Pyrennees ; and if the passes were open or slightly guarded, to penetrate into Spain, and occupy some advantageous or leading position in the avenues to  
that

CHAP. that country. This officer accordingly, having  
XXVI. forced the passes of the mountains, probably near to what is now called Urgel or Fort Louis, knowing that the enemy were posted on the Segra, to dispute his passage, appears to have taken his route by the right of this river, from near its source, to where the army of Afranius and Petreius were encamped at the town of Ilerdà. He had by this means frustrated their intention of disputing the passage of the Segra; and having his army on that side, could at leisure open his communication with the more fertile parts of Catalonia, on the other, in order to receive his supplies and reinforcements from Gaul by the ordinary route. For this purpose, soon after his arrival, he constructed two bridges in the rear of his camp, at the distance of about four miles from each other, forming an immediate communication with Catalonia, for the supply of his army, and for the junction of reinforcements by the more frequented access from Gaul; but as the enemy also had a passage by the bridge of Ilerdà, to intercept these supplies, it was necessary to cover every convoy and foraging party with numerous and powerful efforts. After he had been some time in this position, two entire legions, under the command of Plancus, had marched to cover his foragers, and were to be followed by a body of cavalry. After the infantry had passed, and the cavalry was entered on the bridge, it broke down, and deprived those who were already over, of any communication with the camp. The timber and  
wreck

wreck of the bridge floating by the town of Ilerda, gave the enemy intimation of what had happened, and suggested the design to scour the country on the left of the Segra, with a powerful detachment, in order to intercept any parties who might by this accident be cut off from the main body of their forces. For this purpose, Afranius marched with four legions, and might have taken or destroyed those who remained under Plancus on the left of the river, if this officer had not retired to a height, on which he was able for some time to resist the superior numbers of his enemy. In the mean while, Fabius suspecting the danger to which his detachment was exposed, dispatched two legions more by the other bridge to support the former. On the appearance of this reinforcement, Afranius, whose plan in the present campaign was altogether defensive, thought proper to retire, without hazarding an action, in which he might be exposed to a too hasty decision of the cause.

Two days after this adventure, or about the 2d of May, Cæsar, with an escort of nine hundred horse, arrived; by the remaining bridge, in the camp of Fabius. Having examined the situation of both armies, and ordered the bridge which broke down to be rebuilt, he proceeded as usual to act on the offensive, and to occupy the enemy's attention with successive operations against them, by which, in his usual way, he left them no leisure to form any designs of their own. It was his fortune, indeed, in this and other periods of the present

CHAP. sent war, to need a speedy decision, which made  
XXVI. him take measures that forced his enemies to remain on the defensive, and inspired his men with a notion of their own superiority; an opinion which, after it has been some time entertained, seldom fails to verify itself.

In a few days after his arrival, he advanced with his army in three divisions to the foot of the hill on which the Spanish army was encamped, and while they continued to observe, and endeavoured to penetrate his intentions, he began to break ground, and to make a lodgment for himself in that place. That his purpose might not be known, until the work was somewhat advanced, his army being formed in different lines, he kept the first and second under arms, and ordered the third, without raising a parapet, or planting their palisades, to sink a ditch fifteen feet wide, and of a sufficient length to cover his front. This being done, he retired with his whole army behind it, and ordered them to lie upon their arms all night. Under cover of this temporary intrenchment, he on the following day completed the usual fortifications of his camp, and brought forward the tents and baggage of the army, which till then had remained under a proper guard on his former ground.

Being now in possession of a post within four hundred paces, or less than half a mile of the enemy's station; and having a view of the ground which lay between their camp and the town of Ilerda, extending about three hundred paces, and mostly plain,



plain, with a small swelling or height in the middle of it, he formed a project to seize this ground; and by means of a post in that situation, knowing that the enemy had lodged their magazines and stores in Ilerda, proposed to cut off their communication with the town. In this view, having advanced three legions into a proper position, from which to execute his purpose; he ordered the front rank<sup>1</sup> from one of those legions to start from their colours, and with the utmost speed to gain the height which he intended to occupy. The sudden movement of this body explained his design to the enemy, and they instantly put all the piquets and extraordinary guards of their camp in motion to prevent its effects. Having a nearer way, and the advantage of the ground, they got a-head of Cæsar's party; and being in possession of the height before them, repulsed and beat them back to their main body. Here too, they pursued their advantage; and as they rushed with little regard to order, but with an appearance of undaunted courage, on the flanks as well as the front of the legions which Cæsar had advanced, they put the whole in some degree of confusion, and forced them back from the plain to the heights in their rear.

While the leaders of the Spanish army probably committed an error in not redoubling their blow, or remained in suspense, Cæsar issued from his camp with a fresh legion to support the flying division of his army, obliged the enemy to retire in their

<sup>1</sup> Unius Legionis Antesignanos. Cæsar. de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 43.

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their turn, and having overtaken them before they could reach their camp, obliged them to take refuge under the walls of the town.

The ground at the foot of these walls was steep, and the access to it was by lanes and narrow ways. Thither the troops, at whose head Cæsar had renewed the action, flushed with victory, had followed the enemy, and got into a situation in which they neither could gain any advantage, nor retire without loss. The parties however so situate, continued to skirmish during five hours, and being continually reinforced from their respective armies, a general engagement was likely to ensue on ground extremely unfavourable to Cæsar, but from which he could not retire without an appearance of defeat and absolute rout.

In order to extricate himself with the least possible shew of disgrace, he ordered a general charge, and having drove his antagonists before him to the foot of the wall, he sounded a retreat from thence, and brought off his men, before the enemy could rally in any considerable force, or return to the pursuit.

In this manner, Cæsar withdrew to his camp with considerable loss, and foiled in his design; but on account of the last impression he made on the enemy, with some pretensions to a victory, of which, to support the courage of his troops, he did not neglect to avail himself.

In a few days after this miscarriage, the army of Cæsar suffered a worse and more alarming disaster.

after, in a circumstance to which their situation exposed them. The summer being far advanced, and the snow on the Pyrennees melting apace, all the rivers which are supplied from thence, rose of a sudden to their greatest height. The Segra carried off both the bridges erected by Fabius, and baffled all the endeavours that were used to preserve or restore them. As often as any attempt was made for this purpose, the work was interrupted by the enemy from the opposite bank, or the materials were swept away by the flood. Neither the Segra nor the Cinca were passable, and the country between them, though, at that distance from their confluence, extending in breadth about thirty miles, being exhausted, could no longer furnish the necessary supply of provisions to Cæsar's camp.

About the time that the army began to feel their inconvenience, a convoy which arrived from Gaul, consisting of many carriages, escorted by a large body of Gaulish horse, and accompanied with many officers and persons of distinction, who came to witness the glories of this campaign, the whole, together with their attendants and equipage, amounting to about six thousand men, were attacked by Afranius, dispersed, and with great loss obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.

In consequence of this disappointment, or under the sense of present, and apprehension of future scarcity, the modius<sup>1</sup> of corn sold in Cæsar's camp for fifty denarii, or at the rate of about thirty shillings

<sup>1</sup> Little more than a peck.

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lings a peck. All their attempts to procure a supply were frustrated by the difficulties of their situation, or by the vigilance of the enemy. As the height of the floods was a permanent effect of the season, in swelling every river which descends from mountains that retain their snow in the summer, Cæsar would have no immediate prospect of relief; and as the enemy were plentifully supplied from their magazines in the town of Ilerda, or had, by the bridge of that place, an open communication with the fertile country, on the left of the Segra, Nature seemed to have decided the war in their favours. The Spanish army accordingly triumphed in their good fortune, sending exaggerated accounts of their advantage to all parts of Spain, to Italy, and to Macedonia. Many persons, who had hitherto hesitated in the choice of their party, were now determined. Varro began to exert himself in his province, and levied two entire new legions in the name of Pompey. Many hastened from Italy into Macedonia, to be the carriers of such agreeable tidings, or to have the merit of declaring themselves of the party of the republic, while the issue of the war yet remained in any degree of suspense.

The triumphs, however, which anticipate events are often deceitful; and, by the overweening security and confidence which they inspire, give an able enemy some advantage, in surmounting his difficulties, or facilitate the changes of fortune in his favour. Afranius and Petreius, while they trusted to physical circumstances, and the ordi-

nary



nary course of the seasons, were not sufficiently upon their guard against the superior resources of so able an adversary. They suffered him to build, unobserved, a number of boats, upon a construction which he observes was learned in Britain; having a keel in the ordinary form, and some timbers of strength on the sides; but, instead of plank, finished between these timbers with basket-work and covered with hides. These vessels being of easy carriage, were transported by land about twenty miles above Cæsar's camp; and in a first embarkation ferried over a party sufficient to make a lodgement on the opposite bank. Cæsar continued to reinforce this party, until, having an entire legion intrenched on that side, he ventured to employ his carpenters openly in constructing a bridge, which they began at once from both sides of the river. This work was completed in two days, and again gave him access to the left of the Segra, where, in his turn, he surprised some of the enemy's parties, and procured immediate relief by a supply of provisions to his own camp.

About the time that Cæsar had effected this change in the state of his army, he had news of a naval fight on the coast of Gaul, in which his fleet, under Decimus Brutus, had defeated that of the enemy, and given a speedy prospect of the reduction of Marseilles. This report, together with the disappointment he had recently given to the hopes of his enemies, had at once all the effects of victory, and made him appear more formidable than he was supposed to be, even before the distresses which

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he had lately experienced. His antagonists, from a state of sanguine expectation, sunk into a proportional degree of despondency, and became so much in awe of his superior ability that they abandoned the most fertile part of the country to his foragers, and never ventured, except in the night, to go abroad for the necessary supplies of their own camp. These events affected the natives in a still higher degree, and brought them from every quarter to make a tender of their services in supplying Cæsar with provisions, or in co-operating with his military plans.

In conjunction with the inhabitants, who were now become his allies, Cæsar again found himself in condition to act on the offensive, and to devise new alarms for the enemy. His first object was to render the passage of the river at all times practicable ; and as he had failed in his purpose of separating the Spanish army from the town of Ilerda, he now proposed to extend his command of the country, and to form a chain of posts, by which he might circumscribe the town itself, together with the enemy's camp, which depended upon it for subsistence.

The bridge which he had lately built was at too great a distance, and he experienced the insecurity of such communications over torrents, which came with such force and so much inequality from the mountains. Instead, therefore of attempting to erect any more bridges, he proposed to render the river fordable, by separating its course into many different channels ; and for this purpose made a num-

ber of cuts, through the bank, of about thirty feet deep, passing over the plain, to receive as much of the waters of the Segra as might sufficiently drain the principal stream.

The enemy, as soon as they understood the purpose of these operations, were greatly alarmed. They foresaw that Cæsar, having the passage of the river secured, might command its opposite banks below, as well as above the town of Ilerda, block up the bridge of that place, and, with the aid of the country around him, which, since the late defection of its inhabitants, was ready to support him in all his designs, might have it in his power to prevent their own supplies, and distress them, in their turn, for want of provisions.

That they might not be exposed to incur so great a calamity, they resolved, while Cæsar's work was yet incomplete, to abandon their present station, and to retire beyond the Ebro, where the people, either from fear or affection, were still in their interest. They proceeded to the execution of this purpose with much seeming precaution and foresight. Having fixed upon a proper place at which to lay a bridge over the Ebro, they ordered all the boats, within a certain distance on that river and on the Segra, to be collected together for that purpose. They placed a proper garrison in Ilerda, to check the motions of the enemy in their rear, or if he attempted to reduce that place, to occupy his forces until they themselves should have effected their retreat, and made their arrangements in the new position they intended to take.



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As their first movement in departing from their present encampment, and in passing through the town of Ilerda, incumbered with all their baggage, was likely to detain them some time in presence of the enemy, or expose them to the attacks of his cavalry and light troops, they projected no more, on the first day of their march, than to file off by the bridge; and they fixed on a post at which they might halt on the left of the Segra, and make the proper dispositions to execute the remainder of their plan. This post they sent two legions before them to occupy and to secure.

Having taken these preparatory steps, they decamped, defiled without molestation through the town of Ilerda, and came to the ground on which they had taken care to secure a proper lodgement; but here they halted only until the middle of the night, when they again were in motion. They had a plain of some miles before them, bounded by a ridge of hills, which they were to pass in their way to the Ebro. They might be exposed to Cæsar's light troops in crossing this plain; but as soon as they reached the mountains, they could, by securing the passes in their rear, effectually prevent any further attack from the enemy. Thither they accordingly directed their march; but Cæsar, who had observed their intentions, and who had so far succeeded in his operations on the river as to be able to ford it with his horse, had sent the greater part of his cavalry, in the beginning of the night, with orders to hang upon the rear



rear of the enemy, and by all possible means to retard their progress.

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This service the cavalry performed with so much success, that at break of day the Spanish army, in consequence of the frequent interruptions they had suffered, were still to be seen from Cæsar's camp. The cavalry, as often as the enemy got in motion, were observed to attack them, but when the enemy halted, appeared to stop or retire, and were pursued in their turn. The army of Cæsar being spectators of this scene became extremely impatient, and with the greatest ardour pressed to be led against the enemy. Even officers crowded to their general, and begged they might be allowed to try the ford; they observed of what consequence it was, that an enemy who had been driven with so much labour from one post, should not be suffered to retire in safety to another situation, from which they might renew the war.

Cæsar, affecting to be moved by these representations, and to be prevailed upon to do what it is probable he earnestly desired, instantly made his dispositions to pass the river. He selected the least firm and vigorous men of every cohort for the guard of the camp; placed lines of horse in the river above and below the ford, to break the force of the stream, and to save those who might be overpowered by the strength of the current; in this manner he passed his infantry between the double lines of cavalry without the loss of a man.

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They had a circuit of six miles to make, in order to avoid the town of Ilerda; but notwithstanding this delay, and the advantage which Afranius and Petreius had gained by beginning their march at midnight, and by their not being discovered until it was day, such were the interruptions given by the cavalry, and the speed with which the legions of Cæsar advanced, that they overtook the enemy's rear about three in the afternoon, and occasioned at once a general halt in every part of their column.

Petreius and Afranius, stunned by the unexpected arrival of Cæsar at the head of his whole army, formed on a rising ground to receive him; and both armies seemed to prepare for immediate action. But Cæsar, knowing the necessity which the enemy were under of continuing their retreat, and the prospect he had of increasing his advantage on the march, did not think it necessary to attack them when in order of battle; he took his ground, however, so near them<sup>1</sup>, that he could profit by every opportunity they gave him, and in every attempt they should make to change their situation, could push them into all the disorders of a general rout.

From this position of the two armies, the Spaniards having some time remained in order of battle, were tempted again to resume their march; but having soon experienced the inconvenience of being to retire with an enemy at their backs, and being faint

<sup>1</sup> The want of cannon or fire-arms enabled a superior army to remain almost in contact with that it intended to harass.

faint with hunger and the fatigue of so many tedious and fruitless operations, they determined to halt and wait for the return of night. They had now no more than five miles to pass on the plain, and hoped, by a rapid motion in the night, to traverse this space before Cæsar could overtake them, or before he could oblige them to halt any where short of the mountains, where they looked for a perfect security.

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Both parties appeared to be fixed on their ground for the night, when some prisoners that were brought to Cæsar, gave information that the enemy were in motion, and must in a little time be so far advanced as to reach the hills before he could give them any effectual obstruction. On this sudden emergence, although his army was by no means ready to move, he ordered every trumpet to sound a march, as if he were actually in motion. This feint, however slight, had its effect; the enemy believed that they were to be instantly attacked, or closely pursued when disordered on their way, and incumbered with baggage; to avoid these disadvantages, they desisted from their intention, and gave the signal to halt.

Afranius and Petreius, thus baffled in the execution of the first part of their plan, which had been so reasonably formed, began to lose courage, and remained on this ground all night, and the following day, perplexed with irresolution and various counsels. So far, however, they determined, that before so vigilant an enemy it was safer to march

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 XXVI. they remained yet a second night in the present position.

In this interval Cæsar, having leisure to visit the country over which they were to pass, found it practicable to turn their flank and get to the hills before them. He accordingly moved in the night, and at break of day, before the enemy judged it safe to decamp, he appeared at some distance on their right; but seeming to retire, and to leave them at liberty to continue their retreat. So long as his march had this appearance, they were pleased to think he had discontinued the pursuit, and applauded themselves for having patiently waited so joyful an event. But as soon as he had got a sufficient way to his left, he changed his direction, and pushed with all possible speed to arrive at the mountains. They were no longer at a loss to perceive his design, or the danger with which they themselves were threatened. And they instantly, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, moved in the greatest haste to prevent him.

In this operation, Cæsar was now become certain of one or other of two great advantages; either that he should reach the pass of the mountains before the enemy, and so cut off their retreat; or, if they got there before him, that he should be left in possession of their camp and their baggage. He prevailed, however, in the trial of speed, got the first of these advantages by being before them at the ascent of the mountains, where  
 he



he found a ledge or terras that was sufficiently capacious to receive his army, and which gave him entire command of the pass. CHAP.  
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Afranius, on seeing Cæsar in possession of this ground, sent a considerable party to try the ascent of the mountains at a different place, and to gain the summits behind him; in hopes that, if this were practicable, he might follow with his whole army, and descend from thence to the Ebro. But the party he employed on this service was, in presence of both armies, surrounded by Cæsar's horse, and put to the sword. The rest of the army, without making any attempt to rescue their friends, beheld this scene with a kind of torpid dejection. They dropped their arms, and staggered in their ranks. The troops of Cæsar, who well understood these signs of dismay, became to a degree of mutiny impatient for action; and he himself was sensible that the enemy might in that moment be attacked with the greatest advantage; but as he now thought himself sure of being able to reduce them without a blow, he was unwilling to furnish an opportunity, however unlikely to avail them, of making their escape by the chance of a battle. While he endeavoured accordingly to restrain the unseasonable ardour of his own men, the leaders of the Spanish army had time to retire with theirs, and led them back to the camp which they had left in the morning, and to the melancholy possession of tents and of baggage, which they had been willing to abandon, in order to effect their escape.

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Cæsar having left proper guards to secure the passes of the mountains, returned on the track of the enemy, and took post, as before, so near them, that they could not move without being exposed to his insults.

In this position of the two armies, the sentinels and advanced guards had an opportunity to talk together; they mutually regretted the unhappy quarrel in which they were engaged, and both officers and men becoming by degrees more familiar, met between the lines, and even exchanged visits in their opposite camps. Officers of the Spanish army proceeded so far as to talk of an accommodation, and got over their scruples in treating without proper authority, by proposing to stipulate in the treaty of peace which they were about to conclude, some honourable terms for their generals.

Cæsar was apprized of this correspondence, and, however irregular, connived at a circumstance which he hoped his superior popularity and the splendour of his fortune, would turn to his own advantage. He flattered himself, that as he had been able to seduce the troops of Pompey in Italy, so he might now deprive his antagonists of the mighty army they had formed in this province against him.

The Spanish generals, being intent on a work they were executing to secure their access to water, remained for some time unapprized of the disorderly intercourse subsisting between the two armies; and Afranius, when he came to the knowledge

ledge of what was passing, seemed to observe it with some degree of indifference; but Petreius was greatly alarmed, ran with the officers and the guard which usually attended his person to the space between the lines, dispersed all those who were found in conference together, and put all the soldiers of Cæsar's army who fell in his way to the sword. From thence he went through the camp, and with tears exacted from every legion apart fresh oaths of fidelity to Pompey. He afterwards assembled the whole at the usual place of audience, before the general's tent; and in a speech, composed of insinuation mixed with reproach, endeavoured to confirm them in their duty; and, to the end that he might effectually cut off all hopes of conciliation, ordered all the soldiers of Cæsar's army that could be found within his intrenchments to be brought before him and slain.

Cæsar, at the same time, having many officers and men of the Spanish army in his camp, might have retaliated these acts of severity; but he chose rather to contrast the character of clemency he himself had assumed, with the austere and merciless policy of his enemies; and for this purpose gave their freedom to such officers or men as chose to return to their own party, and rewarded with preferments and honours such of them as were inclined to remain in his service.

Afranius and Petreius, by the timely discovery of these irregular practices, having escaped the disgrace of being delivered up to the enemy, to be treated at his discretion, or to be spared only as objects



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objects of pity at the intercession of their own army, continued the operations in which they were engaged; but by persevering in their plan of resistance, they only enabled their adversary to give still more evident proofs of his superior skill and address. They were sensible that their present post could not be long maintained; it had been taken, in their haste to reach the mountains, from necessity, as an immediate respite from the assaults of an enemy who annoyed their march; and, besides other inconveniences, had a difficult access to water, the brook or river from which they were to be supplied being exposed to the discharge of arrows, darts, and other missiles from the enemy. Their bread, which they had calculated to serve them on their route to the Ebro was nearly exhausted, and they had no immediate prospect of supply. They entered therefore into anxious deliberation on the choice of some other retreat, by which they might soonest get beyond the reach of an enemy who pressed them with such unremitted alarms. They hesitated whether they should return to Ilerda, where they still had some magazines, or should attempt to reach Tarraco<sup>1</sup> in the opposite direction, though at the distance of about fifty miles. The length and difficulty of the way, in which they would be exposed to Cæsar's attacks, determined them against the last; and they chose the first, as promising the nearest and most immediate relief from their present distresses. They accordingly.

<sup>1</sup> Tarragona.



cordingly, without any precaution, decamped, and directed their march to Ilerda.

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The Spanish infantry were now more exposed than they had been on any of their former marches; for their cavalry had been so often discomfited, and had lost courage so much, that they could not be kept to their place in the column, and were now actually received for safety into the centre of the infantry; the rear was therefore cruelly annoyed by Cæsar's horse, supported by the whole force of his legions. In ascending the heights, which were frequent in their way, they had the better of the enemy, by throwing their javelins and darts on those who attempted to pursue them from below; and with this superiority they made a stand on every ascent, to force their pursuers back to some distance; but in descending the hills, the same advantage being taken against themselves, they generally ran in great disorder to the plains. And in this manner, the ground being uneven, their march consisted of alternate stops and precipitate flights, extremely fatiguing, and likely to end in a general rout.

The leaders of the retiring army, to prevent this fatal consequence, thought proper again to form upon a rising ground, and attempted a stratagem to amuse the enemy, and to gain some advance on the march before him. For this purpose, affecting to make some permanent lodgement in the place where they halted, they threw up a breast-work, but neither pitched their tents nor unloaded their baggage,

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baggage, and were ready to depart the moment their pursuer gave them an opportunity, by quitting the order of march. Cæsar, trusting to the effects of his late attacks, and to the appearances which the enemy presented, had no suspicion of their purpose, gave orders to pitch, and even suffered his cavalry to go abroad in parties to forage. This was no sooner observed from the Spanish army, than they instantly resumed their march. It was then about noon, and they made some way undisturbed.

Cæsar seeing himself thus over-reached, instantly put his legions in motion, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, and leaving orders for the cavalry to follow him as soon as they could be assembled, moved on with the foot as near as he could on the enemy's rear. He was in this situation when the cavalry rejoined him, and, by renewing with double ardour their former attacks, obliged the Spanish army again, in a kind of despair, to suspend their march. In order to have some respite from the repeated charges of cavalry with which they were harassed, they halted in a field, which they had no time to examine, and in which they were actually very much exposed.

In this situation, Cæsar had again a fair opportunity of proceeding to a general action, and, with little doubt of the event, of terminating the war by a battle; but he persisted in his purpose of forcing these unfortunate legions to surrender, without any loss or hazard to himself. In this mind he continued to observe

observe them with a degree of insulting indifference. They soon became sensible of the great disadvantage of the place in which they had halted, and endeavoured to change their position, without exposing themselves, if possible, to the enemy, who was so near as to be able to disturb them in every motion they openly attempted to make; for this purpose, they broke ground for a new intrenchment in their rear, and proposing to retire under cover of successive and contiguous intrenchments, as besiegers advance in the attack of a fortress, they passed from one fortified camp as soon as they had prepared another to receive them<sup>1</sup>.

In these slow and toilsome operations they persisted all the night and the following day, and may have become by their labours less exposed to the enemy; but subject to a fresh inconveniency, till then unobserved, in the great distance to which they were removed from water.

As soon as this defect was perceived, which was probably not till after the soldier had consumed what he commonly carried in his flask, they discontinued their fatiguing operations; but no man

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ventured

1 Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 81. Illi animadverso vitio castrorum, tota nocte munitiones proferunt, castraque castris *convertunt*. This passage is differently read in different editions; for *convertunt* we have *conferunt*. And a very learned, as well as intelligent military commentator, supposing that Cæsar meant to say, that they joined their intrenchment close to his own, pretends to see in this some plausible means of retreat; but as this exceeds the author's comprehension, he has preferred the first reading, and though the meaning of *convertunt* is not clear, he has ventured to give it the sense in the text\*.

\* Vid. *Memoirs, &c. et Antiquités Militaire, par Mons. Guichard, Tom premier.*



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ventured abroad for water, and they remained all night under dreadful apprehensions of what they might suffer from the want of this necessary of life. On the following day the whole army turned out in array to the watering-place, and, at the hazard of a general action, proceeded to supply themselves from thence. They were thus suffered to obtain a temporary relief in this article; but none attempted to procure any food, and they soon after, in order to supply their own immediate wants, and to lessen their consumption of water and forage, killed all the beasts of burden in their camp. But while they endeavoured, by means of these pitiful expedients, to await the event of any change that might offer in their favour, Cæsar, with his usual boldness of enterprise, formed a design to cut off all their hopes at once by a line of circumvallation. In conducting or covering this work, his legions were commonly under arms. And the enemy, sensible of the extremity to which they were soon likely to be reduced, advancing in front of their own camp to interrupt him; by a sudden attack might have decided their fate in a battle upon equal terms. But courage does not arise from distress or the apprehension of suffering; the habit of acting upon the defensive had already impressed this army with a sense of inferiority, and their frequent miscarriages had made them distrust the conduct of their officers. Though now immersed in difficulties, from which nothing but victory could extricate them, and suffering insults which nothing but the blood of their enemies



mies could avenge, they, without making any CHAP.  
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In that situation, however, their distresses apace were becoming insufferable. After four days had passed in their camp without any supply of water or provision of any sort, their leaders desired an interview with Cæsar; and, not to expose themselves in so humbling a state to the troops of either army, begged that their meeting might be held apart from both. The proposal of a conference was accepted; but Cæsar would not allow it to be held in any private place: he insisted that Afranius and Petreius should meet him in the space between the two armies; and having previously demanded, as an acknowledgment of his victory, that the son of Afranius should be delivered up as an hostage, he came to the place of meeting, surrounded by multitudes who crowded from both armies in anxious expectation of the issue.

Afranius pleaded in behalf of the troops he commanded, that they had done no more than their duty to the officer under whose auspices they had been levied, and no more than the service of the province in which they had been stationed required; but acknowledged the distresses to which they were now reduced, and implored the victor's clemency.

Cæsar, in return, upbraided the leaders of that army with their obstinate animosity to himself, and with their late cruelty to innocent men, who

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had committed no other offence than that of having embraced their fellow-citizens as friends, and that of being desirous to terminate this unnatural quarrel in an amicable manner. "That army," he said, "had been raised and kept on foot for the sole purpose of making war upon him. For this purpose numerous fleets had been equipped in times of profound peace, and seven entire legions, under able and experienced officers, had been kept in this peaceable province, where there was not the least pretence of a war; that every measure was concerted for his destruction; that in order to raise one citizen to uncommon honours and powers, a new species of arrangement had taken place, by which a person remaining at the gates of Rome, even governing in the city and in every district of Italy, might likewise have the command in two warlike provinces, and be allowed a great military establishment in time of profound peace; that, on the contrary, in order to distress himself, the ordinary rules of the service had been set aside; and that to him alone had been denied, what had always been granted to every citizen who faithfully served the republic, the privilege of retiring, if not distinguished with honours, at least without being loaded with injuries and affronts; that he had borne these indignities, however, with patience, and mentioned them now, not as a prelude to any severities which he meant to inflict, nor as an excuse for any singular advantage he meant to take of their present distresses; that

“ that he demanded no more than peace ; his antagonists should go unhurt, provided they left the province, and became bound not to serve his enemies for the future against him ; that no one should be forced to take any active part on his side ; that all who committed no injury against him should be considered as friends ; and that every man now in his power should have his liberty, without being subject to any other conditions than these.”

It is difficult to determine whether the sword or the tongue of this singular man were most dangerous to the state he attacked. It is probable that many of his present audience were as much convinced by his eloquence, as they had been subdued by his military skill, and thought him a person no less forced to his present extremities by the wrongs he had suffered, than able to do himself justice by the force of his arms. His speech was received by the late partizans of his rival with evident signs of pleasure. To be discharged after a certain period of the most faithful services was all that a Roman soldier, in the ordinary times of the republic, could claim. To receive this favour at the hands of a victorious enemy, by whom they expected to be treated as captives, gave sudden and unexpected joy.

After the material articles were adjusted in this manner, some questions arose with respect to the time and place in which the vanquished army should be dismissed from their colours. Numbers of them, though Roman citizens, had been inlist-



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ed in Spain, and were natives or settlers in that province ; others had been transported from Italy, and wished to return to their country. It was determined, therefore, that the first should be disbanded immediately ; the others march to the Var, where they should be set free, and not be subject to be pressed into any service whatever. Cæsar undertook to supply them with provisions on their march. He ordered the effects of private persons, if found in his camp, to be restored to them. He paid his own soldiers a high price for what they were in this manner desired to restore. By this measure he gained several advantages ; he lightened the baggage of his own army ; made a gratification to his own men, without the imputation of bribery ; and he gained his late enemies by an act of generosity. The vanquished army accordingly came to Cæsar with all their complaints, and appealed to him even from their own officers. It was impossible for mankind to resist so much ability, insinuation, and courage.

About a third of the captive army were dismissed from their colours in Spain ; the remainder passed the Pyrennees, preceded by one part of Cæsar's army, and followed by the other ; who, being thus separated to the van and the rear, and always encamping close to their prisoners, led them, in terms of the capitulation, to the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul<sup>1</sup>.

While the main body of Cæsar's army thus conducted

<sup>1</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.



ducted the remains of the Spanish legions to the place of their destination, Varro yet remained in the western province of Spain; and Cæsar, in order either to effect a conjunction which had been concerted between them, or to force him to surrender, sent Quintus Cassius with two legions to that quarter, and himself followed with an escort of six hundred horse. Upon the report of his approach, the natives, as usual, having taken their resolution in favour of the successful party, declared for the victor. One of the legions of Varro that lay at Gades<sup>1</sup> advancing in form with their colours, came forward to Hispales to receive him, and made offer of their services. Varro himself agreed to make over the forces he commanded, both by sea and by land, and was received at Corduba. Here Cæsar held a general convention of the province; and having thanked the people for the favours they had shewn to his cause, he remitted the contributions, and withdrew all the burdens which Varro, acting under the authority of Pompey, had imposed upon them. In this, as in other examples, he endeavoured to dispel the fears which his irruption into the province had occasioned, and secured the attachment of the people by a sense of the ease and the exemptions which his success had procured them. The fleets and armies which joined him upon every conquest he made, enabled him to station troops for the security of his new acquisitions, without dividing the forces on which he was

<sup>1</sup> Now Cadiz.

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to rely for the farther operations of the war. He accordingly, in the present instance, left, under the command of Quintus Cassius, five legions, consisting chiefly of the troops which had been levied by Varro; and he himself embarking on board a fleet which had been fitted out for his enemies, went by sea to Tarraco, now Tarragona, and from that place by land to Narbonne and Marseilles.

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*The Siege of Marseilles continued.—Its surrender.—Cæsar named Dictator.—Return to Rome.—Mutiny at Placentia.—Cæsar with Servilius Isauricus, Consuls.—Forces and Disposition of Pompey.—Departure of Cæsar to Brundisium.—Transports the first division of his Army to Acroceraunus.—His message to Pompey, and their respective Operations.—The Lines of Dyrrachium.—Cæsar baffled in his attempt to invest Pompey.—Action and Defeat of Cæsar.—His Retreat.—March of both Armies into Theffaly.—Battle of Pharsalia.*

**T**HE city of Marseilles had not surrendered to the forces which Cæsar had left to besiege it, under the command of Trebonius and Decimus Brutus. The last of these officers, according to the disposition which had been made to block up the place by sea, as well as by land, was stationed under the island at the mouth of the bay. His Squadron consisted of twelve ships, but so hastily built, that no more than thirty days had elapsed from the felling of the timber to the launching of the vessels. They were manned, however, with the choice of Cæsar's legions; and, in order to frustrate any advantage which their antagonists might have in the construction or management of their ships, they were furnished with an apparatus to grapple, and could make fast their gunwales to those of the enemy,

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CHAP. my, in order to decide the contest, as on solid  
 XXVII. ground, with their swords.

The Marseillians had equipped ten gallies, of which the greater number, though not all, were decked. These under the command of Domitius, who had been named by the Senate to succeed Cæsar in Gaul, were joined with the seven ships which this officer had brought into their harbour; and being manned from the neighbouring coasts, came abroad into the bay, in order to force Brutus from his station, and to open their communication with the sea. In the beginning of the action, the Marseillians being superior to Cæsar's fleet in the number of their ships, and in the skill of their mariners, had a considerable advantage. But as soon as they suffered themselves to be entangled by the grapple, the Gaulish seamen, though of a very hardy race, could not withstand the arms and discipline of the legionary soldiers, and were defeated with the loss of nine of their ships.

This was the victory already mentioned, and which contributed so much to the reputation of Cæsar's arms, while he lay before Ilerda; and which, joined to the other circumstances of his good fortune, procured him the alliance of so many nations in Spain.

While Brutus thus kept his station in the bay of Marseilles, Trebonius practised all the usual methods of attack to reduce the city. The place being covered on three sides by water, and on the fourth



fourth accessible only by an isthmus or neck of land, which was defended by walls and towers of a great height; he opened two separate attacks, probably on the right and the left of the isthmus, and at each of these attacks, appears to have employed the sloping mound or terrace<sup>1</sup>, which, in the sieges of the ancients, where the defence depended on the height of the battlements, corresponded to the sap of the moderns, and was calculated to conduct the besiegers, by a gradual ascent, to the top, as the other conducts them to the foot of the walls. This work was supported on the sides chiefly with timber, and built up with fascines, hurdles, and earth, rising in the present case to an elevation of eighty feet, and in breadth, as was formerly observed in that employed against the Bituriges<sup>2</sup>, probably no less than three hundred and fifty feet, so as to receive a proper column of infantry in front, and to embrace a proper extent in the walls. The workmen employed in the front of this laborious approach were covered with skreens, mantlets, and penthouses of great length; and such was the consumption of timber in the construction of the whole, that the neighbouring country is said to have been cleared of its woods.

A mere trading city, long disused to war, or accustomed to rely on foreign aid for protection, we may suppose to have been ill provided for such an attack, either in the state of its arsenals, or in the spirit

<sup>1</sup> Agger.

<sup>2</sup> Bourges.

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spirit of its citizens. But this little republic, yet bearing the character of an independent state, and being in some measure accustomed to the presence of an enemy in the barbarous hordes of their neighbourhood, who still looked upon its wealth as a tempting prize, for the security of which it had been necessary to keep its walls in repair, and to replenish its arsenals, was by no means unprovided for its own defence; and the People, although long inured to peace, still kept in mind the duties which the necessities of war might oblige them to render to their country. They were now supported by the presence of a Roman Proconsul, and had hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey himself, whom, in opposition to Cæsar, who was in rebellion against the legal government of his country, they considered as head of the commonwealth. They accordingly persevered in defence of their walls; and by a continual discharge from the battlements, and by frequent sallies, in which they set fire to the works of the besiegers, greatly retarded the progress of the siege. They had engines of a peculiar force, from which they flung missiles of a monstrous size and weight, being beams twelve feet long, proportionally thick, and pointed with iron, forming a species of arrow, which none of the screens or coverings, usually employed in making approaches, could resist; and Trebonius was accordingly obliged to proportion the strength of his timbers and penthouses, and the thickness of his parapets, fascines, and earth on his terrace, to the weight of these enormous weapons.

While

While such efforts were made on both sides at this memorable siege, Pompey had detached Nafidius with sixteen gallies from the coast of Macedonia to endeavour the relief of Marfeilles. This squadron had entered the straits of Messina by surprise, and, having cut out of the harbour a ship which belonged to Curio's fleet, proceeded on their destination to the coast of Gaul. Being arrived in the bay of Tauroentum, now La Ciotat, in the neighbourhood of Toulon, they sent intimation of their coming, in order to concert operations with those in the harbour of Marfeilles.

The besieged were greatly animated with these hopes of relief; and having already drawn from their docks as many ships as supplied the place of those they had lost in the late engagement, they now manned them with the choice of their citizens, and determined once more to try their fortune at sea. When this fleet was about to depart, numbers of women and many citizens, who, on account of their age, could not take part in the service, crowded to the shore, and with tears exhorted the soldiers and mariners to be mindful of their own honour and the preservation of their country, on the eve of becoming a prey to their enemies. Multitudes of people, at the same time, drew forth in procession, and crowded to the temples with prayers and supplications for the success of this last effort they were to make in defence of their commonwealth.

This bustle in the streets of Marfeilles, with the motion of the shipping in the harbour, being observed



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served from the camp of Trebonius, which was situated upon a height, and which had a view into the town, gave sufficient intimation of what was intended; and Brutus was warned to be upon his guard: but the Marseillians, having found a favourable wind, had the good fortune to clear the bay, and, without any interruption from his squadron, joined Nasidius at Tauroentum. In consequence of this junction an action soon after ensued, in which the Marseillians made great efforts of valour; but were ill supported by Nasidius, who, unworthy of the command with which he had been intrusted, withdrew at the beginning of the action, and fled to the coast of Spain. The Marseillians, being left to sustain the contest alone, lost nine of their ships, of which five were sunk, and four were taken.

These tidings were received at Marseilles with inexpressible sorrow; but did not alter the resolution of the inhabitants to persevere in their defence, and in the use of every possible method that could be employed to protract the siege, and to give Pompey time to devise more effectual means for their safety. They accordingly, with great vigour and success, counteracted the ordinary operations of the siege, burning and demolishing a considerable part of the works which were raised up against them, and obliging the besiegers frequently to renew their labours.

The first attack, against which the besieged were not able to find an adequate defence, came from a work which had not been a part in the original plan



plan of the siege, but had been devised by the soldiers who had succeeded each other on the guard of the agger, or mound of approach, as a lodgement or cover to secure themselves from surprise. It was at first no more than a space of ten yards square, inclosed with a brick wall five feet thick; but so situate, that if it were raised to a proper height, it might cope with the battlements, and greatly annoy the besieged. To give it this consequence, masons were employed to raise the wall, and great efforts of ingenuity were made to protect them in their work. A moveable penthouse, of great thickness in the roof, and screened on the front and sides with net-work made of cables, or the strongest ropes, was raised on beams or rafters of a proportional strength, and contrived to be hoisted up by machinery, to keep pace with the building, and to cover the workmen as they rose on the successive courses of masonry which they laid. With these precautions, a tower was gradually raised on the foundation of the original brick wall, to the height of six stories; and being furnished with ports or embrasures on every floor, gave the besiegers, by means of their missiles, the command of all the space from thence to the ramparts. They accordingly, under the cover of engines, which were employed to make a continual discharge from this tower, filled up the ditch, and pushed up a gallery to the foot of the wall. In this position, notwithstanding all the efforts of the besieged, by a continual discharge of heavy stones from above, to  
destroy

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destroy or overwhelm the supports of their gallery, they undermined the foundation of the rampart, and brought some part of it in ruin to the ground.

The inhabitants, greatly alarmed at the sight of a breach, which might soon be enlarged to admit of being stormed, made some signals of truce, and sent to beseech Trebonius that he would suspend his operations, and wait for the arrival of Cæsar, in whose clemency they hoped to find some protection against the fury of troops, who it seems had already threatened the inhabitants with a massacre.

Trebonius, accordingly, moved by these entreaties, and by the instructions he had received from Cæsar himself, not to deliver up the town, in case it fell into his hands, to the rage of the soldiers, suspended his operations, and supposing the petition of the inhabitants equal to an offer of surrender on their part, intrusted his works to slender guards, who, in their turn, relying on the submissive professions of the people, were proportionally remiss in their duty. The citizens, tempted by the opportunity which was thus offered them to strike an important blow, and to throw back to a great distance all the posts of the enemy, made a vigorous sally from the town, and being favoured by a high wind, which blew directly on the works of the besiegers, set the whole on fire, and reduced to ashes, in a few hours, what had been the labour of many months to erect.

As Trebonius had already exhausted the greater part of the materials which the country around him

him could furnish, it appeared difficult to resume the attack. But he himself, as well as the troops under his command, being greatly exasperated by the late breach of faith in the town, made every effort of ingenuity and courage to repair their losses. They substituted brick work for timber in supporting the sides and galleries of their terrace; and advanced with so rapid a progress in their new approach, that the besieged, now greatly spent with toil, and disappointed in their hopes of relief, were struck with fresh and more alarming apprehensions of what they might expect from the resentment of troops whom they had incensed with a recent and just provocation; and they returned to their suit for mercy, with more humble and more sincere intentions of submission.

While messages were passing to this effect, Domitius Ahenobarbus, sensible that he could no longer serve the cause of his party at this place, embarked with his attendants and friends on board of three galleys which still waited his orders in the harbour. Having the opportunity of a high and favourable wind, which made it unsafe for the squadron of Brutus to weigh, or to quit their anchors in pursuit of him, he endeavoured to escape from the bay. In this attempt two of his vessels were taken, but the third, with himself on board, got off, and reserved him to take that share which yet remained for him in the growing misfortunes of his party throughout this disastrous war.

Such was the state of affairs when Cæsar arrived



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rived from Spain, and expecting, in the present contest for empire, to profit as much by the reputation of his clemency, as by the terror of his arms, listened to the supplications of the people of Marseilles, and took possession of the town without any act of resentment or severity whatever. While he was yet at this place, he had accounts from Rome, that his party in the city had procured an act of the People to vest him with the power of Dictator. The ceremony of his nomination had, in the absence of both Consuls, been performed by Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, then Prætor in office, who, though a person of mean capacity, was, by the chance of his situation, involved in many of the greatest affairs that followed; and, though but a single accomplice in the crimes of this guilty age, passed unhurt through all the scenes of its violence, to become almost the only example of an ignominy and disgrace, which so many others had merited no less than himself.

Cæsar, being thus raised, though by an irregular step, to a legal place in the commonwealth, hastened to Rome, in order to be invested, for the first time, with the ensigns and powers of Dictator. In his way he was stopped at Placentia by some disorders which threatened a mutiny among the troops who were assembled in that place. The legions, elated by victory, and filled with a sense of their own importance in a contest for the sovereignty of the empire, were become impatient of discipline, and in haste to avail themselves of that mi-  
litary



litary government which they were employed to establish. In entering Italy they treated Roman citizens as their subjects, and the country as their property. Being restrained, they resented the severities which were practised against them, entered into cabals, and even talked of abandoning Cæsar; and of declaring for Pompey. Here, however, the usual courage and ability of this singular man supported him. He brought the mutinous troops, under arms, before him, put them in mind how much he had ever coveted, and been anxious to obtain the affections of the soldiers; but assured them, that it was no part of his intention to earn those affections by making himself an accomplice in their crimes. “Shall we,” he said, “who profess to be the deliverers of our country from oppression, become ourselves the greatest oppressors? Shall I, who am intrusted with the command of a Roman army, become the patron of licentiousness, and, in order to indulge for a moment the passions of my soldiers, suffer them to ruin their own fortunes for ever? What should induce me?—The fear of violence to my person, or the danger to which my life may be exposed?—If my life were attacked, there are enough to defend it. But what is life compared to the honour of a Roman officer, which I am concerned to maintain? There are persons who have said, That they will desert my cause, and go over to Pompey. Let them. They shall soon have an opportunity to do so. If Pompey be my

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“enemy, what is there I should more earnestly wish, than to find his cause intrusted to such hands as these? men who make war on their friends, and disobey their officers. He had been slow,” he said, “in proceeding to the fatal extremes which were now become necessary. The guilty,” he continued, “had been long known to him; but he had endeavoured to conceal their offences, in hopes that remorse and shame, or the fear of justice, would have made the actual application of punishment unnecessary; but that he must now, though with the greatest reluctance, proceed to the last of remedies.”

In order that he might not involve the whole of those who were present in the same desperate cause, he affected, in this harangue, to treat the offence he was to punish as the crime of a few. They were now to be set apart, he said, and their punishment should purge the army, and retrieve its honour. In pursuance of this plan, he affected to believe, that those of the ninth legion were the principal authors of this mutiny. He ordered a few of them for immediate execution, and boldly dismissed the whole of the legion from his service. The remainder of the army, having thus obtained an implied exculpation, in token of their own innocence, vied with each other in applauding the justice of their general. Even the legion, which was dismissed from the service, detesting, as a punishment on themselves, what they had threatened to execute as an act of resentment against their commander,

befet

befet him with humble and earneft entreaties, that he might be pleafed to receive them again into his fervice. He affected great difficulty in granting this request; but, after much follicitation, fuffered himfelf to be gained by their profefions of penitence \*.

With a confiderable acceffion of authority, acquired by his fuccefs in quelling this mutiny, Cæfar proceeded to Rome, where he affumed the title and enfigns of Dictator; being the firft example of any perfon, fince the abdication of Sylla, intrufted with this alarming power. It was faid to be conferred upon him, however, merely in compliance with form; and that there might be a proper officer, in the abfence of both the Confuls, to prefide at the elections. His own object, at the fame time, being to gain to his party the authority of legal government, and, in his conduct, to give proofs of clemency and moderation, without any intention, for the prefent, to perpetuate or even to exercife any of the high powers of Dictator, he proceeded to hold the elections, and was himfelf, together with Servilius Ifauricus, chofen Conful for the following year. In the interval that followed, before their installation, he continued to afsemble the People in the character of Dictator, and obtained fome laws refpecting the times, and the diftracted ftate of the public affairs. Credit and trade were at an alarming ftand; he procured an

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\* Dio. Caff. lib. xli. c. 27.—35. Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. p. 547.  
Sueton. in Cæf. c. 69. Lucan. lib. v. 244.



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act to facilitate the recovery of debts, by delivering the effects of the debtor to be divided among his creditors, upon an estimate of what the different subjects might have been sold for at the time that the war broke out.

Many being supposed to hoard great sums of money, as the only means of preserving it from the violence of the times, or being unwilling to lend on such securities as were then to be had, Cæsar procured another act, by which any person was forbid to have in his possession, at once, above sixty thousand Roman money <sup>1</sup>.

He obtained a general act of indemnity, from which Milo alone was excepted, restoring persons of every denomination, who, at the breaking out of the war, lay under the censure of the law, and were in exile for corrupt practices in the State; and, in pursuance of this measure, procured a pardon for all the disorders which had been committed in opposition to the late government; but for none of the irregular efforts that had been made in support of it. He opened the city at once to all the inhabitants of the Cisalpine Gaul, and by a single vote gave them a title to be enrolled with the People of Rome as members of the republic <sup>2</sup>. In these, and in other affairs of less moment, while his troops were in motion through Italy, he passed a few days in the city, and being ready to depart, resigned the power of Dictator. This resignation,

<sup>1</sup> About 500 l.

<sup>2</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 36, 37, 38. Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.



resignation, made by a person possessed of a military force, and hitherto victorious, was considered as an evidence of his moderation, and served to dispel the fears of those who expected to see the immediate establishment of a military government. He was now about to assume the office of legal magistrate, and to appear in the character of Roman Consul against those who, lately trusting to the name and authority of the republic with which they were vested, had treated himself and his adherents as rebels; but who now, in their turn, were about to incur all the disadvantages of that imputation which he was about to retort upon them; and with the additional charge of an attempt to dismember the empire, and to arm so many of the provinces against the sovereignty of the State.

The competitors in this famous contest were arrived at or but a little past the prime of life: Pompey was fifty-seven; and Cæsar fifty. The first had been early distinguished as an officer, and for many years had enjoyed a degree of consideration, which far exceeded that of any other Roman citizen of the present or any former age. His reputation, however, in some measure, had sunk, and that of Cæsar had risen, on the first shocks of the present war; but the balance was not yet absolutely settled, and the minds of many were yet held in anxious suspense. The fortune of Cæsar, wherever he acted in person, had always prevailed; but where he

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himself

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himself was not present, his affairs wore a less promising aspect.

His forces under Curio had acquired an easy possession of Sicily; and this officer, encouraged by his first success, transported two legions into Africa, found Varus encamped near Utica, obliged him to retire into the town, and was preparing to besiege it, when he received intelligence that Juba, king of Numidia, was advancing to its relief with all the powers of his kingdom. This prince had been induced to take part in the war by his attachment to Pompey, and still more by his personal animosity to Curio, who, in his Tribunate, had moved for an act to deprive him of his kingdom.

Curio, upon this intelligence, wisely withdrew from Utica to a strong post in the neighbourhood, and sent orders into Sicily to hasten the junction of the troops he had left behind him in that island. While he waited their coming, some pretended deserters from the Numidian army arrived in his camp, and being instructed to mislead him with false intelligence, reported that the king had been recalled to defend his own dominions; and that only Sabura, one of his generals, with a small division, was come to give what support he could to the party of Pompey in Africa.

Upon this information, Curio formed a design to intercept this division of the Numidians before they could be joined by Varus; and for this purpose, leaving a guard in his camp, he marched in the night to attack the enemy, where he was informed

formed that they lay on the banks of the Bagrada. His cavalry being advanced, fell in first with the Numidian horse, whom they defeated. Encouraged by this advantage, he himself hastened his march to complete the victory; Sabura, by whose art the last intelligence had been conveyed to him, likewise, after a little resistance, fled before him. And by these artifices, Curio was gradually insnared into the midst of Juba's forces, was surrounded, and attacked on every side. He attempted, in vain, to take refuge on a height which he had in his view, and in so doing, with the greater part of his army, was put to the sword. The few who escaped, together with those who had been left in the camp, endeavoured to find a passage into Sicily, and, being disappointed, surrendered themselves to Varus, by whom they were treated with clemency; but being observed, and distinguished by Juba, from whom they had escaped, and who himself arrived at Utica on the following day, were claimed as his captives, and put to death.

About the same time, Dolabella, to whom Cæsar had given the command both of his sea and land forces on the coast of Illyricum, was, by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, expelled from thence; and Caius Antonius, attempting to support Dolabella, was shut up in a small island on the same coast, and, with his party, made prisoners<sup>1</sup>.

The principal storm, however, with which the  
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<sup>1</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 41 et 42.



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new government was threatened, appeared on the side of Macedonia. In this country, Pompey himself was now at the head of a great force. He had transported five legions from Italy; and, since the middle of March, when his last division sailed from Brundisium, he had been in the quiet possession of Greece, Macedonia, and all the eastern and more wealthy and populous parts of the empire. He had sent his father-in-law, Cornelius Scipio Metellus, into the provinces of Asia and Syria, to collect the forces and the revenues of those opulent countries; and dispatched his own son Cneius with instructions to assemble all the shipping that could be found on the coast. He likewise sent general orders to all the Roman officers in different parts of the east, and to the allies or dependants of the Roman People, to join him with every power they could raise. Seven thousand citizens of rank had followed him from Italy<sup>1</sup>. Numbers of veterans, who had been settled in Thessaly, repaired to his standard. He was joined by one legion from Sicily, by another from Crete, and two from Asia. He had two legions under Scipio in Syria, had assembled three thousand archers, and as many slingers; had hired, in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, two thousand foot and seven thousand cavalry. Dejotarus sent him six hundred horse; Ariobarzanes five hundred; Cotus, a Thracian prince, five hundred; the Macedonians furnished two hundred; five hundred, being the remains

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch in Pompeio.



remains of Gabinius's army, had joined him; his son brought eight hundred from his own estates; Tarcundarius three hundred; Antiochus Commagenes two hundred: amounting to fifty-five thousand legionary troops, eight thousand irregular infantry, and ten thousand six hundred horse. In all seventy-three thousand six hundred effective men<sup>1</sup>.

He had likewise assembled a numerous fleet; one squadron from Egypt, of which he gave the command to his son Cneius; another from Asia, under Lelius and Triarius; one from Syria, under Caius Cassius; that of Rhodes, under Caius Marcellus and Coponius; that of Achaia and Liburnia, under Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius: the whole amounting to above eight hundred galleys, of which Bibulus had the chief command, with orders to guard the passage from Italy to Greece, and to obstruct all the communications the enemy might attempt by the Ionian Sea.

Pompey had likewise formed large magazines of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene. The principal resort of his land forces was at Berricea, on the fertile plains between the Axios and Haliacmon, that run into the bay of Thermæ. The Roman Senate was represented at Thessalonica by two hundred of that body, who, together with the two Consuls, held their assemblies, and assumed all the functions of the Roman State. The Roman People were likewise represented

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bello Civile, lib. iii.

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sented by the concourse of respectable citizens, who repaired to the army, or to this place'. But though so many members of the government, thus violently expelled from Rome, considered themselves as the real constituents of the commonwealth, they suffered the usual time of elections to elapse, and did not attempt to preserve in their retreat a succession of the usual officers, in opposition to the elections that were made at Rome. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, at the expiration of their year in office, took the several commands allotted to them, as usual, under the title of Proconsul.

The general had been extremely active in forming, as well as in assembling this powerful armament. He intended, early in the spring, to take possession of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other towns on the coast, probably with a view to fall upon Italy, with a weight which now appeared sufficient to ensure the high reputation as a commander, which his successes, on other occasions, had procured him.

Cæsar, on his part, had drawn all his army to the coast in the neighbourhood of Brundisium; but it was not likely that he would attempt to pass a sea which was commanded by the enemy's fleet, or venture upon a coast where he had not a single port, and in the face of a superior army, now completely formed and appointed, under the command of an officer, whom no man was ever supposed to surpass.

surpass. The formality of entering on the office of Consul, to which Cæsar had been elected, it was supposed, might detain him at Rome till after the first of January; and Pompey accordingly made no haste in taking his intended stations on the coast of Epirus, from which he might either act on the defensive, or invade Italy as the occasion required<sup>1</sup>.

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It was difficult, however, to foresee what such an enemy as Cæsar might attempt. Having staid no more than eleven days at Rome, while he acted in the character of Dictator, and obtained his election as Consul, without waiting for his admission into office, a formality which his antagonists vainly supposed was to detain him, he set out in December for Brundisium. At this place twelve legions and all his cavalry were already, by his order, assembled. He found the numbers of his army considerably impaired by disease, being come from the more healthy climates of Spain and Gaul to pass the sickly season of Autumn in Apulia. In any other hands than his own, an army so reduced would have scarcely been fit for the defence of Italy against such forces as were assembled to invade it; and his march to Brundisium would have appeared altogether a defensive measure, or intended to counteract the operations of his enemy from beyond the seas. The season too appeared extremely unfavourable to any hostile attempts on Greece. But these were in fact encouragements to Cæsar,

as

<sup>1</sup> Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii.

CHAP. as they were likely to put the enemy off his guard,  
 XXVII. and instead of a commanding invasion of Italy, to  
 lie under the disadvantage of a defensive war in  
 his own quarters.

No more transports were collected in the harbour of Brundisium than were sufficient to receive about twenty thousand foot and six hundred horse. Cæsar, nevertheless, immediately on his arrival, informed the troops of his intentions to embark, and of his resolution to fix the scene of the war in Greece. He cautioned them not to occupy transports with unnecessary baggage and horses, and exhorted them to rely on the consequences of victory, and on his own generosity, for a full reparation of any loss they might sustain by leaving their effects behind them. He embarked seven legions in the first division, and with these he himself sailed on the fourth of February. He turned from the usual course, and steering unobserved to the right, arrived next day, where the enemy, if they had really been apprised of his embarkation, were least likely to expect him, on what was reputed a very dangerous part of the coast, under a high and rocky promontory, that was called the Acroceraunus.

U. C. 705.  
 C. Julius  
 Cæsar, P.  
 Servilius  
 Isauricus.

As soon as the fleet had come to an anchor, Cæsar having Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's officers who was taken in Spain, till now detained as a prisoner, dismissed him with a message to his general in the following terms: "That both parties  
 " had already carried their obstinacy too far, and  
 " might



“ might learn, from experience, to distrust their  
 “ fortunes ; that the one had been expelled from  
 “ Italy, had lost Sicily, Sardinia and Spain, with  
 “ one hundred and thirty cohorts (or thirteen leg-  
 “ ions)<sup>1</sup> ; that the other had sustained the loss  
 “ of an army in Africa, cut off with its general<sup>2</sup>,  
 “ and had suffered no less by the disasters of his  
 “ party in Illyricum ; that their mutual disap-  
 “ pointments might instruct them, how little they  
 “ could rely on the events of war ; that it was  
 “ time to consult their own safety, and to spare  
 “ the republic ; that it was prudent to treat of  
 “ peace while the fortunes and the hopes of both  
 “ were nearly equal ; if that time were allowed to  
 “ elapse, and either should obtain a distinguished  
 “ advantage, who could answer, that the victor  
 “ would be equally tractable as both were at pre-  
 “ sent ?

“ But since all former endeavours to procure a  
 “ conference, or to bring on a treaty between the  
 “ leaders themselves had failed, he proposed, that  
 “ all their differences should now be referred to  
 “ the Senate and People of Rome ; that, in the  
 “ mean time, each of them should solemnly swear,  
 “ at the head of their respective armies, That, in  
 “ three days, they should disband all their forces,  
 “ in order that, being disarmed, they might seve-  
 “ rally be under a necessity to submit to the legal  
 “ government of their country ; that he himself,  
 “ to

<sup>1</sup> The armies of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, &c.

<sup>2</sup> The army of Curio and C. Antonius.

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“ to remove all difficulties that might be suggested  
“ on the part of Pompey, should begin with dis-  
“ missing all the troops that were under his own  
“ command, whether in garrison or in the field.”

It appears that Cæsar, if these declarations had been accepted, might have been somewhat embarrassed for evasions; but equally bold in all his measures, he risked this event, or rather foresaw it could not happen, as he was sure that this offer of peace, like the former, would be rejected; and the rather, that it would be considered as an effect of his weakness, and of the danger into which he had fallen by his supposed rash debarkation with so small a force. At any rate, there is no doubt that his message was intended, in the usual strain of his policy, to amuse his enemy, or to remove the blame of the war from himself. As he usually accompanied such overtures of peace with the most rapid movements and the boldest resolutions, the moment Vibullius set out, he disembarked his troops, and in the night dispatched the transports on their return to Brundisium to bring the remainder of his army.

His landing on the coast was the first intimation received by the enemy of his intention to pass a sea, which they supposed sufficiently guarded by their fleets, or of his daring to carry the war into a country, in which they thought themselves secure by the superiority of their numbers, and of their other resources.

put

put to sea, and came in time to intercept about thirty of the empty transports on their return to Italy. These he burnt; and, sensible of his own remissness in suffering so great a body of the enemy to pass, he distributed his ships along the coast, and determined, for the future, to keep the sea in the face of every difficulty, and under every distress.

In the mean time, Cæsar marched directly to Oricum, where Lucius Torquatus, on the part of Pompey, was posted, with orders to maintain his position to the last extremity. But Cæsar, as soon as he appeared in the character of Roman Consul, preceded by the ensigns of office; prevailed on the garrison to desert their commander, and to surrender the place. Without stopping here, he proceeded to Apollonia, was received in the same manner by the inhabitants, in opposition to the officer who commanded for Pompey. In consequence of these examples he was acknowledged by all the towns of Epirus, and continued his march with the greatest dispatch towards Dyrrachium, where Pompey had collected his military stores, and formed his principal magazines. By his unexpected arrival he had hopes of being able to surprise that important place, and to make himself master of it, before a sufficient force could be assembled to resist him.

Pompey, in execution of the plan he had formed, was on his march from Macedonia towards the coast of Epirus, when he was met by Vibullius,

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and received from him the first intelligence of Cæsar's landing. He was not amused with the message which this officer brought him, nor did he attempt to retort the artifice, by affecting to be deceived. He even expressed himself in terms harsh and impolitic, "That he neither chose to return to his country, nor to hold his life by the concession of Cæsar;" and, without returning any answer, detached some parties towards the coast where the enemy was landed, with orders to lay waste the country, break down bridges, destroy the woods, and block up the high-ways with the timber they felled'. He sent expresses to Scipio, with an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and with orders to hasten his passage into Europe, with all the forces he had been able to assemble in Asia. He himself advanced with great diligence; and being informed on the march, that Oricum and Apollonia had already fallen into the enemy's hands, he hastened to save his magazines and stores at Dyrrachium, and without stopping, night or day, marched in such disorder, that many deserted as from a cause already ruined or desperate. He arrived, however, in time to prevent the designs of Cæsar on Dyrrachium; encamped under the walls, sent a squadron of ships immediately to retake or block up the harbour at Oricum, and ordered such a disposition of the fleet as was most likely to prevent the passage of a second embarkation from Italy.

Cæsar,



Cæsar, finding himself prevented at Dyrrachium, halted on the Apfus; and, in order to cover Epirus and wait for the second division of his troops from Italy, prepared to intrench himself on the banks of that river. Having accordingly secured the main body of his army in this post, he himself returned with a single legion to receive the submission of the towns in his rear, and to provide for the supply of his camp.

In the mean time Bibulus, on the part of Pompey, blocked up the harbour at Oricum, and obstructed the passage from Italy with his fleet.

Calenus, on the part of Cæsar, who had orders to lose no opportunity of transporting his army from Brundisium, actually embarked and put to sea; but being met by a packet from Cæsar, with intelligence of the dispositions which had been made by the enemy to intercept him, he returned, suffering one of the vessels that had accompanied his fleet to keep on her way, in order to carry an account of his motions; but she was taken by the enemy and destroyed.

Bibulus, who commanded the fleet which lay before Oricum, being precluded from the land by the parties which Cæsar had posted along the shore, forced to bring his daily supplies of wood, water, and other necessaries at a great disadvantage from Corcyra, and reduced to great distress, endeavoured, under pretence of a negotiation, to obtain a cessation of arms. But Cæsar, who came in person to Oricum, on hearing of this proposition, sup-

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posing that the design of Bibulus was to find an opportunity, under cover of the truce, to procure some supply of provisions and water, rejected the offer, and returned to his camp on the Apfus.

Pompey had advanced from Dyrrachium, and took post on the opposite bank of that river. Dion Cassius and Appian agree that he made some attempt to pass the Apfus, and to force Cæsar in this post; but that he was prevented by the breaking of a bridge, or by the difficulties of a ford. According to Cæsar's own account, the armies continued to observe each other, and the troops, separated only by a narrow river, had frequent conferences from the opposite banks. It was understood that in these interviews no hostilities should be offered. Of the two parties, that of Cæsar was the more engaging to soldiers; notwithstanding his own affectation of regard to the civil constitution of the republic, his military retainers still hoped to remain in possession of the government. He therefore encouraged the communication of his men with those of the opposite party. On this occasion Vatinius, by his direction, went forward to the bank of the river, and raising his voice, complained of the harsh treatment lately offered to Cæsar, in the contempt shewn to all his overtures and advances to peace. May not one citizen, he said, send a message to another, when he means only to prevent the shedding of innocent blood? He proceeded to lament the fate of so many brave men as were likely to perish in this quarrel;

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rel; and was listened to with profound silence by many of both armies, who crowded to the place. CHAP.  
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These remonstrances on the part of Cæsar, delivered by an officer of high rank, and appearing to make so deep an impression on both armies, when reported at Pompey's quarters, appeared of too serious a nature to be slighted. An answer, therefore, was given by the direction of Pompey, that on the following day A. Varo should be sent to any place that should be agreed upon as safe between the two armies, and there receive whatever propositions should be made to him. The parties accordingly met at a place appointed, and multitudes from both armies crowded around them. Pompey considering the whole as an artifice to gain time, or to find an opportunity to debauch his men, probably gave instructions to break up the conference, in a way that for the future should keep the troops at a greater distance from each other. Soon after the officers met, some darts, probably by his directions, were thrown from the crowd. Both sides being alarmed by this circumstance, they instantly parted, and withdrew under a shower of missiles, in which numbers were wounded.

The fate of the war seemed to depend on the vigilance of the fleet, and on the difficulties with which Cæsar had to contend in bringing any reinforcements or supplies from Italy. Bibulus, from the effect of fatigue, was taken dangerously ill; but could not, upon any account, be persuaded to leave his station, and died on shipboard.

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There being nobody appointed to succeed him in the command at sea, the leader of each of the separate squadrons acted for himself without any concert. Scribonius Libo, with fifty galleys, set sail from the coast of Epirus, steered towards Brundisium, where he surprised and burnt some trading vessels, one in particular laden with corn for Cæsar's camp. Encouraged by these successes, he anchored under the island which covered the mouth of the harbour: from thence he kept the town in continual alarm, landed, in the night, parties of archers and slingers, with which he dispersed or carried off the patrols which the enemy employed on the shore; and thus, master of the port of Brundisium, expected fully to obstruct that outlet from Italy, and to awe the neighbouring coast. To this purpose he wrote to Pompey, that the other divisions of the fleet might go into harbour; that his squadron alone, in the post he had taken, was sufficient to cut off from Cæsar all reinforcements and further supplies. But in this he presumed too much on the first effects of his own operations. Antony, who commanded the troops of Cæsar in the town of Brundisium, by placing numerous guards at every landing-place on the contiguous shore, effectually excluded the squadron of Libo from any supply of wood or water, of which his ships, for want of stowage, could not have at any one time a considerable stock; and he reduced them to such distress for want of these articles, that they were obliged to abandon their



station, and to leave the harbour again open to the sea.

In the mean time, pressing orders arrived from Cæsar to hasten the embarkation of the troops. Dion Cassius, and Appian relate, that he himself being impatient of delay, embarked alone in disguise on board of a barge, with intention to pass to Brundisium; that, after he had been some time at sea, the weather became so bad, as to determine the master of the vessel to put back; but that being prevailed upon by the entreaties of Cæsar, he continued to struggle with the storm for many hours. They farther relate, that the mariners being likely to faint, the passenger at last discovered himself, and encouraged them to persist, by telling them that they carried Cæsar and his fortunes; that, nevertheless, he was forced to give way, and afterwards intrusted his orders to a messenger; but that he returned to camp before it was known that he had been absent. He himself says, that some months being past, and the winter far advanced, he suspected that some opportunities of effecting the passage of his second division had been lost; that he was become highly impatient, and wrote to hasten the embarkation; informing his officers, that they might run ashore any where between Oricum and Apollonia; as the enemy's fleet, having no harbour in those parts, were frequently obliged, by stress of weather, to depart from the coast.

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Upon these orders, the troops with great ardour began to embark. They consisted of four legions and eight hundred horse, under the command of Mark Antony and Calenus. The wind being at south, and no enemy appearing in the channel, they set sail, and steered for the coast of Epirus, but were drove to the northward; and on the second day passed Apollonia, but were discovered by the enemy from Dyrrachium. As they were far to the leeward of that part of the coast on which Cæsar had instructed them to land; and as it was vain for them with this wind to attempt getting to the southward, they chose to give way at once, and steer for some convenient harbour northward of all Pompey's stations. But in following this course, as they passed by Dyrrachium they were instantly chased by Quintus Coponius, who commanded Pompey's squadron at that place, chiefly consisting of Rhodian galleys. The wind at first being moderate, Coponius expected easily to weather the head-lands that were to leeward of his post; and, though the gale increased after he set sail, he still continued to struggle against it. As soon as Antony observed this enemy, he crowded sail, and made for the nearest harbour; being in the bay of Nympheus, about three miles beyond Lissus<sup>1</sup>, on the coast of Dalmatia. This bay opened to the south, and was very accessible, though not secure with the present wind. He chose, however, to risk the loss of some ships, rather than fall into the

<sup>1</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 26.

the enemy's hands; and made directly for this place. Soon after he entered the harbour the wind shifted to the south-west, from which his ships were now sufficiently covered, and he debarked without any loss. At the same time the wind, in consequence of this change, blowing more directly on the land, and more violently, bore hard on Coponius, forced him upon the shore, where the greater part of his galleys, being sixteen in number, were stranded and wrecked.

Such of Antony's transports as got safe into the bay of Nympheus, landed three veteran legions, with one of the new levies, and eight hundred horse. Two of his transports, one with two hundred and thirty of the new raised troops; the other, with somewhat less than two hundred veterans, being heavy sailors, fell astern; and it being night before they arrived, mistook their way, and, instead of the bay of Nympheus, came to an anchor before Lissus. Ottacilius Crassus, who was stationed by Pompey with a body of horse in that place to observe the coast, manned some small boats, surrounded these transports, and offered the troops who were on board favourable terms if they would agree to surrender. Upon this summons the new levies accordingly struck; but the veterans ran their vessels ashore, and having landed, fought their way, with the loss of a few men, to Nympheus, where they joined the main body of their army that was landed with Antony.

The

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The colony at Lissus had been settled by Cæsar, as a part of the province of Illyricum, and now appeared to favour his cause ; Ottacilius therefore thought proper to withdraw with his garrison ; and Antony having stationed some of the transports at this place to enable Cæsar to embark his army for Italy, if, as was reported, Pompey should attempt to remove the scene of the war into that country ; and having sent the remainder back for the troops which were still left at Brundisium, he dispatched messengers to Cæsar with the particulars of his voyage, and an account of the place at which he had landed.

The fleet, with this division of the army under Antony, had been seen on the coast, from the stations both of Pompey and of Cæsar, steering to the northward ; but it was not known for some days what was become of them. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, that they had effected a landing to the northward, both parties determined to move to that quarter. Pompey decamped in the night, and knowing the route which Antony was likely to take, placed himself in his way, giving orders that the army, without lighting fires or sounding their trumpets, should remain in profound silence. Antony, however, having intelligence of this disposition of the enemy, did not advance. Cæsar, in the mean time, to favour his junction, was obliged to make a considerable circuit, ascended on the banks of the Apfus to a ford at which he passed ; from thence continued his march to the northward,



northward, and seemed to advance on Pompey's right, while Antony remained in his front. In this situation, Pompey, apprehending that he might be attacked on different sides at once by Cæsar and by Antony, thought proper to quit his station; and leaving their armies to join, fell back to Asparagium, a strong post about a day's march from Dyrachium.

Cæsar having obtained this great reinforcement, was no longer so anxious as he had hitherto been for the preservation of his possessions upon the coast. His enemies, by the superiority of their fleets, could prevent his receiving any regular supply of provisions from the sea. It was necessary for him, therefore, in order that he might have some other resource, and be in condition to act on the offensive, to extend his quarters by land, and to cover some tract of country from which he could subsist his army. For this purpose he removed from Oricum the legion that was stationed at that place; taking such precautions as were necessary to secure his shipping in the port from any surprise by sea. For this purpose, he drew the greater part of the vessels on shore, sunk one in the mouth of the harbour, and placed another at anchor near it, mounted with a considerable tower, and manned with a proper force. Being thus secured on the coast, he sent numerous detachments in different directions: L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, into Thessaly; C. Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts and a party of horse, into Ætolia; Cn. Domitius

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Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, into Macedonia ; giving strict charge to each of these officers, that they should collect all the forage and provisions which those or the neighbouring countries could furnish.

As Pompey had relied much on the authority of government, with which he was vested at the beginning of the war, and which he believed gave his party a dispensation from the exercise of those popular arts, with which Cæsar thought proper to recommend his cause, he threatened to punish the refractory, more than he encouraged or rewarded the dutiful ; and he often therefore extorted services from the provinces, neglecting the necessary attention to conciliate their affections ; and such were the effects of this conduct, that the detachments which now appeared on the part of Cæsar were every where favourably received. Sabinus made himself master of Ætolia. Longinus found the people of Thessaly divided, and was joined by one of the parties. Calvisius, upon his arrival in Macedonia, had deputations from many towns and districts of the province, with assurances of favour and submission ; and by these means the possessions of Cæsar, even in those countries on which his antagonists had chiefly depended, began to be equal to theirs.

It was thought an unpardonable error in Pompey, thus to suffer his quarters to be over-run by an enemy who had but recently acquired a footing on the coast, and whose army was, in number  
of

of cavalry and light infantry, as well as of regular  
 foot, greatly inferior to his own. Pompey, how-  
 ever, knowing the interest which Cæsar had in  
 bringing the contest to a speedy decision, did not  
 choose to divide his forces, and he relied for the  
 security of the southern and inland provinces, on  
 the legions which were soon expected to land from  
 Asia on the eastern shores of Macedonia or Thes-  
 saly.

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Scipio, being the father-in-law of Pompey, had  
 been employed in assembling the forces of Asia,  
 and had, by severe exactions, availed himself of  
 the resources of that opulent province. He was  
 still occupied in this service at Ephesus, when he  
 received from Pompey an account of Cæsar's arri-  
 val in Epirus, and an order without delay to tran-  
 sport his army into Europe. He accordingly, soon  
 after the arrival of Cæsar's detachments at their  
 several places of destination, debarked in the bay  
 of Thermé, or of Thessalonica, and penetrated in-  
 to Macedonia, directing his march towards the  
 quarters of the two legions which Cæsar had sent  
 thither under the command of Domitius Calvinus,  
 and gave a general alarm on his route ; but being  
 arrived within about twenty miles of Domitius, he  
 turned on a sudden into Thessaly, as thinking  
 Longinus, who was stationed in that country with  
 one legion of raw troops, might be made an easier  
 prey.

To lighten his march, he left his baggage under  
 a guard of eight cohorts, commanded by Favonius

CHAP. on the Haliacmon, a river which separates Macedo-  
 XXVII. nia from Thessaly, and proceeded with great  
 dispatch towards the quarters of Longinus. This  
 officer, greatly alarmed at his sudden approach,  
 and mistaking, at the same time, for an enemy a  
 body of Thracian horse which were coming to his  
 own assistance, hastily withdrew by the mountains,  
 and continued his retreat to Ambracia. Scipio  
 was about to pursue Longinus on the route he had  
 taken, when he was recalled by earnest representa-  
 tions from Favonius, the officer he had left to  
 guard his baggage; informing him, that his post  
 was in the utmost danger of being forced by Cal-  
 vinus, who was on his march through Macedonia  
 for that purpose. Scipio accordingly returned with  
 all possible dispatch to the Haliacmon, and arrived  
 at the post of Favonius, after the dust which arose  
 from the march of the enemy had appeared on the  
 plain; and thus came barely in time to sustain his  
 party, and to rescue his baggage.

The armies continued to occupy the opposite  
 banks of the Haliacmon; and as Scipio, by the  
 flight of Longinus, was become master of all Thes-  
 saly, Calvinus continued in possession of Macedo-  
 nia, and from thence secured a considerable source  
 of supply to Cæsar's army.

It would have been of great moment to Pom-  
 pey's affairs, and not inconsistent with the dilatory  
 plan he had formed for the conduct of the war,  
 to have risked an action between these separate  
 bodies on the Haliacmon, rather than to have suf-  
 fered



ferred his enemy to retain the command of so many posts of consequence; and Scipio accordingly passed the river with a view to bring on an engagement; but after some stay on the plain, finding no opportunity to attack the enemy with any hopes of success, he repassed the river, and having occupied his former station, there passed some partial encounters between such as were advanced on the different sides, but without any considerable event.

While so many large bodies, detached from the principal armies, were thus contending in Thessaly for the possession of the country, Pompey remained to cover the ground, which was of greater importance to him, in the neighbourhood of the sea, and the port of Dyrrachium. Having, at the distance of about a day's march in his rear, this town and harbour as a place of arms, at which he had deposited his magazines and stores, and from which he received his ordinary supply of provisions, he had taken his measures to protract the war; and trusting to his own superior resources, both by sea and by land, did not doubt that by waiting until the countries which Cæsar had occupied should be exhausted, he might force him to retire from the contest without the risk of a battle. To hasten this event, he endeavoured every where to straiten his quarters in the country, and to block up or destroy all the harbours he had on the coast.

Cnæus,

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Cnæus, the eldest of Pompey's sons, commanding the Egyptian fleet, in execution of this plan which had been laid to harass the enemy, without exposing their cause to a general hazard, attacked Cæsar's principal naval station at Oricum, raised the vessel that had been sunk at the mouth of the harbour, forced the armed galley that was stationed before it, and carried off or destroyed all the ships that were laid up in the port. From thence he proceeded to Lissus, burnt thirty transports which Antony had left in the harbour; but having made an attempt on the town, was repulsed with loss.

Cæsar, on the opposite part, sensible of the interest which he had in bringing the war to a speedy decision, advanced upon Pompey, forced a place of some strength that covered his front, and encamped in his presence. The day after he arrived in this position, either to bring on a general action, or to gain the reputation of having braved his antagonist, he formed his army on the plain between the two camps; but as Pompey continued firm or unmoved by this insult, and as the recent losses which Cæsar had sustained in his shipping, and on the coast, rendered his prospect of future supplies or reinforcements every day less secure, he projected a movement, by which he proposed either to force an engagement, or to preclude the enemy from all his resources in the town and harbour of Dyrrachium.

For this purpose, and that Pompey might the less suspect any important design, he decamped in  
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the day, when having a large circuit to make, he at first took a route, which led away from Dyrrachium, and was thought to retire for want of provisions; but having wheeled in the night, he directed his march with the utmost speed to the town. Pompey having intelligence of the change which Cæsar had made in his route during the night, perceived his design; and having a nearer way to Dyrrachium, still expected by a rapid march to arrive before him. But Cæsar having prevailed on his men, notwithstanding the great fatigues of the preceding day, to continue their march with little interruption all night, although he could not enter the town, which was fortified against him, was in possession of the only avenue which led to it, when the van of Pompey's army appeared on the hills.

Pompey thus shut out from Dyrrachium, where he had placed his magazines and stores, and from the only harbour he had on the coast, had recourse to the Petra, a small promontory which covered a little creek or bay not far from the town, and there endeavoured to supply the loss of the principal harbour, by bringing ships of burden to unload, and by procuring supplies in boats from his magazines and stores in the town; and in this manner was still in condition to avoid any immediate risk of his fortunes by the chance of a battle.

Cæsar, on the other hand, being disappointed in the design he had formed to exclude the enemy altogether from their magazines in the town of Dyrrachium, and seeing no likelihood of being able to bring the war to a speedy decision, his own communication

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munication with Italy being entirely cut off, and the fleets he had ordered from thence, from Sicily, and from Gaul, having met with unexpected delays, sent an officer, named L. Canuleius, into Epirus, with a commission to draw into magazines all the corn that could be found in that or the neighbouring districts, and to secure them at proper places for the use of his army. This, however, in a country that was mountainous and barren, itself commonly supplied with corn from abroad, and lately on purpose laid waste by the enemy, was not likely to furnish him with any considerable supply, or to enable him for any time to support a dilatory war. His genius was therefore at work, by some speedier course, to harass his enemy, or to hasten the contest to an end.

In these circumstances, however, he did not neglect his usual artifices to amuse and distract his antagonists with great professions of moderation, and with overtures of peace. On hearing of Scipio's arrival in Europe, affecting to have despaired of obtaining a treaty by any further direct applications to Pompey himself, and willing to appeal to the reason of the father-in-law against the obstinacy of the son, he sent Clodius, a supposed common friend, with letters and instructions, to inform Scipio of the great pains he had taken to obtain an equitable accommodation, " all which, he presumed, had hitherto failed, through the unhappy timidity of those he intrusted with his messages, who being persons of inferior rank under Pompey, had not the courage to deliver



“ them properly to their general. But subjoined  
 “ that, through the mediation of Scipio, who  
 “ could deliver himself with so much freedom;  
 “ who could advise with so much authority; and  
 “ who, being at the head of a great army attached  
 “ to his own person, could even enforce what was  
 “ just, he might expect a different issue to propo-  
 “ sitions so fair and so reasonable. And that in  
 “ this event Scipio would have the honour of be-  
 “ ing the restorer of tranquillity and good order  
 “ to Italy, of peace to the provinces, and of pro-  
 “ sperity to the whole empire.” Clodius was re-  
 ceived with respect; but on delivering his mes-  
 sage, it appears, that all further communication  
 was refused him as a person who came to insult  
 or amuse with false pretensions. Cæsar, indeed,  
 was himself, as usual, so far from trusting to the  
 effect of these propositions, or so far from remit-  
 ting his own operations in order to confirm his pa-  
 cific professions, that he even redoubled his efforts  
 in that very quarter which was intrusted to Scipio;  
 and as he had already possessed himself of Epirus,  
 Acarnania, and Ætolia, he carried his views still  
 farther on that side, and sent Fusius Calenus to be  
 joined by Longinus and Sabinus, and to endea-  
 vour, by the isthmus of Corinth, to penetrate into  
 Achaia.

He himself at the same time engaged in a pro-  
 ject, which to those who do not recollect the ama-  
 zing works which were frequently executed by  
 Roman armies, particularly by that of Cæsar him-

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self, will appear so vast, and even romantic, as to exceed belief: this project was no less than to invest Pompey in his camp, though at the head of an army superior to his own, and oblige him to recede from the coast, or submit to be invested with lines, and completely shut out from the country. For this purpose he occupied several hills in the neighbourhood of Pompey's station, strengthened them with forts, joined those forts by lines of communication across the vallies, and soon appeared to have projected a complete chain of redoubts, and a line of circumvallation.

Pompey, to counteract this daring project, took possession of some heights in his turn, fortified and joined them in the same manner, and while the one endeavoured to contract, the other endeavoured to enlarge, the compass of his works. The archers and slingers on both sides, as in the operations of a siege, were employed to annoy the workmen. The armies lay under arms, and fought in detail for the possession of advantageous grounds. When forced from one height which they attempted to occupy, they seized upon another that was contiguous, and still continued their line, though obliged to change its direction.

In these operations, a campaign, which was opened in January with the landing of Cæsar on the coast of Epirus, already drew on to the middle of summer, and both parties had undergone great labour, and were exposed to peculiar distress. Cæsar's army, already inured at the blockade of Alesia, and

and the sieges of Marseilles and of Avaricum, to toils like those in which they were now engaged, flattered themselves with a like glorious issue to their present labours. They were in want of bread, and obliged to substitute in its place a kind of root boiled up with milk; but were comforted under this hardship with the prospect of fields which were replenished with ripening corn, and which gave the hopes of a plentiful harvest. They not only continued their countervallations with incredible toil, but turned or interrupted all the rivulets or springs that formerly watered the grounds on which the enemy were now encamped.

Pompey's army, on their part, were less inured to such toilsome operations. They had plenty of bread, which came to them with every wind, from the different coasts that were still in their possession, but were in great distress for want of water and forage: many of their horses had died; the men, too long confined to the same ground, and to the same air, which was infected with filth, and the exhalation of putrid carcases, being reduced to the use of bad water, were become extremely sickly.

Pompey, nevertheless, held his enemy at some disadvantage by the superiority of his numbers, and by the extent of line which he obliged him to form and to defend; and it appears that he availed himself of these advantages with all those abilities of a great officer, which he was justly sup-

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posed to possess. He not only forced Cæsar, without hazarding a general action, to recede from many of the heights which he attempted to occupy, and obliged him, with great labour, to widen the compass of his lines; but likewise alarmed him by various attacks on the works which he had already completed, in some places forced open the bars which the enemy had placed in his way, and recovered his own communication anew with the country before him. But as Cæsar could present his whole army in many places to cover the works he was executing, it was impossible, without risking a general action, which Pompey avoided, entirely to stop his progress.

In the course of these operations it appears, from the text of Cæsar's Commentaries, though incomplete, that the armies changed the ground of their principal encampments as well as the disposition of some separate posts, and mutually harassed each other with frequent surprises and alarms. And Cæsar mentions no less than six capital actions which happened in one day at the lines of circumvallation, or under the walls of Dyrrachium; and in most of them it is probable that Pompey had the advantage, as he acted on the string, or smaller circumference, while his antagonists moved on the bow, or the wider circle.

Pompey completed his own line of circumvallation to a circuit of fifteen miles, having a chain of four-and-twenty redoubts on the different hills over which it was carried. By this work he obli-

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ged Cæſar to recede half a mile beyond him, and to extend his compaſs to above ſeventeen miles in circumference. CHAP.  
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The extremities of both their works terminated on the ſhore ; and Cæſar having no boats or ſhips to oppoſe to the numerous craft of his enemy, ought, perhaps, by the conſideration of this very circumſtance, to have been diverted at firſt from his project. But as he fought merely for occaſions of action, he was contented with the hopes of finding them even under ſuch diſadvantages. While he was obliged to remain with the ſtrength of his army at that end of his line which was neareſt the town of Dyrrachium, in order to prevent the acceſs of Pompey to his magazines, he propoſed to fortify the other extremity of it with double works, and had already thrown up, at the diſtance of two hundred yards from each other, two intrenchments, conſiſting of a parapet ten feet high, and of a ditch fifteen feet wide ; one facing the lines of Pompey, the other turned to the field, in order to guard againſt any ſurpriſe from parties which, coming by water, might land in his rear. He was likewiſe about to join theſe intrenchments by a tranſverſe or flank, to cover him from the ſea.

Before this tranſverſe was finiſhed, Pompey made a diſpoſition to force his way at the opening it was intended to cloſe, and of conſequence to take his enemy in the rear over the whole extent of his lines. For this purpoſe he brought in the night fix entire legions, or ſixty cohorts, to that part of his

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own works which faced this place. He embarked a numerous body of archers, slingers, and other light troops, having their helmets and shields fortified, as it seems was the custom, with basket-work, to break the force of the stones which were likely to shower from the enemy's parapets, and furnished with great quantities of fascines and other materials proper to fill up the ditch. This embarkation was effected in the night; and the officer who commanded it had orders to land part of the troops in the rear of both Cæsar's intrenchments, and another part in the space betwixt the two lines between them where the work was still incomplete. These separate divisions were to be supported by the whole force of the legions in front, who were to take advantage of any effect which the missiles from their boats might produce on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

These attacks were accordingly made at the dawn of day, in three different places at once, and had all the consequences of a complete surprise. They fell with the greatest effect upon the station of the ninth legion, of which the piquets and other guards being instantly routed, the whole legion was put under arms to support them; but soon infected with the panic, was carried off in the flight. Antony, who occupied the nearest station on the heights, appearing in that instant with twelve cohorts, and a better countenance, stopped for a while the pursuit of the enemy, and furnished a retreat to the troops who were routed.

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The alarm was conveyed to Cæsar himself, by fires lighted on all the hills, and he hastened to the ground with as many cohorts as could be spared from the posts in his way; but he came too late, Pompey had already forced the intrenchments, had burst from his confinement, and was beginning to encamp in a new position, where, without losing his communication with the sea, he rendered abortive for a long time Cæsar's purpose of excluding him from the supplies of necessaries or conveniencies which were to be derived from the land, and was now in a posture to command a free access to water and forage, from the want of which he had been chiefly distressed in his late situation.

Thus Cæsar, far from reaping the fruits which he expected from the labour of so many months, began to incur the censure of a visionary projector, who presumed to practise on the ablest captain of the age the arts with which he had succeeded against ignorant Barbarians, or, at most, against generals of mean capacity.

These circumstances, however, probably made not any impression on Cæsar himself, nor greatly altered the confidence of his army: he presented himself again before the enemy in their new position, and pitched his camp in their presence, still determined to act on the offensive, even in the sequel of attempts in which he had failed. An action accordingly followed, of which the result is evident, although it is difficult, from the imperfect

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text of his Commentaries to ascertain the detail. It appears that both armies had changed the ground which they had taken immediately after the last action; that in this remove Pompey had taken possession of the camp which Cæsar had left; and as his army, being more numerous, occupied more ground than that of Cæsar had done, he made a second intrenchment, quite round that which had been formerly occupied by Cæsar. This camp was covered by a wood on one side, and by a river, at the distance of four hundred paces, on the other.

While Pompey lay in this position, he had thrown up a line of communication from the flank of his camp to the river, in order to cover his access to water. But after he had taken this precaution, he thought proper to change his ground, and had moved about the distance of half a mile on his march to occupy a new situation, when, for some purpose that is not explained, he thought proper to send back a legion, or large detachment of his army, to resume the possession of the ground he had so recently left.

Cæsar, on his part, being occupied in fortifying a camp in the last situation he had taken, and observing this returning detachment from Pompey, thought it gave him a favourable opportunity, by cutting it off, to recover part of the credit he had lost in the late action. While, to amuse the enemy, he ordered his men to continue the work in which they were engaged, he himself marched with



twenty-three cohorts, in two divisions, under cover of the wood, came to the ground unobserved, and with the division which was led by himself, mixed with the enemy, who had already taken possession of the exterior lines, and drove them from thence to the interior intrenchment, with great slaughter. The other division being in the mean time to attack the same works at a different place, mistook the line of communication which covered the access from the camp to the river for the main intrenchment of the camp itself, and before they perceived their mistake, had run along this line to a great distance in search of an entrance ; when observing, at last, that the line along which they ran was not defended, the infantry went over it first, and were followed by all the cavalry : but the time which they had lost by their former mistake gave Pompey an opportunity to come to the relief of his detachment. As soon as he appeared, Cæsar's cavalry, finding themselves entangled between the line of communication, the intrenchment of the camp, and the river, began to retire with great precipitation, and were followed by the foot, who fell into great confusion. That part of Pompey's detachment, which, in the beginning of the action, had been defeated by Cæsar, seeing themselves likely to be supported, rallied in the rear-gate of the camp ; and the party which Cæsar himself commanded against them, observing the precipitant retreat of the other division, saw dangers and difficulties accumulating on every side. Imagin-  
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ing that they were about to be surrounded, or shut up within the enemy's works, they betook them to flight, crowded back to the ditch, and, in attempting to repass it, were killed in such heaps, or were trodden under foot in such numbers, that the slain filled up the ditch, and made a passage for those who followed.

In this state of general confusion and terror, the presence and authority of Cæsar, which, on other occasions, used to be of so great effect, were entirely disregarded. The bearer of a standard, upon Cæsar's catching it, and endeavouring to stop him, quitted his hold, and continued to run without it; a rider, whose horse he had seized by the bridle, dismounted, and ran off on foot. The rout was complete; but the ditches and works, amongst which the action began, as they embarrassed the flight of the one party, so they retarded the pursuit of the other; and Pompey, who did not expect such a victory, remained in suspense. He mistook the flight of Cæsar for a feint, to draw him into some ambuscade. In this he was governed, probably, by the high estimation for discipline and valour to which Cæsar's army was so justly entitled: but which no troops can uniformly support at all times: and if it be true, as is probable, that the flight of an army in actual rout may be always distinguished from a concerted retreat, he on this day committed an unpardonable error; and Cæsar, who may be inclined to exaggerate the oversights, though not the advantages, of his enemy,

my, owns that he himself lost about a thousand men, with above thirty standards or colours, and owed the preservation of his army to the excessive caution or incapacity of his enemy. He himself acted indeed like a person defeated, instantly abandoned all his famous lines of Dyrrachium, and all his outposts; and to make head against the victor, brought all the scattered parts of his army together.

Pompey, in the mean time, lost the opportunity, or was not sensible of his good fortune till after the time for improving it was past. But this victory, although it had not been perceived in the moment at which a signal advantage might have been made of it, was presently afterwards greatly exaggerated. Pompey had from his own army the usual salutations of triumph, or received the title of Imperator, which he continued in the usual form to assume, and sent his accounts of the action, by expresses, to every part of the empire; but had the moderation however to abstain from the practice which was common in the case of victories obtained over foreign enemies, that of binding his fasces and his dispatches with laurel.

Cæsar, by carrying the war into Macedonia, had put himself in a very arduous situation. He had passed over a sea on which the enemy were masters, and had invaded a country of which they were in possession, with forces greatly superior to his own: but this daring adventure, which, even in its first successes, excited astonishment, now exposed

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posed him to censure, and his attempt to invest so great an officer as Pompey, at the head of an army superior to his own, appeared altogether wild and extravagant. The merit of all his former campaigns, as is common upon reverses of fortune, began to be questioned by those who, after the event, can instruct and correct every general; and the glory he had gained in the former part of the war was entirely obscured. He was even said to have gained the Spanish army by corruption, and to have purchased with money the surrender which he pretended to have forced by his address and his sword. People returned to their first apprehensions, that Pompey was the greatest general which any age or nation had ever produced; that he had effectually put an end to the present contest, and had left nothing for his party to do but to reap the advantage of a victory he had obtained for them.

Some time before this event, and while the minds of men were yet in suspense, Cato, in one of the councils which had been summoned by Pompey, observed that Cæsar had acquired much popular favour by his ostentation of mercy, and by the hopes of protection which he held out to every man who did not actually take arms against him; while Pompey and his followers, by publishing threats against all who did not actually espouse their cause, had rendered the army of the republic an object of terror; he therefore moved, that a proclamation should be issued, containing assurances,



rances, that every town not actually in arms should be protected, and that no blood should be shed but in the field of battle. A resolution to this purpose had been accordingly published at that time <sup>1</sup>; but in the present exultation of victory was forgotten. The times were said to require exemplary justice, and to justify executions and forfeitures, not only of those who were actually in arms against their country, but of those likewise who had betrayed its cause by a mean and profligate neutrality. The favourites of Pompey already, in imagination, satisfied their revenge, and gratified their avarice, at the expence of the opposite party and of its abettors <sup>2</sup>. Every one considered the use which he himself was to make of the victory, not how it might be secured or rendered complete.

The shock which Cæsar had received in so critical a time and situation, was, not without reason, supposed to be decisive; he had abandoned his lines, and called in all his outposts. His army appeared to sink under the weight of their misfortunes. Inferior to the enemy in numbers, greatly reduced by their losses, and fallen in their own estimation, they were not soon likely to recover the courage required to contend for the field again with so renowned and so superior an adversary.

Cæsar, however, was not overwhelmed by these appearances; he knew what was the force of an army which had been taught, by the experience  
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<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 494.

<sup>2</sup> Cæsar. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 33.

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of many years, to repose the utmost confidence in themselves and in their general, and which was not likely to sink, without hopes of recovery, under any single event. He considered their apparent dejection as a symptom of indignation, and of rage, more than of fear or debasement; and, instead of blame or reproach, soothed them with consolation, and with the apologies which he industriously framed for their late miscarriage. He bid them recollect their former actions, and not be dismayed by a single accident which befel them in the midst of a career sustained with a spirit so much superior to that of any enemy they had ever encountered: "If fortune has crossed us for once," he said, "we must retrieve our losses by diligence and resolution. Difficulties only excite the brave, and awaken their ardour; you have formerly experienced difficulties, and every soldier who was with me at Gergovia will remember the effects of perseverance and courage."

He was sensible, however, that some particular officers had set a shameful example; and he supposed, that by singling out these for punishment, he might seem to exculpate the soldiers, and re-instate them in their own esteem. For this reason he dismissed, with infamy, some bearers of standards, who, he alleged, had mislaid the troops, whose object it is never to part from their colours. By these means the sullen dejection of the legions was changed into rage, and an ardent impatience

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to retrieve their honour<sup>1</sup>. They did not presume to importune their general to intrust them so soon again with his fortunes; but they imposed voluntary tasks, by way of penance, on themselves, saying, they deserved no better. Many of the superior officers gave it as their opinion to Cæsar, that whatever resolution he might have taken for the future plan of the war, so favourable a disposition in the army, and so fair an opportunity of yet ending the contest with honour on the very ground on which they had incurred their disgrace, should not be neglected, nor suffered to escape. Cæsar, however, could not be persuaded to stake his fortunes on the effect of a feverish ardour, which still had some mixture of consternation or dismay, nor to rely on a fury which had more of despair than of rational confidence, against the impetuosity of a superior enemy recently flushed with victory. Nor was he safe to remain in his present situation, without any posts in his rear to secure his communication with the country, and without any immediate prospect of supply for the subsistence of his army. For these reasons, he determined, without loss of time, to decamp and to remove to some distance from the enemy<sup>2</sup>. In the first night after this resolution was taken, and as soon as it was dark, the sick and wounded, with all the baggage, under the escort of a legion, were sent off, with orders that they should not halt till they reached Apollonia, being a march of about

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<sup>1</sup> Cæs. de Bel. Civ. lib. iij.<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

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thirty miles. At three in the morning, the main body of the army, observing a profound silence, turned out of the camp by different gates, and took the same route. Two legions yet remained for the rear-guard. These, after a proper interval, being ready to depart, sounded the usual march to make the enemy believe the van of the army was then only beginning to move, and the whole being thus already on their way, and without any incumbrance, they soon gained a considerable distance from those who were likely to pursue them.

Pompey, as soon as he was apprised of this retreat, drew forth his army, and followed with great expedition. After marching a few miles he overtook, with his cavalry, the rear of Cæsar's army at the passage of the river Genusus; but being received by the horse, interlined with infantry, made little impression, and saw them effect the passage of the river without any considerable loss.

Cæsar, having thus completed an ordinary march, took possession of the lines which he had formerly occupied at Asparagium; but not intending to remain in that station, gave orders to the legions only to rest on their arms. And, in order to deceive the enemy, sent forth his cavalry by the front gate in their fight, as if with intention to forage; but with orders to wheel under cover of some rising ground, and to re-enter the camp again on a different side, and to take post in the rear of the infantry, then about to resume the march. Pompey, supposing that the enemy's cavalry were actually



tually foraging, or from every appearance convinced that Cæsar had determined to halt for the night, and that the business of the day was over, followed his example, pitched in the same lines, which he likewise had formerly occupied at this place, and suffered his men to stray in search of forage and wood; many also who, in the hurry with which they decamped in the morning, had not time to make up their package, were now allowed to lay down their arms, and return to Dyrrachium in search of the effects they had left.

Cæsar, who waited only until the measures he had taken should so far mislead the enemy, again put his army in motion about noon, and without interruption, on the same day completed a second march of eight miles; while Pompey's army, having already laid aside their arms and encamped, were not in condition to follow. Cæsar having gained so much ground a-head of the enemy, continued his retreat during some of the subsequent days in the same order, having his baggage advanced some hours before him: and Pompey, having fallen so far behind by the delay of the first day, and having harassed his army in attempting to regain what he lost; on the fourth day, entirely discontinued the pursuit.

This respite gave to both parties some leisure to deliberate on the plan of their next operations. Cæsar continued his march to Apollonia, that he might lodge his sick and wounded, pay off the arrears of his army, and make a proper disposition

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for the security of the places he held on the coast. And having already one cohort at Lissus, placing three at Oricum, and four at Apollonia, he proceeded on his route from thence to the southward. He proposed, without delay, to penetrate into Thessaly, and to occupy, for the subsistence of his army, as much as he could of that fertile country. He flattered himself, that if Pompey should follow him thither, or remove to a distance from his own magazines and his supplies by sea, the war might be continued between them upon equal terms. If he attempted to retake Oricum and the towns on the coast, he must expose Scipio and the body under his command, in the eastern parts of Macedonia, to be separately attacked; or, if he wished to preserve Scipio and his army, he would be obliged to quit his design upon Oricum in order to support them. If he should pass into Italy, it was proposed to follow him by the coasts of Dalmatia. And this last alternative of carrying the war into Italy, from the difficulties, the delays, and the discredit to which it might have exposed Cæsar's cause, appears to have been the preferable choice for Pompey. It was accordingly debated in council, Whether, being master of the sea, and having abundance of shipping, he should not transport his army, regain the seats of government, and strip his antagonist of that authority which he derived from thence? or, whether he should not stay to finish the remains of the war in Macedonia? The advantages likely to result from his

return

return to Rome with the ensigns of triumph, after he had left it with some degree of disgrace, were obvious. But the war appeared so near to its end, that it was reckoned improper to leave any part of it unfinished. It was argued, that, by quitting the present seat of the war, Cæsar would be left to recover his forces in a country yet full of resources, and would only exchange the western part of the empire for the east, from whence Sylla had been able, and from whence Pompey himself was now about to recover the city and the possession of Italy.

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But, what weighed most of all in these deliberations, was the safety of Scipio which required the presence of Pompey in Macedonia. If the last should remove his army from thence, the former, with the forces recently arrived from Asia, would fall a sacrifice to the enemy.

Upon these motives Pompey, as well as Cæsar, having their several detachments, or separate bodies, to be sustained or rescued from the dangers with which they were threatened, determined to march into Thessaly, concerting their respective movements, so as to protect their own parties, or to cut off those of the enemy. Cæsar, by his march to Apollonia, had been turned from his way; and having the discredit of a defeat, or being supposed on his flight, was harassed or ill received by the country as he passed. The messengers, whom he had dispatched to Domitius, were intercepted; and

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this officer, while both armies were advancing, having made some movements in Macedonia in quest of provisions, and having, with the two legions he commanded, fallen into Pompey's route narrowly escaped, and only by a few hours, being surprised and taken.

Cæsar, having arrived in time to rescue Domitius, and being joined by him as he passed the mountains into Thessaly, continued his march to Gomphi. The people of this place having refused to open their gates, he scaled the walls, gave the town to be pillaged; and intending, by this example, to deter others from retarding his march by fruitless resistance, he put all the inhabitants to the sword. When he arrived at Metropolis, the people, terrified by the fate of Gomphi, received him as a friend; and Cæsar, to contrast this with the former example, gave them his protection. From hence to Larissa, where Scipio, having fallen back from the Haliacmon, then lay with a considerable army, the country was open, and Cæsar or his parties, were every where permitted to advance without opposition. Having passed all the lesser rivers which fall into the Penius, he took post on the Enipeus, which runs through the district of Pharsalia. Here he commanded extensive plains, covered with forage and with ripening corn; had a very fertile country to a great distance in his rear; and being joined not only by Domitius, but probably likewise by the legion which Longinus commanded in Ætolia, in all a mounting



mounting to ten legions, he was in condition to renew his offensive operations.

Pompey, at the same time, directed his motions likewise towards the same quarter; but although he had the more direct route, and was every where received as victor in the late action, was still on his march. Scipio had advanced from Larissa to receive him; and being joined, they took post together on a height near the village of Pharsalus, and in sight of Cæsar's station, at the distance of no more than thirty stadia, or about three miles<sup>1</sup>. The armies being some time fixed in this position, Cæsar drew forth, in the front of his intrenchment, to provoke his antagonist. It was evidently not the interest of Pompey to give an enemy, whom he had brought into considerable straits, an opportunity of relief by the chance of a battle. But as this was a defiance, and had some effect on the minds of the soldiers, it was proper to return it; and both sides, during many days, continued to turn out in the front of their respective lines. Cæsar advanced, on each successive day, still nearer to Pompey's ground; but there were some difficulties in the way of his farther approach, in which he was unwilling to engage himself in the presence of an enemy, nor was Pompey inclined to quit the eminence on which he had hitherto formed his line of battle.

The summer being far spent, and much of the forage and corn of the neighbouring plains being consumed, Cæsar began again to suffer for want of pro-

<sup>1</sup> Appian, de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

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visions, and having no hopes of bringing the enemy to a battle on this ground, he determined to change it, for some situation in which he could more easily subsist his own army, or by moving about, harass the enemy with continual marches, and oblige them perhaps to give him an opportunity to fight them on equal terms. Having resolved on this plan, and having appointed a day on which the army should move, the tents being already struck, and the signal to march given, while the van was passing through the rear-gate of the camp, it was observed, that Pompey's army, being formed according to their daily practice, had advanced farther than usual in the front of their lines. Cæsar immediately gave orders to halt, saying to those who were near him, "The time we have so earnestly wished for is come; now let it be seen how we are to acquit ourselves." He immediately ordered, as a signal of battle, a purple ensign to be hoisted on a lance, at the place where his own tent had been recently struck<sup>1</sup>. Appian says, That he likewise ordered the pales to be drawn, and the breast-work to be levelled in the front of his camp, or towards the enemy, that his army might not hope for a retreat, nor have any intrenchments within which to retire<sup>2</sup>;

It was evidently Pompey's interest to avoid a battle, and to wait for the effect of the distresses to which Cæsar's army must have been exposed on the approach of winter. But this is the most difficult

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Vita Pompei.

<sup>2</sup> Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

ficult part in war, requiring great ability in the general, together with unalterable courage and discipline in the troops. A commander may be qualified to fight a battle, but not dextrously to avoid an antagonist who presses upon him; an army may have that species of courage which impels them in action, but not that degree of steadiness or constancy which is required to support them long unemployed in the presence of an enemy. In whatever degree Pompey himself was qualified for the part which the service required of him, he was attended by numbers of Senators and persons of high rank, who, thinking themselves in a civil or political capacity, equal with their general, bore the continuance of their military subordination with pain. They said, he was like Agamemnon among the kings, and protracted a war that might have been ended in a day, merely to enjoy his command. Nursed in luxury, and averse to business, petulant in safety, useless in danger, impatient to be at their villas in the country, and their amusements in the town; and anticipating the honours and succession to office which they imagined due to their rank and their merits in the present service, they railed at the conduct of their leader, affected courage by urging him to fight, whilst in reality they only wished to terminate the suspense and anxiety of a campaign, which they had not the resolution to endure. Many of the allies, then also present in the army, who were princes of high state in their own dominions, were impatient of so much

C. H. A. P. much delay ; and the troops of every denomina-  
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 loud in their censures of a caution which they  
 thought themselves in condition to dispense with.

Poinpey, thus urged by the clamours of his army, felt himself under a necessity of coming to a speedy decision, and had prepared for action on the morning of that very day on which Cæsar was about to decamp. Although he was sensible, that, in this conjuncture, it was not his interest to hazard a battle, it is probable, that he did not think the risk was great. He too, as well as others of his party, had become elated and confident upon his late success<sup>1</sup>. His numbers greatly surpassed those of Cæsar, especially in horse, archers, and slingers ; and he trusted, that, by this part of his army, he should prevail on the wings, and carry his attack to the flank, and even to the rear of the enemy. Having the Enipeus, a small river with steep banks, on his right, which sufficiently covered one of his flanks<sup>2</sup>, he drew all the cavalry, amounting to seven thousand, with the archers and slingers to his left, expecting that the event of the battle would be determined on this wing. He himself, therefore, took post to second the operations of the cavalry, still keeping under his immediate view the two famous legions which he had called off from Cæsar at the beginning of the war. Scipio was posted in the centre, with the legions from Syria, having the great body of the infantry

<sup>1</sup> Cic. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. iii.

<sup>2</sup> Appian. de Bello. Civ. lib. iii.



infantry divided on his right and his left. The right of the whole was covered by a Cilician legion, and the remains of the Spanish army which had joined Pompey under Afranius. The whole amounted to one hundred cohorts, or about forty-five thousand foot, drawn up in a line of ten men deep <sup>1</sup>.

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Cæsar, observing this disposition, formed his army in three divisions; the left was commanded by Antony, the right by Sylla, and the centre by Cn. Domitius. The tenth legion was posted on the right, and the ninth on the left of the whole. He had eighty cohorts in the field; but these so incomplete, as not to exceed above twenty-two thousand men. He saw the disparity of his cavalry and irregulars on the right, having no more than a thousand horse to oppose to seven thousand of the enemy. But in order to reinforce and support them, he draughted a cohort from each of the legions on the right to form a reserve, which he placed in the rear of his cavalry, with orders to sustain them, or to repel the enemy's horse, when they should attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. This body formed a fourth division of his army, not placed in the same line with the other divisions; but facing obliquely to the right, in order to receive the cavalry that was destined to turn upon that side, and instead of a flank to present them with a front which they did not expect. He passed along the lines of his right, and earnestly entreated them

<sup>1</sup> Frontinus de Stratagematis. N. B. This is the only instance in which the depth of the Roman column or line is mentioned.

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them not to engage till they got the signal from himself. He reminded them of his continual attention to the welfare of his men, desiring them to recollect with what solicitude he had endeavoured to bring on a treaty, in order to save both armies to the republic; and how far he had always been from any disposition wantonly to shed the soldiers blood. He was answered with shouts that expressed an impatience to begin the action. Pompey had directed the cavalry and archers assembled on his left to begin the attack; and instructed them, as soon as they had driven Cæsar's horse from the plain, to fall upon the flank and the rear of his infantry.

These dispositions being completed, a solemn pause and an interval of silence ensued. The same arms, and the same appearances presented themselves on the opposite sides. When the trumpets gave the signal to advance, the sounds were the same; many are said to have shed tears<sup>1</sup>. Being so near, that they had only space enough in which to acquire that rapid motion with which they commonly shocked, Cæsar's army began to rush forward, while Pompey's, agreeably to orders he had given them, remained in their places, expecting that the enemy, if they were made to run a double space in coming to the shock, would be disordered, or out of breath. But the veterans, in Cæsar's line, suspecting the intention of this unusual method of receiving an enemy, made a full stop; and, having drawn breath, came forward again with

<sup>1</sup> Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 53.

with the usual rapidity. They were received with perfect order, but not with that resistance and equal force which motion alone could give. The action became general near about the same time over the whole front. Pompey's horse, as was expected, in the first charge, put Cæsar's cavalry to rout, and, together with the archers and slingers, were hastening to turn the flank of the enemy. But as soon as they opened their view to the rear, being surprised at the sight of a regular body of infantry which was drawn up in firm order to oppose them, and the confusion into which they were thrown by the push and wheel they had made, disqualifying them to meet such an enemy, they instantly gave way; and although no one was in condition to pursue, fled to the heights. The archers and slingers, being thus deserted by the horse, were put to the sword. And Pompey's left, on which he expected the enemy could not resist him, being flanked by the cohorts who had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæsar, in order to increase the impression he had made, brought forward fresh troops to the front of his own line; and while his reserve turned upon the flank, made a general charge, which the enemy no longer endeavoured to withstand.

Pompey, on seeing the flight of his cavalry, an event he so little expected, either thought himself betrayed, or despairing of the day, put spurs to his horse, and returned into camp. As he entered the Prætorian gate, he called to the guards to stand  
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to their arms, and to provide for the worst. "I go the rounds," he said, "and visit the posts." It is likely that surprise and mortification had unsettled his mind. He retired to his tent in the greatest distress, and yet he awaited the issue. His army, in the mean time, being routed; fled in confusion through the lanes of their own encampment. It was noon, and the victors, as well as the vanquished, were greatly fatigued; but Cæsar seldom left any refuge to a flying enemy, not even behind their intrenchments. He ordered Pompey's lines to be stormed, met with some little resistance from the guards that were placed on the parapet, but soon prevailed. The rout and the carnage continued through the streets and the alleys of the camp, to the rear-gate and passages through which the vanquished were crowding to recover the fields, and from which, without any attempt to rally, they continued their flight to the neighbouring hills.

When Pompey's army drew forth to battle, their tents were left standing, as in full confidence of victory; and the plate, furniture, and equipage of the officers were still displayed, as if intended for show. Notwithstanding this circumstance, Cæsar had authority enough to restrain his troops<sup>2</sup> from plunder, and continued the pursuit. Seeing crowds of the vanquished had occupied a hill in the rear of

<sup>1</sup> Cass. de Bello Civile, lib. iii. c. 94.

<sup>2</sup> The spoils of an enemy were commonly secured by the Romans in a regular manner, to be equally divided.



of their late station, he made haste to surround them, and to cut off their farther retreat. But they themselves, having observed that the place was destitute of water, abandoned it before they could be prevented, and continued their flight. Cæsar having ordered part of the army to keep possession of the enemy's camp, another part to return to their own, he himself, with four legions, endeavoured to intercept those who continued to flee in their way to Larissa. He had the advantage of the ground; so that after a hasty march of six miles, he got before them; and, having thrown himself in their way, obliged them to halt. They took possession of a height over a stream of water, from which they hoped to be supplied. Night was fast approaching, and the pursuers were spent with fatigue; but Cæsar yet prevailed on his men to throw up some works to prevent the access of the enemy to the brooks; when overwhelmed with toil and distress, these remains of the vanquished army offered to capitulate; and while the treaty was under deliberation, many among them, who were Senators and persons of rank, withdrew in the night, or made their escape; the rest surrendered at discretion. Persons of distinction, who had been formerly prisoners, and experienced a clemency which was no longer necessary, were now put to death. Some, in a manner to be afterwards quoted, were spared at the intercession of their friends, to whom Cæsar permitted that each should save one of the prisoners.

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prisoners<sup>1</sup>. The private men took oaths of fidelity to the victor, and were enlisted in his army. Cæsar, having ordered such of his men, as had been on service all the night, to be relieved from his camp, he himself continued his march with a fresh body the same day to Larissa.

<sup>1</sup> Dio. Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 61.

END OF VOLUME THIRD.











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